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Right after the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was killed by a Mo-
roccan immigrant in 2004, surveys conducted in the Netherlands reflected a marked dete-
rioration of the image of Muslims in public opinion. A sign, put up at the site of crime, 
stated “Stop islamization of the Netherlands”. When asked about Muslims living in the 
Netherlands, forty per cent of polled Dutch people said that Muslims should not feel at 
home in the Netherlands anymore. The reactions were not just limited to verbal expres-
sions: A couple of mosques and Koran schools have been burned down in the aftermath of 
the murder. Evidently, a country otherwise known for its liberal attitudes towards immigra-
tion was shaken by an eruption of xenophobia. These specific events seem to be sympto-
matic for a trend that can be noticed in many Western European countries. People's stereo-
typic views about Muslims as being fanatic and violent seem to polarize with every single 
terrorist that makes it into the media. Comparably, the stereotype about immigrants as be-
ing prone to crime, is boosted by each crime report which mentions national affiliation. 
“A man is taking a walk in Central Park in New York . Suddenly he sees
a little girl being attacked by a pit bull dog. He runs over and starts
fighting with the dog. He succeeds in killing the dog and saving the 
girl's life. A policeman who was watching the scene walks over and
says:" You are a hero, tomorrow you can read it in all the newspapers:
"Brave New Yorker saves the life of little girl" The man says: - "But I 
am not a New Yorker!" The policeman answers, "Oh, then it will say in 
the newspapers in the morning: ‘Brave American saves life of little
girl’" “But I am not an American!" - says the man. "Oh, what are you 
then?" , asks the cop. The man says: - "I am a Saudi!" The next day the 
newspapers says: "Islamic extremist kills innocent American dog."
(Joke cited on www.islamictorrents.net) 
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The German Press Council states in the German Press Code (2006) that “there must 
be no discrimination against a person because of his/her sex, a disability or his/her mem-
bership of an ethnic, religious, social or national group.” This code has important implica-
tions for reports on crimes as further noted: “When reporting crimes, it is not permissible to 
refer to the suspect's religious, ethnic or other minority membership unless this information 
can be justified as being relevant to the readers' understanding of the incident. In particular, 
it must be borne in mind that such references could stir up prejudices against minorities.” 
Despite this explicit code, many news reports do mention the group membership of a perpe-
trator or suspect. Jäger and colleagues (Jäger, Cleve, Ruth, & Jäger, 1998) have analyzed 
1565 articles in the German media and counted that about half of them included specifica-
tions about suspects' national affiliation. The researchers just screened those reports that 
appeared in one of the large German newspapers or political magazines. Practice might dif-
fer even more from the guidelines of the press council if taking into account those news 
that are published on internet by non-professionals. 
The following news report, written by an user of the online magazine “Shortnews”, 
exemplifies this practice, and the report’s discussion in an online bulletin board demon-
strates how people might deal with such an information. The hobby-journalist states: “Two 
teenagers have been arrested in Munich for attempted murder of a taxi driver. A 16-year old 
Turkish and a 17-year-old German have attacked their victim in order to get money for 
drugs.” […] “40-times the young Turkish stabbed the taxi driver.” (Shortnews, 14.01.07; 
translated from German). Another user commented on this news in an online bulletin board 
(“Klamm-Forum”) the following way: „Who wonders ….again a Turkish involved... (I feel 
sorry for the normal Turkish, who also get this bad reputation falsely).” This user, on the 
one hand, regards the category Turkish as a good explanation for the deed, on the other 
hand, he is able to acknowledge that many Turkish might not be like this. This apparently 
contradictory reaction seems to be common as other comments reveal.  
A less dramatic example of a group member who might reflect badly on the image 
of her group was found in another online bulletin board (“PC-Freunde”). Some users were 
engaged in the discussion whether Paris Hilton lacks intelligence. This American celebrity 
proofed her profound geographical knowledge in a court case by locating London outside 
of Britain and stating that everybody in Europe speaks French. This news was commented 
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by several users with “typical blond” because it seems to fit the cultural stereotype of dumb 
blonde. A female user, who took part in the discussion group and who was obviously 
known by the other users to be blond as well, was immediately described as the exception 
that proves the rule. Is that what typically happens: Extreme, but yet stereotypic exemplars 
are regarded as representative for the group as a whole, whereas non-stereotypic exemplars 
are taken as an exception?  
The present dissertation can be characterized as phenomenon driven, since the basic 
research question developed upon the tragic events taking place in the Netherlands in 2004. 
In this case, obviously people have generalized from the behaviour of one extremist to a 
whole cultural group. Based on previous social psychological research, it was difficult to 
tell whether this reaction should be regarded as exceptional, comprehendible just by the 
outstanding emotionality of the incidents and by previous Islamist terrorist attacks, or 
whether stereotypes in general are susceptible to polarization. Hence, it was not my first 
aim to test a certain theoretical model, but to better understand the incidents of these devel-
opments. Nevertheless, it deemed necessary to translate the basic question into theoretical 
terms in order to develop assumptions based on previous research.  
Research dealing with stereotype change has focused on how stereotypic views of 
other groups can be altered by confronting observers with members of the group who do 
not confirm the stereotype (Rothbart & John, 1985). However, deviance from the stereo-
type has been seen as more valuable in one direction than in another. Because the ultimate 
goal is to improve inter-group relations, researchers' interest has focused on how moder-
ately positive group members would modify an otherwise problematic image of the group 
(incongruent relation). Unfortunately, as the above examples suggest, it does happen that 
people encounter deviant individuals who are in fact more negative than the average group 
member. What van Gogh's murder, the Turkish teenager, and Paris Hilton have in common 
is that their behaviours are deviating from what is expected, but still they are not opposed to 
the prevalent stereotypes. Their deviance from the stereotype is just a matter of degree, 
namely more extreme than expected. So far, researchers have mainly differentiated between 
congruent and incongruent exemplars (cf. chapter 3). The kind of exemplar this dissertation 
is dealing with will be called supercongruent hereinafter. I would like to stress that being 
incongruent or supercongruent is not just a matter of valence. You might think, for exam-
1. Introduction: You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen Them All… 10 
 
ple, of a Harvard professor winning the Nobel price: We would certainly expect all mem-
bers of the category “Harvard Professor” to be highly intelligent, but would we deem them 
all worthy of receiving this distinction? We have to acknowledge that there is more to our 
stereotypes than incongruent and congruent exemplars.  
We have little knowledge so far about the circumstances under which supercongru-
ent members of a group lead to a polarization of the stereotype and under which circum-
stances the stereotype remains unaffected because the exemplar is recognized as being quite 
extreme. In light of these extreme members, other category members might even appear 
quite moderate, and hence the stereotype might be attenuated. Stereotype change research 
remains largely silent regarding the influence of such supercongruent members. The present 
dissertation addresses the question whether exemplars who are more extreme than our ex-
pectations (supercongruent) have a different impact on stereotypes than exemplars that are 
deviating in the other direction (incongruent).  
The term change will be used in a broad sense within this dissertation: It comprises 
gradual change such as attenuation or polarization, as well as complete extinction or altera-
tion of a certain stereotype. Whether an individual has the power to change a stereotype 
largely depends upon a categorization decision, which means whether the exemplar is seen 
as a legitimate or illegitimate member of the group. Previous research has addressed the 
question when deviating group members are included or excluded from judgments about 
the group as a whole. Based on these findings, it might be possible to propose assumptions 
about how the direction of deviance might affect the decision whether to include or exclude 
an exemplar. By learning about the impact of supercongruent exemplars on stereotypes, it 
might be possible to interrupt a process of stereotype polarization.  
 The second chapter summarizes definitional issues about stereotypes, the third one 
outlines some assumptions about the nature of supercongruent and incongruent exemplars, 
and the fourth chapter resumes relevant theoretical models and previous research dealing 
with changing inter-group attitudes. The contact hypothesis, various models of stereotype 
change, the inclusion/exclusion model, and the accentuation theory, are outlined to answer 
the following questions: 1) what determines whether an exemplar will exert influence on 
the representation of a category, and 2) what are the possible kinds of influence. The fifth 
chapter treats the question of when an exemplar is perceived as typical for a group and 
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mainly summarizes assumptions of the self-categorization theory. The sixth, and final theo-
retical chapter, points to several implications of direction of deviance based on the previous 
research on stereotype change. Two basic hypotheses about the perception and impact of 
supercongruent exemplars will be established which were tested in the first four studies de-
scribed in chapter seven. Chapter eight and chapter nine deal with moderating variables to 
the basic effect, which means they are devoted to the question whether certain circum-
stances exist in which the basic effect identified in chapter seven does not occur. Learning 
about these circumstances should help to understand the underlying processes involved in 
the basic effect (chapter 8), and to develop possible attempts for intervention (chapter 9). 
I would like to stress again that a reader should bear in mind that the present disser-
tation is not aiming at testing a certain theoretical model but at understanding a certain phe-
nomenon which has not yet been the focus of research. In order to devise predictions, di-
verse lines of research will be presented in the theoretical chapter. To a certain extent, these 
lines of research can be contradicting and most of these contradictions will remain unre-
solved. 
2. Stereotypes: Cognitive Templates to Simplify Your Life 12 
2. Stereotypes: Cognitive Templates to Simplify Your Life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Muslims, teenagers, blondes, housewives, homosexuals – each label will trigger 
certain associations and expectations about the particular traits of group members. Social 
scientists as well as lay people refer to these expectations by the term ‘stereotype’. Targets 
of stereotyping might be social groups, whose membership is based on age, nationality, re-
ligious affiliation, taste of music, profession etc. However, not just social groups, also cate-
gories of objects can be the target of preformed expectations called stereotypes. We might 
expect wholefood products to be rather expensive and branded products to possess high 
quality. Although the usage of the term ‘stereotype’ seems to be self-explicatory, there are 
some questions that need to be addressed in order to clarify what is meant by ‘stereotype’ 
within this dissertation. The question of how stereotypes can be defined, how they are rep-
resented, and why they exist, will be briefly discussed because these issues might determine 
whether and under which conditions stereotypes are likely to change (Hilton & von Hippel, 
1996). Obviously, a detailed discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of the pre-
sent theoretical introduction (for a more detailed overview see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; 
Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Schneider, 2004).  
2.1 Stereotypes: How are They Defined? 
The term ,stereotype’ is rooted in the Greek words ,stereos' and ,typos'. ,Stereos’ 
can be translated with ‚rigid, constant, invariable’; ,typos' means ,pattern, type, imprint, 
trace, impression’. The journalist Walter Lippmann (1922) was the first within the social 
sciences to use the term in its present meaning. He employed the term stereotype to name 
“general cognitive structures that people tend to have because the real environment is alto-
gether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.” […] “We have to re-
construct it on a simpler model before we can manage it” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 16). Hence, 
“For the most part, we do not first see, and then define, we define
first and then see.” 
Lippmann (1922; p. 81)
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he assumed that people tend to use preformed pictures about the social environment in or-
der to simplify social perception. Lippmann regarded stereotypes as efficient in dealing 
with everyday life, but also pointed to the pitfall of ending up with a biased and erroneous 
picture of the world.  
Gordon W. Allport (1954) further elaborated the concept of stereotypes in his book 
“The Nature of Prejudice”. Allport defined the term stereotype as “an exaggerated belief 
associated with a category” (p. 187). This definition comprises two aspects: First, stereo-
types are category-based beliefs. We do not employ the term stereotype to refer to the be-
lief that John Cleese1 is funny. But we do use the term if someone holds the belief that all 
British are humorous. Second, stereotypes are exaggerated or false beliefs. Although cur-
rent definitions mostly do not include the notion of accuracy or exaggeration anymore, 
many of Allport's predictions have held up over the last fifty years.  
In the last four decades, stereotypes have been defined in many different ways 
within social psychology. Generally spoken, stereotypes are often regarded as the cognitive 
dimension of inter-group attitudes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981), while prejudice is concep-
tualized as the affective dimension. Definitions of stereotypes basically differ in regard to 
the assumed accuracy, to the question whether they are individual beliefs or whether they 
have to be culturally shared to qualify as a stereotype, to the question of valence, and level 
of comparison, meaning whether the attribute value is typically compared with that of other 
groups or with that of other attributes related to the same group. For example, stereotypes 
have been defined as “those generalizations about a class of people that distinguish that 
class from others” (McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980, p. 197; see also Campbell, 1967; Ford 
& Stangor, 1992). This definition emphasizes the aspect of differentiation as central to the 
conception of stereotypes and thereby renders stereotypes rather context dependent. Since 
this dissertation deals with the question whether the social context exerts influence on 
stereotypes, this definition is deemed important. However, it already carries heavy theoreti-
cal baggage. Presumably, not all stereotypes are to the same extent interrelated with other 
categories (Goldstone, 1996). Therefore, I would like to adopt a broader definition of 
stereotypes, one which constitutes the standard viewpoint within social cognition. Ashmore 
and Del Boca have defined stereotypes as “a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a 
                                                 
1 British comedian who is known for being one of the founding members of Monty Python.  
2. Stereotypes: Cognitive Templates to Simplify Your Life 14 
group of people” (1981, p. 16). This definition stays silent about all of the above mentioned 
issues. It shares with Allport's definition the scope on beliefs, meaning cognitive structures, 
and not affective reactions, but it does not narrow down the focus on false or exaggerated 
beliefs. Furthermore, it allows to incorporate negative as well as positive attributes. The 
target of the beliefs are social groups.  
2.2 Stereotypes: How are They Represented? 
One way of understanding stereotypes is to examine the nature of the cognitive 
structures on which they are based. As mentioned before, stereotypes are category-based 
beliefs. The question of how stereotypes are represented in memory corresponds to the 
question of how categories are represented. Roughly speaking, categories can be under-
stood as the outcome of a partitioning of our surrounding, for example, in social psycholo-
gists and clinical psychologists, or in social scientists and natural scientists. Typically, we 
do not treat every object as a single entity. The machine, for example, on which this disser-
tation is written can be described by brand and serial number, but it can also be referred to 
as a computer, and everyone will have some idea in mind, for example, that this machine is 
useful for data handling. Hence, category labels seem to be stored in memory together with 
some information about the features of category members.  
To date, four popular major social cognitive approaches exist which aim at clarify-
ing how categories are stored in memory: prototype models, exemplar-based models, asso-
ciative networks, and connectionist models (for a detailed overview see Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Smith, 1998; Smith & Queller, 2004). Most of the research dealing with stereotype 
change is either related to prototype - or exemplar-based models of stereotypes.2 Therefore, 
the gist of these two classes of models will be briefly covered below, while associative 
networks and connectionist models will not be elaborated on.  
Prototype models assume that knowledge of social categories is stored in memory in 
form of prototypes, which are conceptualized as abstract representations of the typical fea-
tures (Posner & Keele, 1968; 1970; Reed, 1972). Within the research on natural object 
categories, a prototype was defined by Rosch (1975, p. 193) as the “clearest case” or “best 
example” of a category, so, any real or hypothetical instance that is perceived the most typi-
                                                 
2 For an exception see Queller & Smith (2002). Their approach to stereotype change is based on a connection-
ist model.  
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cal. More specifically, prototypes were assumed to comprise average feature values (Me-
din, 1989; Smith & Medin, 1981). This implies that a mean or modal value of each feature 
is associated with the category. According to prototype-models, categorization, which 
means the decision to regard a certain stimuli as belonging to a certain category, is based on 
the similarity between an exemplar and the prototypes of alternative categories (Medin, 
1989). The similarity between an exemplar and the prototype of a certain category is also 
called, prototypicality, or goodness-of-fit of the exemplar.  
Furthermore, prototype-models assume that social categories are organized hierar-
chically (e.g., Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Maurer, Park, & 
Rothbart, 1995), existing of basic-level categories, subtypes, and subgroups. The term ba-
sic-level category describes the most commonly utilized classification (e.g., based on race, 
gender, or age). On a hierarchically lower level, subtypes were defined as comprising those 
people who disconfirm the stereotype, or to put it differently, who are the exceptions to the 
overall stereotype. Subgroups were conceptualized as being made up of people who mani-
fest the stereotype in a different way than people in other subgroups (see Medin, Lynch, & 
Solomon, 2000, Richards & Hewstone, 2001). The category “the elderly”, for example, 
might consist of such diverse subgroups, as “the grandmotherly type”, or “elder statesman”. 
As we will see later, these assumptions carry important implications for theorizing about 
stereotype change.  
Pure prototype-models rest on the assumption that one fixed prototype is stored in 
memory. The prototype should be the same no matter in which context a judgment is made, 
or to put it differently: This model does not allow for any context-sensitivity. However, if 
you try to think of the prototypical CDU politician, you might end up with a different pic-
ture dependent on whether you compare them with politicians of “DIE LINKE” or “NPD”. 
Quite some empirical evidence exists for the context sensitivity of prototypes (e.g., 
Corneille & Judd, 1999; Goldstone, 1996; Haslam et al., 1995; cf. chapter 5), which causes 
major problems for pure prototype models. 
Exemplar-based models stress the role of concrete instances (rather than general, 
abstract properties) in the mental representation of categories and actual experiences with 
category members are the substrate of the mental representation (Linville, Fischer, & Sa-
lovey, 1989; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Smith & Zárate, 1992). New information is classi-
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fied according to its similarity with stored exemplars. General information, such as the 
typical properties of a category, is computed at the time a judgment is needed by retrieving 
the representation of multiple individual exemplars from memory3. Which exemplars will 
be included in the computation depends on their accessibility.  
Most of the exemplar-based models and the prototype models basically differ on the 
issue when prototype abstraction occurs: either at the time of initial encounters with mem-
bers of the category (prototype-based) or at the time when information is retrieved from 
memory in order to come up with a judgment (exemplar-based) (e.g., Linville & Fischer, 
1993). Nowadays, pure prototype- or exemplar-based models are not very popular. Most 
researchers within social psychology allude to one of the hybrid versions of the two, which 
assume that a stereotype representation contains a mix of both, exemplars along with ab-
stract knowledge (Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Hastie, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981; Smith 
& Zárate, 1990). Some researchers argued that prototype-based representations might be 
strongest for those categories, with which people have little experience, but yet strong ex-
pectancies. These expectancies could be, for example, based on cultural socialization 
(Smith & Zárate, 1990). Exemplar-based representations, on the contrary, were suggested 
to dominate when beliefs about a social category are not yet very developed and when sin-
gle exemplars are highly accessible within memory (see Higgins, 1996). 
So far, it has been stated that categories are either represented by single exemplars, 
by average feature values (prototype), or that they contain both. During the last two dec-
ades, however, several researchers from both traditions claimed that representations do also 
comprise perceived variability (Hamburger, 1994; Linville et al., 1989; Judd, Ryan, & 
Park, 1991). Perceived variability can be defined as “the extent to which category members 
are viewed as being widely dispersed about the mean of the attribute (Linville et al., 1989, 
p. 165).  
Clearly, all these models lead to different conclusions about the rigidity or sensitiv-
ity of stereotypes to change and about the specific aspects of a stereotype that are likely to 
change (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). According to pure prototype models, stereotypes are 
insulated from change by the formation of subtypes leading to a rather rigid view of stereo-
                                                 
3 Not all exemplar-based models do allow for the computation of general information (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). 
But because these models have difficulties to account for the formation of group stereotypes, they will not be 
considered here.  
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types (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992, cf. chapter 4.1). According to exemplar-based 
models, stereotypes should be rather context sensitive as the judgment is created on the spot 
and thereby influenced by salient exemplars (e.g., Schwarz & Bless, 1992, cf. chapter 4.2). 
A rather heterogeneous group of researchers (some allude to prototype models, others to 
exemplar models) assumes that the variability components of stereotypes do change, 
whereas other aspects remain stable (e.g., Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; Hamburger, 
1994; Paolini, Hewstone, Rubin, & Pay, 2004). The topic of stereotype change will be cov-
ered in more detail in chapter 4.  
2.3 Stereotypes: Why do They Exist? 
Why do people hold and utilize stereotypes? Although it is not the scope of this dis-
sertation to discuss in detail the different functions of stereotypes, the general pattern that 
emerges from this literature is worth noting, especially as it relates to stereotype change 
(for an overview see Snyder & Miene, 1994). What Lippman (1922) has already assumed 
by describing stereotypes as efficient has been demonstrated more than seventy years later 
within social cognition research. Macrae and colleagues have shown in a dual-task para-
digm that stereotypes help to save cognitive capacity (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen; 
1994), and Bodenhausen has demonstrated that we use stereotypes especially when we are 
tired and lack cognitive resources (Bodenhausen, 1990). Stereotypes seem to serve as quick 
and easy heuristics (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). Besides making information processing 
easier, further purposes were suggested to be served by stereotypes, for example justifica-
tion of the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This utility account of stereotypes has two im-
portant implications. Firstly, stereotypes should be based on attributes that differentiate 
groups from each other in order to fulfil their simplifying function or to justify social hier-
archies (see Ford & Stangor, 1992; McCauley & Stitt, 1978). The second implication is 
more directly related to the topic of change: Given the important functions stereotypes 
seem to serve, they should be valuable to people and they might be reluctant to give them 
up even when facing contradictory evidence.  
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2.4 Summary 
Stereotypes were defined as a set of beliefs about the personal characteristics of a 
group of people. Some researchers pointed to the differentiating nature of stereotypes, 
which means that a stereotype is likely to consist of such attributes that distinguish the tar-
get category from other categories. Stereotypes were argued to be represented either in an 
abstract fashion by prototypes, or consist of concrete instances, such as exemplars, or com-
prise both. Representations of social categories were furthermore argued to include vari-
ability information. As a matter of fact, pure exemplar- or prototype-based models are be-
coming more and more uncommon, but still they have influenced diverse theories about 
stereotype change. It has been demonstrated that stereotypes fulfil important functions, 
such as simplification or justification, which should render them rather valuable. As stated 
before, these basic issues regarding stereotypes might determine when and how stereotypes 
change. A more detailed discussion of factors influencing stereotype change will follow 
within chapter 4. But first I would like to depict diverse relations between exemplar and 
category in order to introduce more solidly the concept of supercongruent exemplars. 
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3. Exemplar-Category-Relations I: Supercongruent vs. Incon-
gruent 
Shirin Ebadi, awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003, and Mohammed Atta, 
one of the five hijackers to crash the first plane into the World Trade Center in 2001, are 
both members of the category ‘Muslims’, but obviously, both relate quite differently to the 
stereotype of this category.  
One of the central factors characterizing the relationship between an exemplar and a 
category is the congruency of the exemplar with the stereotypical expectations. Is the ex-
emplar in line with our expectations for the group or does it deviate? Accordingly, re-
searchers have typically differentiated between a congruent and an incongruent relation-
ship. Yet, there is some ambiguity about the meaning of incongruency. Some researchers 
have conceptualized incongruency as the opposite of the stereotype (e.g., O'Sullivan & 
Durso, 1984), others have described it as being typical for another, contrasting category 
(e.g., Brewer et al., 1981). Brewer and colleagues, for example, used items that were de-
scriptive of the category “young people” (e.g., has a lot of nervous energy) as incongruent 
stimuli for the category “elderly”.4 
As mentioned before, stereotypes are supposed to consist of average feature values 
(Medin, 1989; Smith & Medin, 1981), which are either stored in the form of a prototype or 
computed at the time of judgment by averaging the accessible exemplars. People should 
have an idea about the extent to that members of a category possess a certain trait. This as-
sumption has important implications for the relationship between categories and exemplars 
because it allows for the possibility of another kind of deviance besides incongruency: Ex-
emplars could deviate in the direction of the stereotype by being even more extreme than 
one would have expected. 
Returning to the above example: If we focus on the stereotype of Muslims as being 
fundamentalist and fanatic, then Shirin Ebadi certainly is not in line with the category. She 
is what has been called incongruent to the category's stereotype. Mohammed Atta, although 
                                                 
4 In many but probably not in all circumstances it will be the same attributes that are opposite of the stereo-
type and typical for another contrasting group. One example of a stereotypic attribute for the contrasting cate-
gory “young people” in Brewer and colleagues’ study (1981) was “fusses over her appearance”. Yet, the op-
posite of this attribute was not part of the stereotype of “the elderly” as described within that study.  
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most people probably would attribute fundamentalism and fanaticism to him, is such an 
extreme exemplar that his fit with the stereotype becomes questionable as well. The present 
dissertation addresses the impact of this second type of exemplars, which I will refer to as 
supercongruent. 
Supercongruent and incongruent exemplars differ in several important ways. Firstly, 
even if you imagine a supercongruent and an incongruent exemplar sharing exactly the 
same amount of objective deviance from a category's prototype5, the deviance from super-
congruent exemplars to the prototype should be perceived more as a quantitative deviance, 
while the deviance from an incongruent exemplar to the prototype is quite likely to be per-
ceived as qualitative in nature. Supercongruent exemplar and prototype share the same at-
tribute, they just differ in extremity. Incongruent exemplars, on the other hand, most proba-
bly do not possess the attribute in question. For example, if we hold the belief that members 
of a certain group are rather intelligent, then supercongruent exemplars would probably be 
described as highly intelligent (possess the same attribute), whereas incongruent exemplars 
either might not be describable by the attribute intelligent because it is not characteristic for 
them, or they might be even described as unintelligent, simple-minded, or ignorant (do not 
possess the same attribute).  
Two further differences between these two kinds of exemplars are based on the no-
tion that stereotypes are differentiating in nature. As mentioned before, several theorists 
included in their definition of stereotypes a differentiation between a certain category from 
other categories (e.g., McCauley et al., 1980, Campbell, 1967; Ford & Stangor, 1992). Ac-
cordingly, theorists have described incongruency as being typical of another group (e.g., 
Brewer et al., 1981). Given that supercongruent exemplars were conceptualized as those 
exemplars that deviate in direction of the stereotype, they can be understood as deviating 
away from the prototype in the opposite direction as relevant comparison categories. This 
leads to one of the central distinctions between the two kinds of deviance: Incongruent ex-
emplars, if they are taken as representative members of the category, decrease the distinct-
iveness between two groups, whereas supercongruent ones increase it.  
                                                 
5 The usage of the term prototype within this dissertation does not necessarily imply that the prototype is 
stored in memory, it could be also estimated at the time of judgment by averaging the accessible exemplars.  
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Included in the notion of differentiation is the fact that for an attribute to qualify as 
stereotypic for a certain category, the category has to be somehow pronounced on that at-
tribute in comparison with some other categories (e.g., McCauley & Stitt, 1978). Because a 
supercongruent exemplar is deviating in the direction of the stereotype, whereas an incon-
gruent exemplar differs in direction of some comparison category, they might differ in ex-
tremity. Supercongruent exemplars differ more from the grand mean of all available or sali-
ent stimuli, while incongruent exemplars with the same amount of deviance from the proto-
type are more likely to be rather pale.  
To make the point, incongruent and supercongruent exemplars with the same 
amount of objective deviance from the prototype might differ in respect to 1) the perceived 
character of the deviance (quantitative vs. qualitative), 2) the direction of deviance in rela-
tion to comparison categories (away from comparison category or in direction of compari-
son category), and 3) their extremity. Based on these differences, several assumptions will 
be made in chapter 6, concerning the impact of supercongruent exemplars on a group's 
stereotype. First, however, I will summarize different models which address stereotype 
change, such as the contact hypothesis, models of stereotype change, the inclu-
sion/exclusion model, and the accentuation theory. 
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4. Models of Change 
 What impact does an encounter with a single group member have on the general 
belief we hold about the group? While we know much already about the impact of incon-
gruent exemplars, knowledge is rather scarce in respect to supercongruent exemplars. In 
order to derive assumptions about the impact of supercongruent exemplars, it deems neces-
sary to take a closer look at previous research dealing with stereotype change. In the present 
chapter, I will outline various models that address the following questions: 1) what are the 
antecedents determining whether an exemplar will or will not exert influence on the overall 
judgment, 2) what are the potential kinds of influence, and 3) given that exemplars do in-
fluence the overall judgment, what determines the size of this influence? Before going into 
detail, the contact hypothesis will briefly be summarized, as it is the first and most promi-
nent theory for answering the question of whether a single group member may impact the 
image of a social category. 
After World War II, researchers within the social sciences began to stress the role of 
contact in prejudice reduction (e.g., Allport, 1954; Newcomb, 1947). The idea is based on 
the assumption that prejudice largely stems from ignorance. Accordingly, a rather problem-
atic image of a group can be altered by bringing people into contact with single members of 
the category to overcome this ignorance. This “encounter” does not have to be direct. 
Rothbart and John (1985) have mentioned as an alternative source of belief change indirect 
“atmospheric” effects, which could be due to media portrayals for example. Hence, first-
hand contact or reports, which indicate that our attitudes towards a certain category are bi-
ased, were assumed to convince us to correct our attitudes.  
Results to the question of whether a contact experience has the potential to improve 
inter-group relations are highly diverging. Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) have argued and 
demonstrated that this inconsistency is largely due to the fact that researchers have focused 
on different outcomes which bear different patterns of relationship with contact (for similar 
results see Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Bachelor, 2003). Those researchers who concentrated on 
affective dimensions of inter-group attitudes, namely prejudice, have painted a more posi-
tive picture of the susceptibility to change, while researchers focusing on the cognitive di-
mension have been more sceptical (see Rothbart, 1996). Because the focus of this disserta-
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tion lies on the cognitive aspects of inter-group attitudes (stereotypes), I will turn now to 
research dealing with contact effects on this cognitive aspects.  
The rather optimistic view emanating from contact theory was damped by findings 
of stereotype change research. Rothbart and John (1985) proposed a two-step model in their 
cognitive analysis of the effects of inter-group contact: First, the inter-group contact must 
provide clear evidence that disconfirms the stereotype, and second, this experience must 
become associated with the category. The first precondition is facilitated through personal-
ized contact, as the stereotype will be salient and guide the interpretation of the person's 
behavior during group-based contact. Ambiguous behavior will be interpreted in light of 
the stereotype (Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993). However, for the second step to take 
place, the person has to be categorized as a group member. Hence, categorization lies at the 
heart of this process. Categorization can be defined as “the process of understanding what 
some thing is by knowing what other things it is equivalent to and what other things it is 
different from” (McGarty, 1999, p. 1). Rothbart and John (1985) have pointed to the fact 
that category membership is not fixed, but variable. Many factors influence where the 
group boundaries are drawn. According to this model, a trade-off between individualized 
and group-based contact somehow has to be established.  
Several theories, which can be summarized as consistency theories (see Abelson, 
1983), draw similar predictions about the various possibilities of how people deal with in-
consistent cognitions. We can understand the encounter with an incongruent, or more gen-
erally, with a deviating exemplar of a social category as a contradiction within our cogni-
tive system. This state of mind is assumed to be experienced as unpleasant and people 
should strive to resolve the inconsistency by reorganizing their cognitions (Festinger, 1957; 
Heider, 1946). An example: Most people in our society hold the stereotype of professors as 
being intelligent. Imagine, meeting a certain professor, Professor X, who happens to behave 
in a rather unintelligent manner. This experience should constitute a contradiction within 
the cognitive system.  
Basically, we have three possibilities how to deal with information that contradicts 
our beliefs: 1) We can make the information fit our beliefs, for example, by carrying out 
suitable attributions (e.g., it is due to lack of motivation that Professor X behaves in an un-
intelligent manner), or 2) we can regard the information and the belief as two distinct in-
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stances which have very little in common by excluding the exemplar from the category 
(e.g., Professor X is not a “real” professor since he is professor in a conservatory), or 3) we 
make the belief fit the information by a process of belief change (e.g., professors are not 
that intelligent)6. The following paragraphs will be especially concerned with the last two 
possibilities (for the role of attributions in stereotype maintenance see e.g., Hewstone, 
1990).  
All models addressing stereotype change in one way or another deal with the ques-
tion of categorization: When is an inconsistent exemplar categorized as a member of the 
stereotyped group? And what is the impact of the categorization process for the judgment 
about the group and the exemplar? To date, four major classes of models have been pro-
posed, which address the question of how stereotypic views are revised: the bookkeeping 
model, the conversion model, the subtyping model, and exemplar-based models (see Hilton 
& von Hippel, 1996). While the first three models especially emphasize the antecedents of 
categorization, the last class of models focuses more on the outcomes of categorization.  
4.1 Antecedents of Categorization  
According to the bookkeeping model, stereotypes change incrementally. Every piece 
of disconfirming information leads to a gradual, minor modification of the stereotype, 
which was referred to as “fine-tuning” (Rothbart, 1981). The conversion model assumes 
that stereotypes change in an all-or-non fashion (Rothbart, 1981). Incongruent information 
does not affect the stereotype until a certain threshold is reached. After crossing the thresh-
old, a critical reevaluation of the stereotype will take place leading to radical change. Minor 
disconfirming exemplars have no effect. The subtyping model, which is clearly based on a 
prototype representation of social categories, states that the impact of disconfirming infor-
mation depends on the structure of the information: Highly incongruent exemplars are very 
likely to be viewed as an untypical exception and will be set aside. Hence, the overall 
stereotype is not affected. Moderately incongruent information, on the other hand, is as-
sumed to have some minor impact on the stereotype (Brewer et al., 1981; Weber & 
Crocker, 1983).  
                                                 
6 These are the major possibilities. However, there are also others, for example stereotype maintenance 
through compensation (Seta, Seta, & McElroy, 2003).  
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In order to test the three models researchers have varied the extremity of the exem-
plar information and either concentrated the disconfirming information on a few exemplars 
or dispersed it over several members so that every exemplar is just moderately deviant 
(e.g., Weber & Crocker, 1983). Most of the studies have shown support for the subtyping 
model of stereotypes, which means that stereotypes change less in the concentrated than in 
the dispersed condition (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Johnston, Hewstone, Pendry, & 
Frankish, 1994; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 1983). As a matter of fact, dis-
confirming exemplars commonly do not affect the stereotype and the process of mentally 
fencing-off the disconfirming exemplar has been called subtyping. Subtyping was defined 
“as the process by that exemplars who disconfirm, or are at odds with, the group stereotype 
are mentally clustered together and essentially set aside as exceptions that prove the rule” 
(Maurer et al., 1995, p. 812). Subtyping can be understood as a change in the cognitive rep-
resentation of the category, by which it becomes more differentiated.  
Departing from this result, and based on the notion that most outgroup stereotypes 
are rather negative, researcher were subsequently interested in finding ways of how people 
can be prevented from subtyping disconfirming information and how change can be facili-
tated instead (e.g., Hewstone, Hassebrauck, Wirth, & Wänke, 2000; Kunda & Oleson, 
1995, 1997; Richards & Hewstone, 2001; Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999). This focus de-
veloped since researchers concentrated on stereotype incongruent information.  
Goodness-of-fit (perceived typicality) between the exemplar and the category has 
proven to be one of the major criteria determining whether the attributes of an exemplar 
will modify the category attributes or not. Perceivers who consider the disconfirming out-
group member as an atypical exemplar change their stereotype less than those who perceive 
the deviant member to be a typical exemplar of the group (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 
1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 
1984). Weber and Crocker (1983), for example, paired disconfirming information about 
lawyers (e.g., wearing ill-fitting clothes) either with typical instances of the category (e.g., 
described as rich, white, married), or with atypical instances (e.g., black, single, poor). Sub-
jects' beliefs were more likely to be affected when the disconfirming exemplars possessed 
other attributes that rendered them typical. Goodness-of-fit between an exemplar and a 
category has been manipulated in diverse ways: 1) by varying the amount of stereotypic 
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dimensions on which the exemplar is disconfirming (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; 
Weber & Crocker, 1983; Wilder, 1984), 2) by varying the extremity of deviance (e.g., 
Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Wyer, Sadler, & Judd, 2002), or 3) by context, namely task instruc-
tions (e.g., Bless & Wänke, 2000).  
To make the point, various paradigms all led to the same conclusion of perceived 
typicality as a main determinant of the impact of one exemplar on the judgment about the 
category7. The same conclusion was drawn by researchers within the inclusion/exclusion 
model, although they called it “feature-overlap” (Bless, Schwarz, Bodenhausen, & Thiel, 
2001; Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Authors of the inclusion/exclusion model were arguing for 
the assignment of the exemplar to the category (inclusion) as the default reaction, unless the 
exemplar is not highly atypical (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Because exclusion was assumed 
to require extra processing steps, assimilation was argued to be especially likely to occur, 
whenever processing motivation and /or cognitive capacity are low. This parallels the find-
ing of stereotype change research that subtyping processes, which can be considered as 
similar to exclusion, demand cognitive capacity (Yzerbyt et al., 1999). Because the inclu-
sion/exclusion model focuses more on the consequences of categorization, it will be out-
lined more thoroughly within the next chapter.  
People seem to justify subtyping or exclusion of an exemplar from the category rep-
resentation generally by relying on a humble fit between exemplar and category.8 Conse-
quently, one could ask what determines the fit between an exemplar and the category. 
Chapter 5 will summarize the basic arguments to this question.  
4.2 Consequences of Categorization 
Within this chapter, possible outcomes of the exemplar's categorization will be ad-
dressed. I will thereby concentrate on the effects on central tendency judgments of a cate-
gory. However, a growing number of researchers suggests that it is further necessary to 
consider perceived variability as an outcome variable (e.g., Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 
1999; Hamburger, 1994; cf. chapter 8).  
                                                 
7 Some researchers treated perceived typicality as an outcome of subtyping because they demonstrated that 
the link between perceived typicality and stereotype change is bidirectional (e.g., Hewstone & Hamberger, 
2000). 
8 Other factors were demonstrated as well, as for example the availability of additional, neutral information to 
justify subtyping (Kunda & Oleson, 1995; cf. chapter 9).  
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 The inclusion/exclusion model, which has been briefly mentioned in the previous 
chapter, concentrates on the outcomes of categorization for the target category as well as 
for the exemplar (Schwarz & Bless 1992; 2007). While stereotype change researchers 
mostly manipulate the features of an exemplar and test whether this influences the decision 
to generalize or to subtype (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1997), researchers testing the inclu-
sion/exclusion model usually manipulate categorization more directly while keeping infor-
mation about the exemplar and the category constant (e.g. Bless et al., 2001; Bless & 
Wänke, 2000). Furthermore, the inclusion/exclusion model is more general compared to 
classic stereotype change models in the sense that it does not distinguish between cognitive 
aspects of social judgments (stereotypes) or more affect-laden judgments. Further, it as-
sumes the same processes for social, as well as non-social categories.  
 The inclusion/exclusion model is based on an exemplar-representation and rests on 
the notion that stereotypic judgments are assumed to be formed on the spot (Smith & 
Zárate, 1992; cf. chapter 2.2). Therefore, judgments should be influenced by salient stimuli 
within the context. Models referring to an exemplar-based representation allow for greater 
change than the previously mentioned models. Usually, researchers within this tradition use 
the term ‘context dependency’ instead of change. The term used implies that the influence 
might not be durable in time. Whether long-term belief change or short-term context sensi-
tivity, the influence might take two different directions, namely assimilation or contrast.  
4.2.1 Consequences of Categorization: Direction of Influence 
 Schwarz and Bless (1992; 2007) have argued that judgments require a mental repre-
sentation of the judgmental target and a representation of the standard against which the 
target is judged. Both representations were assumed to include chronically as well as tem-
porarily accessible information. Thereby, judgments should be influenced by the present 
context. The contextual information can be used in two ways: Either as part of the represen-
tation of the judgmental target, leading to assimilation, or as a standard of comparison, 
leading to contrast. This decision is based on a categorization process (cf. chapter 4.1).  
 Assimilation was defined as a positive relation between the contextual stimuli (e.g., 
exemplar) and the judgment (Schwarz & Bless, 2007). Contrast was defined as a negative 
relation between the two. The inclusion of a certain exemplar into the representation of a 
category was assumed to trigger assimilation processes in the judgment of the category and 
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the exemplar. Hence, contact-based stereotype change was assumed to consist of a trade-
off: For example, the image of a category that is stereotypically seen as rather negative, 
could improve by means of a positive exemplar. At the same time, the view on the exem-
plar might suffer from being assimilated towards the categories’ prototype (e.g., Bless et 
al., 2001). The same trade-off was demonstrated to be involved in contrast effects.  
 “Subtyping” and “exclusion”, as already mentioned, can be understood as similar 
processes. However, as Richards & Hewstone (2001) have noted “there has been consider-
able debate concerning the consequences of subtyping” (p. 56). While exclusion was ar-
gued to always lead to contrast effects, those researchers referring to subtyping and who 
have included a control condition either demonstrated contrast effects as a consequence of 
subtyping (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1997, Study 4), or reduced assimilation (e.g., Yzerbyt et 
al., 1999, Study 2), or observed no change at all (e.g., Yzerbyt et al., 1999, Study 1).  
4.2.1 Consequences of Categorization: Size of Influence 
 Assimilation, as well as contrast effects, were argued to be more pronounced the 
more extreme the salient stimuli are (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). For example, given that an 
exemplar is included in the representation of a certain category, its effect on the central ten-
dency judgment of the category will be larger when the exemplar is extremely deviant from 
the other information included in the representation. When considering the key-points of 
the previous chapter, a caveat becomes apparent here: Extremely deviating exemplars are 
likely to exert more influence, but at the same time, they are more likely to be subtyped or 
excluded because of perceived atypicality than less extremely deviating exemplars.  
 Another determinant of the size of assimilation and contrast effects is the amount of 
additional information included in the representation of the category or the representation 
of a comparison standard. A given piece of information will exert less influence the more 
other information is accessible (Bless, Igou, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2000). However, the over-
all size of assimilation or contrast effects will be bigger the more contextual information is 
added (Schwarz & Bless, 2007). This principle was referred to as the set-size effect.  
 Another theory that has been applied to category formation and change, is the ac-
centuation theory (e.g., Krueger, 1991; 1992; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Krueger, 
Rothbart, & Sriram, 1989; Tajfel, 1969). In contrast to most of the previously mentioned 
research, researchers interested in the accentuation theory typicality taught their partici-
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pants to differentiate between two categories and then confronted them with a huge list of 
exemplars, that deviated from the just formed expectations in one or the other direction. 
Researchers aimed at demonstrating that not all exemplars exert the same size of influence. 
Exemplars that enhance differences between categories exert a bigger impact in terms of 
assimilation than exemplars that reduce the difference. Krueger and colleagues were build-
ing on the work by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963), who demonstrated that exaggeration of inter-
category differences is a general perceptual phenomenon. Krueger and colleagues (1989) 
were the first to test this accentuation effect with respect to ongoing changes in judgments 
due to new information. In a first phase, participants in their studies learned to distinguish 
between two distributions of three-digit-numbers which were presented in different fonts. 
Subjects learned that one distribution was made up of higher (or lower) values than the 
other (comparison) distribution. Repeatedly, participants had to rate the cumulative means 
of both categories. During the learning phase the ratings were quite accurate. In the second 
half of these experiments, a list of new numbers was presented that either enhanced or re-
duced inter-category differences. Perceived mean change was bigger when differences were 
enhanced rather than reduced. Krueger and colleagues (1989) attributed this effect of ac-
centuated mean change to a biased averaging process. More specifically, this asymmetry 
was argued to be based on memory processes (e.g., Krueger, 1992; Krueger & Rothbart, 
1990). Krueger and Rothbart (1990, Exp. 3) could demonstrate that difference-enhancing 
stimuli were remembered better than difference-attenuating stimuli. The data, however, did 
not allow to draw a conclusion about the nature of this memory effect. Did the expectations 
that developed in the first phase of the experiment influence the memory? Were difference-
enhancing stimuli recalled better because of their greater extremity and thereby salience? 
Or, were difference-attenuating stimuli erroneously recalled as contextual stimuli? These 
questions remain open. 
4.3 Summary 
 Whenever people are confronted with information about single exemplars that 
somehow deviates from their expectations for the category, they try to resolve this inconsis-
tency by either assimilating their perception to the stereotype, by attributing their behaviour 
to some external sources, or by understating the typicality of the exemplar for the category. 
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If these resolutions seem implausible, they might finally change their stereotype. Whereas 
prejudice, the affective facet of inter-group attitudes, seems more susceptible to change, 
stereotypes have been proven to be rather rigid. They are protected against disconfirmation 
by allowing for a hierarchical structure consisting of subtypes that comprise the disconfirm-
ing exemplars. Perceived typicality of the exemplar has been conceived as the major ante-
cedent for subtyping. The inclusion/exclusion model has also pointed to the important role 
of typicality (or feature-overlap) as a cause for inclusion or exclusion. While researchers 
agreed on the important role of perceived typicality in stereotype change, less agreement 
exists concerning the outcomes of subtyping (or exclusion, respectively). Based on the in-
clusion/exclusion model, an exemplar that has been excluded from the representation of the 
category should lead to a contrast effect. Researchers studying stereotype change either 
found no impact of a subtyped exemplar on the category, or they provided evidence for at-
tenuated assimilation, or for a contrast effect. Researchers dealing with the accentuation 
effect have stressed the fact that not all exemplars affect the overall judgment equally. 
More weight is given to exemplars that enhance, rather than reduce, inter-category differ-
ences. Accentuation theory was one of the precursors of a theory that explained categoriza-
tion as a more dynamic process and which will be outlined in the following chapter, namely 
self-categorization theory. Because perceived typicality has proven to be such a critical fac-
tor in stereotype change, I will turn now to the question of what impacts perceived typical-
ity. 
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5. Exemplar-Category-Relations II: Who’s Typical, Who’s Not 
It has been argued in the previous chapter that perceived typicality or goodness-of-
fit is one of the main determinants of whether an exemplar will exert influence on the 
stereotype of a category or not. In the present chapter, it will be outlined what determines 
perceived typicality. 
So far, it has been mentioned in various passages that exemplars differ in perceived 
typicality. Although this notion seems plausible, it has not always been taken for granted. 
Within the classical view of categories, which draws back to Aristotle, it has been assumed 
that categories consist of defining features. Every exemplar that possesses these features is 
an equally good member of the category. The severest problem for the classical view is that 
it seems impossible to state this defining features.9 As a consequence, categories became 
thought of as “fuzzy-sets” (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).  
In the 1970s, a series of studies on natural language concepts demonstrated that the 
structure within a category is graded, implying that some members of a category are better 
examples than others (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This graded structure within a category 
was described as the typicality gradient. Sparrows, for example, seem to be perceived as 
more typical for the category ‘birds’ than penguins. As mentioned before, a prototype was 
defined by Rosch (1975) as the clearest case or best example of a category within a certain 
context. So, any real or hypothetical instance that is perceived the most typical.  
But how does the internal structure of a category arise? Or, how does the prototype 
form? Rosch and Mervis (1975) proposed an argument based on family resemblance. Ac-
cording to these authors, members of a category become viewed as prototypical, the more 
their attributes overlap with other members of their category and the less they overlap with 
attributes of members of other categories. Hence, an intra- and inter-group comparison 
ought to be involved. Although the work by Rosch is oftentimes cited as an example of a 
prototype-based model, her notion of typicality as being dependent upon an inter-group 
comparison clearly contradicts the context-insensitivity of prototypes according to other 
prototype-models (cf. chapter 2).  
According to prototype- and exemplar-based models, categorization decisions are 
based on similarity judgements. But stimuli can be similar in infinitely many different ways 
                                                 
9 An often cited example is the category “game”, for which it is impossible to formulate the defining features.  
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(Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). A perceiver has to have some idea about the relevant 
dimensions for the comparison. Therefore, some researchers pointed to the necessity to in-
clude prior knowledge and context information into our conception of categorization (Mur-
phy & Medin, 1985; Smith & Zárate, 1992). Especially complex categories, such as social 
categories, became more and more conceptualized as being constructed from working 
memory instead of being static, stored entities (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). Researchers 
within the social identity approach developed a similar stance on categorization, as will be 
described within the following paragraphs.  
Within self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) categorization is regarded as a dynamic, context-dependent process, 
rather than an activation of a cognitive structure (Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999). With 
the aim of developing a theory that explains social categorization and its role in social per-
ception and identification, Turner and colleagues applied and developed the idea imposed 
by Rosch and Mervis (1975) for social categories. Within SCT all person perception is re-
garded as the outcome of some categorization process, which can vary in the degree of in-
clusiveness. Interpersonal and inter-group perceptions differ in their abstractness. Which 
kind of abstraction and thereby category is applied is, on the one hand, dependent on attrib-
utes of the perceiver, such as aims and prior knowledge (Medin et al., 1993). On the other 
hand, upon the salience of a certain comparative context. Within any given frame of refer-
ence categorization is dependent on relative similarities: A set of stimuli is more likely to 
be categorized as an entity the more the stimuli are perceived to be similar to each other 
and the more they are perceived to differ from other stimuli in a certain context. This has 
been called the meta-contrast principle (Turner, 1987).  
The meta-contrast ratio can be also used to define the prototypicality of an instance 
within a certain category (Turner & Oakes, 1989). Respectively, the prototypicality of an 
instance also depends on this relative similarity and thereby on an intra- and inter-group 
comparison. Thus, the exemplar being the most prototypical in a certain context is the one 
that is the most similar to other members of the category, and most dissimilar to members 
of other categories (being salient in a certain situation). An example taken from Oakes and 
colleagues illustrates this principle: “ […] In a communist party, members wishing to be 
perceived as prototypical communists must differ in politics from members of more con-
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servative, capitalist parties, but they must not be so ultra-left that they begin to differ sig-
nificantly from other communists” (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998, p. 80). Since the typi-
cality judgment is dependent upon an inter-group comparison, it can just be made on-the-
spot within a certain context.  
Wyer and colleagues (2002) have demonstrated the context sensitivity of the proto-
type in two studies addressing stereotype change. Participants learned about a target cate-
gory, which was described as politically liberal and academically motivated, either in the 
context of another group, which was described as politically conservative, or a group that 
was described as academically unmotivated. The prototype was expected to be more ex-
treme (polarized) on the dimension which was discriminative in the specific context. Par-
ticipants later encountered additional members of the target category, who were contradict-
ing the stereotype on both dimensions (political orientation and academic motivation). As a 
consequence of the polarized prototypes, extremity of deviance was assumed to be bigger 
on the respective, context relevant attribute dimension. Participants changed their stereo-
types more on the dimension that did not differentiate between the two social groups. Dis-
confirming exemplars were assumed to be perceived as more atypical on the context-
relevant dimension, and this greater atypicality in turn rendered them more likely to be sub-
typed. The results confirmed, on the one hand, the context sensitivity of the prototype and 
thereby the categorization theory, and on the other hand, they provided evidence for the 
pivotal role of perceived typicality in stereotype change.  
In sum, the aforementioned argumentation carries two important implications. First, 
perceived typicality seems to follow the meta-contrast ratio: An exemplar is perceived as 
more typical, the more it is similar to other members of the category, and the less it is simi-
lar to non-members. Second, because typicality depends upon an inter-group comparison, 
the perception of typicality is context-dependent. The notion of a prototype only makes 
sense within a certain frame of reference. 
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6. Super- vs. Incongruent: Perceived Typicality and Stereotype 
Change 
6.1 Hypotheses and Previous Findings 
Various theories about the nature of categories and the process of categorization 
have been outlined as well as specific models about stereotype change. Previous research 
has demonstrated that stereotypes can be quite resistant to disconfirming information (cf. 
chapter 4). Incongruent exemplars, that is, exemplars that are contradicting the stereotype, 
are often subtyped because of their perceived atypicality. Although other models, such as 
the inclusion/exclusion model, regard assimilation as the default process, they also stress 
the fact that atypical exemplars are likely to be excluded from the representation of the 
category. Especially those researchers who were interested in the impact of one single devi-
ating exemplar, argued and demonstrated that this exemplar will not influence the central 
tendency aspect of the stereotype (e.g., Hamburger, 1994; Paolini et al., 2004). This result 
might have been influenced by the decision to concentrate on incongruent exemplars in-
stead of on supercongruent ones.  
The basic question of this dissertation is: What is the impact of one supercongruent 
exemplar on the central tendency facet of a stereotype compared with an incongruent ex-
emplar? Since perceived typicality has been argued and demonstrated before as being a 
main predictor of exemplar-based change (cf. chapter 4), a second and related question is 
whether supercongruent and incongruent exemplars are perceived as equally typical.  
Research on the representation of natural object categories (Rosch, 1975), as well 
research based on the social identity approach (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), assumed and 
demonstrated that perceived typicality is dependent on an intra- and inter-group comparison 
(cf. chapter 5). The more an exemplar is similar to other members of a group and the more 
it differs from non-members, the higher will be the perceived typicality (Turner & Oakes, 
1989). As incongruent exemplars have been defined before as deviating in the direction of a 
comparison category and supercongruent exemplars were now defined as deviating away 
from a salient comparison category (cf. chapter 3), perceived typicality should differ ac-
cording to the direction of deviance.  
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Thus, the first hypothesis tested in this dissertation concerns the difference in per-
ceived typicality: It is predicted that supercongruent exemplars should be perceived as 
more prototypical than incongruent exemplars, even if they share the same amount of ob-
jective deviance from the prototype. Hence, the same objective deviance translates to dif-
ferent degrees of subjective deviance. 
Similar reasoning has been tested in the subjective group dynamics model (e.g., 
Abrams, Hogg, & Marques, 2005; Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000). Researchers 
within this field showed that members who deviate in their opinion towards an opposing 
group, called “anti-norm deviants”, are perceived as more atypical than those who deviate 
away from the opposing group, called “pro-norm deviants”. The reason for that asymmetry 
in prototypicality was seen in the greater contrast anti-norm deviants pose to the normative 
direction of their group compared to pro-norm deviants. Also other researchers related to 
the social identity approach provided evidence that typicality perception is dependent upon 
an intergroup comparison. Haslam and his colleagues showed that extreme members of an 
outgroup are perceived as more representative than more moderate members (Haslam et al., 
1995). In their study, the same exemplar was either described as being moderate (associated 
with smaller inter-category differences) or extreme (associated with greater inter-category 
differences). When participants had to indicate their own attitude before making the typi-
cality judgment, they judged the extreme outgroup exemplar as more typical than the mod-
erate one. This asymmetry has so far been tested in the context of an ingroup-outgroup dis-
tinction. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the same principles should also apply 
without a persons' ingroup being salient as a reference point.  
Typicality has proven to be the critical factor for generalization in stereotype change 
research (cf. chapter 4). Perceivers who consider the disconfirming outgroup member as an 
atypical exemplar change their stereotype less than those who perceive the deviant member 
to be a typical exemplar of the group (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 
1997; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984). Based on these find-
ings and the assumption of differences in perceived typicality, I hypothesized that super-
congruent exemplars have a different impact on the group stereotype than incongruent ex-
emplars.  
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It is predicted that supercongruent exemplars are likely to be included into the rep-
resentation of a category and thereby leading to an assimilation of the prototype to the su-
percongruent exemplar. The impact of incongruent exemplars on the prototype should be 
smaller because they are more likely to be subtyped due to their lower perceived typciality. 
Therefore, prototypes should more easily get polarized than attenuated. The classical find-
ing of stereotype change research, namely that deviating exemplars are very likely to be 
subtyped, should not hold for supercongruent exemplars. 
This hypothesis is supported by research on the accentuation theory. As mentioned 
before, one major difference between incongruent and supercongruent exemplars is that the 
former ones decrease inter-group distinctiveness while the latter ones increase it (cf. chap-
ter 3). Exaggeration of inter-category differences seems to be a general perceptual phe-
nomenon (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Krueger et al., 1989; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; cf. 
chapter 4). Because people seem to be prone to maximize inter-category distinctions, as-
similation of the prototype to supercongruent information should be very likely to occur. 
The aim of the present research is to demonstrate that the accentuation principle also ap-
plies to existing social stereotypes and single deviating exemplars.  
Empirical evidence regarding supercongruent exemplars is scarce so far. Two stud-
ies within research on stereotype change, although mainly interested in the effect of incon-
gruent exemplars, comprised a condition that was considered as overly stereotypic. Kunda 
and Oleson (1995; Exp. 4) included an overly stereotypic condition in order to demonstrate 
that subtyping due to additional, neutral information is not just a matter of deviance, but of 
true inconsistency. Participants in their study read an interview with a gay man who either 
described himself as having stable relationships (incongruent), or as changing partners 
quite frequently (overly stereotypic). The additional information that the gay man works as 
an accountant blocked generalization in case of the incongruent exemplar, but not in case of 
the overly stereotypic exemplar. The chosen research paradigm, however, did not allow for 
a comparison between the objective deviance of the incongruent and supercongruent exem-
plar from the prototype. It is not even clear whether the exemplar was actually supercon-
gruent or congruent.  
Garcia-Marques and Mackie (1999; Exp. 2), who were interested in the effect of in-
congruent exemplars on perceptions of variability, included a supercongruent condition in 
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one of their studies in order to show that variability judgments are affected by incongruent 
exemplars and not by any kind of deviating exemplar. By using numerical information (IQ-
values), they aimed at making the degree of deviance between incongruent and supercon-
gruent exemplars comparable. Their main interest was in the variability judgment and no 
adequate measure of stereotype change was included in the study. Participants had to come 
up with IQ values for 30 randomly sampled members of the group. The deviating exemplar 
was introduced by providing participants with a first IQ score. The averaged IQ estimations 
in this study were influenced by the supercongruent as well as the incongruent first score. 
Effects on this measure, however, could be explained better in terms of anchor effects than 
in terms of belief change. Therefore, it seems to be important to have a closer look at the 
effect of supercongruent exemplars on the central tendency of a stereotype.  
Research on the accentuation effect also gave rise to the present hypotheses 
(Krueger, 1991; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Krueger et al., 1989). These studies started off 
with a stereotype learning phase in which two categories (target and comparison category) 
were presented by rendering a long list of category members accessible. Some studies dealt 
with categories made up of three-digit-numbers (Krueger, 1991; Krueger et al., 1989), later, 
researchers aimed at extending the previous findings on the accentuation effect with trait-
descriptive adjectives as stimuli (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990). Participants learned about a 
focal category, made up of traits that were neutral in favourability, and either a negative 
contextual category or a positive contextual category. During the first phase of the experi-
ment categories were not overlapping. Subjects had to rate the favourability of each trait 
and to estimate both group means at the end of phase one. Phase two, in which participants 
were presented with another set of 48 traits, was designed to test the idea that difference-
enhancing stimuli will influence the overall estimation more than difference-attenuating 
stimuli. Participants received an additional list of traits for the focal category that either in-
creased favourability or decreased it. For the contextual category, mean favourability of the 
additional traits was identical to mean favourability during phase 1. Krueger and Rothbart 
found support for contrast, as well as accentuation effects during phase 2. Contrast effects 
could be demonstrated by averaging the favourability judgments of the single traits and 
comparing this index between the two context conditions. Accentuation effects were shown 
by comparing the average estimated mean for the focal group with the computed average of 
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the individual ratings for each context condition. Krueger and Rothbart (1990; Exp. 3) in-
cluded a surprise recall task at the end of their study to test the idea whether memory proc-
esses could be responsible for the accentuation effect. Indeed, memory was worse for the 
difference-attenuating traits than for the difference-enhancing traits. Krueger and Rothbart 
were not very specific why exactly they assumed memory to be better for difference en-
hancing stimuli. As mentioned before, the data did not allow to draw a conclusion about the 
nature of this memory effect. It could have occurred due to expectancies influencing mem-
ory, or due to greater salience of difference-enhancing stimuli based on their greater ex-
tremity, or to confusion of difference-attenuating stimuli. Krueger and colleagues did not 
mention (or test) differences in perceived typicality. Effects might have occurred due to 
higher perceived typicality of difference-enhancing stimuli based on meta-contrast princi-
ples. The question remains whether accentuation is a purely memory-driven phenomenon. 
As mentioned before, Krueger and colleagues always presented their subjects with a long 
list of stimuli. In those situations, memory processes might be more important than in cases 
in which just one exemplar is presented. However, in real life, supercongruent exemplars 
might be rather rare due to their extremity. Hence, it is quite unlikely that one encounters 
several supercongruent exemplars at once. Unfortunately, no evidence exists so far about 
the impact of one single supercongruent exemplar on the prototype of an existing social 
category.  
6.2 Overview of the Present Research 
The present studies investigated the impact of supercongruent exemplars. In con-
trast to earlier studies, which addressed similar questions, I a) tested whether supercongru-
ent exemplars can be differentiated from congruent and incongruent exemplars, b) exam-
ined the impact of one single supercongruent exemplar on pre-existing stereotypes as well 
as on artificial stereotypes, c) compared the impact of one supercongruent exemplar to that 
of one incongruent exemplar with the same objective amount of deviance from the proto-
type, and d) assessed typicality and mean level change within the same studies. Part II and 
Part III are summarizing studies that additionally examined moderating factors which e) 
shed some further light on the underlying processes of the basic effects, and f) provide 
hints how stereotypes can be prevented from getting polarized. 
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Within the first experimental chapter four studies will be presented that address the 
two main hypotheses concerned with perceived typicality and mean level change (a-d). 
Various kinds of paradigms were used within the present research to capture belief change 
and accentuation. Basically, it was tested whether supercongruent exemplars are perceived 
as more typical than incongruent exemplars and whether they exert a bigger impact on the 
central tendency of a stereotype than incongruent exemplars. By testing typicality and 
mean-level change within the same studies, I explored whether these two judgments are 
causally linked, meaning whether higher perceived typicality of supercongruent exemplars 
compared with incongruent exemplars is responsible for the higher impact of supercongru-
ent exemplars on the stereotype.  
To further clarify the underlying mechanisms, studies presented in Part II investi-
gated whether a generalization of supercongruent information is inevitable. In particular, I 
was interested whether a polarization of the stereotype due to supercongruent information 
still occurs when participants’ attention is drawn towards the deviance of the exemplar. 
This idea rests on the assumption that a supercongruent deviance might be easily over-
looked by perceivers because the deviance is quantitative in nature. Hence, the default reac-
tion when confronted with a supercongruent exemplar should be an assimilation process, 
which could be blocked by forcing participants to focus on dissimilarities between exem-
plar and prototype.  
In Part III an interventional hypothesis was tested within a new experimental para-
digm (cf. chapter 9). I explored whether the same factors that have been demonstrated to 
trigger subtyping of incongruent exemplars could possibly block generalization of super-
congruent exemplars as well. 
7. Part I: Asymmetry in Perception and Impact 40 
7. Part I: Asymmetry in Perception and Impact of Super- and 
Incongruent Exemplars 
7.1 Introduction 
Within the first empirical part of this dissertation I would like to summarize results 
concerning the two basic questions, namely 1) whether supercongruent and incongruent 
exemplars with the same objective amount of deviance from the prototype differ in per-
ceived typicality, and 2) whether their impact on the central tendency of a stereotype dif-
fers. Additionally, it was tested whether these processes are causally linked. Based on the 
meta-contrast principle, I argued that supercongruent exemplars should be perceived as 
more typical than incongruent exemplars because supercongruent exemplars differ more 
from members of contrasting categories than incongruent exemplars. Based on this higher 
perceived typicality and the accentuation effect, supercongruent exemplars should further-
more exert a bigger impact on the overall central tendency judgment of a category than in-
congruent exemplars. This means that supercongruent exemplars should lead to a stronger 
assimilation of the prototype than incongruent exemplars.  
Study 1 was designed to test whether supercongruent exemplars can be distin-
guished from congruent exemplars and whether they are perceived as more typical than in-
congruent exemplars. The study dealt with IQ values of members of a group stereotypically 
seen as rather intelligent. The numerical nature of IQ values provided the opportunity to 
create equal distances from the prototype, which was assessed in a pre-test. Study 2 tested 
whether supercongruent information indeed leads to an accentuation of inter-group differ-
ences, whereas incongruent information has no impact. Hence, it addresses the question 
whether supercongruent exemplars are used by social observers to maximize differences 
between categories. The study also dealt with IQ values of the same category as Study 1. 
Study 3 was carried out to test whether supercongruent exemplars cause stronger assimila-
tion than incongruent exemplars within a paradigm that is more common for stereotype 
change research. The target category was one which is stereotypically seen as lacking 
warmth. Study 4 was designed to exclude the alternative hypothesis that this effect is driven 
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by the greater extremity of supercongruent compared with incongruent exemplars. For this 
study, a stereotype learning paradigm about artificial groups was applied.  
In order to increase generalizability the stereotypes employed within this set of stud-
ies vary in valence and are related to the warmth and competence dimensions of the stereo-
type-content-model (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999). Fiske and colleagues have argued 
for two separate and basic dimensions of stereotypes, namely warmth and competence, 
which can describe most of the stereotypes predominant in most cultures.  
I would like to briefly note some technical details which are common to all four 
studies summarized in the first empirical chapter. In all four studies I aimed at constructing 
a supercongruent and an incongruent exemplar with an equal amount of deviance from the 
prototype. Numerical information was used in all studies (test-points in competence and 
social competence related tests). Based on the finding that prototypes are context dependent 
(Oakes et al., 1998) a comparison category with an opposing stereotype was rendered sali-
ent in most of the studies in order to hold the standard of comparison for all participants 
constant. Because the present studies aimed at comparing the impact of incongruent and 
supercongruent exemplars by creating equal distances from the prototype, it was deemed 
necessary to fix the prototype as far as possible by at least holding the frame of reference 
constant over pre-test and main study.  
7.2 Study 1: Differences Between Incongruent, Congruent and Super-
congruent Exemplars 
7.2.1 Introduction 
The main goal of the first study was to demonstrate that supercongruent exemplars 
can actually be distinguished from congruent exemplars in the sense that people perceive 
supercongruent exemplars as deviating from the expectations. Additionally, Study 1 was 
designed to test the first hypothesis concerned with typicality. Participants should judge 
supercongruent exemplars as more typical than incongruent exemplars even if they share 
the same amount of deviance from the prototype. Hence, the same objective deviance 
should translate to different degrees of subjective deviance. The material used in this study 
is partly similar to the one used by Garcia-Marques and Mackie (1999; Exp. 2). As a target 
stereotype I chose that of computer programmers being relatively intelligent. Thus, the first 
7. Part I: Asymmetry in Perception and Impact 42 
 
study examines the perception of exemplars which are deviating in different directions from 
a competence related stereotype.  
7.2.2 Method 
 Pretest. In order to identify the prototypical expectation regarding IQ-values of 
computer programmers, participants in a pre-test rated the average IQ-scores of several oc-
cupational groups. Computer programmers were judged as relatively intelligent (M = 
110.44, SD = 7.82) compared with a list of seven other occupations (Mmin = 91.39 to Mmax = 
111.94). The average rating for computer programmers was significantly higher than the 
overall average value of 100 mentioned in the introduction to the pre-test, t(17) = 5.66, p < 
.05, d = 1.89.  
Participants and Design 
Eighteen students from the University of Jena, Germany, participated in the study. 
The design of the study was a 3 (Exemplar: congruent, incongruent, supercongruent) x 2 
(Item: deviance, typicality) x 2 (Order: incongruent first, supercongruent first) mixed-
subjects design with the first two variables as repeated measures. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that a large psychometric survey had been conducted con-
cerned with IQ-scores of different occupational groups. They were further informed that the 
IQ-test used in this survey was standardized in a way that 100 would occur as the overall 
average value and 68% of the population would end up with a score between 85 and 115. 
Participants were asked to answer two questions related to three different results which 
have ostensibly occurred in this survey for computer programmers. The first result was a 
congruent one (IQ = 110). Half of the participants judged a supercongruent computer pro-
grammer (IQ = 138) next and then an incongruent one (IQ = 82). The other half of the par-
ticipants judged the deviant exemplars in the reversed order. All three scores were intro-
duced with the following sentence: “Imagine a computer programmer with an IQ-score of 
110 (or 138, or 82, respectively)”. First, participants had to indicate on a 9-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely) how much this person deviates from the majority of 
computer programmers. High values indicate stronger deviance. Secondly, participants had 
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to rate on a similar 9-point scale how typical this person is for computer programmers in 
general. High values indicate higher perceived typicality. 
7.2.3 Results and Discussion 
How are supercongruent exemplars perceived? Results suggest that participants per-
ceive an extremely intelligent member of a group that is stereotypically seen as intelligent 
as deviating from the rest of the group but still as more typical than an unintelligent group 
member. Answers to the deviance item were recoded such that higher values indicate less 
perceived deviance. A 3 (Exemplar) x 2 (Item) x 2 (Order) mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the first two factors as repeated measures revealed that order had no impact 
on the results, all Fs < 1.77, p ≥ .20, and, therefore, means in Table 1 are depicted inde-
pendent of order. The analysis yielded a significant effect of exemplar, F(2,15) = 25.45, p < 
.05, η² = .77. However, most importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant interac-
tion with item, F(2,15) = 5.01, p < .05, η² = .40. To understand this effect, simple compari-
sons between the exemplar conditions were carried out adjusting for multiple comparisons 
with sidak adjustment. Table 1 also displays the results of these comparisons. One compari-
son did not show a significant difference: the one between perception of deviance of an in-
congruent (M = 2.44) and a supercongruent exemplar (M = 3.50), p = .40. This result indi-
cates that participants perceived exemplars who deviated in different directions as equally 
deviating from the majority. The fact that a significant difference between the deviance of a 
congruent (M = 6.78) and supercongruent exemplar appeared, p < .05, points to an actual 
difference between supercongruent and congruent exemplars. The supercongruent exemplar 
was perceived as more deviating than the congruent exemplar. However, although both the 
incongruent and supercongruent exemplars were perceived as equally deviating, their typi-
cality was judged differently. The supercongruent exemplar (M = 4.39) was judged as more 
typical than the incongruent exemplar (M = 1.94), but still less typical than the congruent 
exemplar (M = 7.22), both ps < .05. A second set of simple comparisons with the same ad-
justment revealed that only for the supercongruent exemplar did typicality and deviance 
judgments differ significantly from each other, p < .05. The two judgments, however, were 
marginally significant in case of the incongruent exemplar, p = .06.  
In order to underscore the results of the simple comparisons a 2 (incongruent vs. su-
percongruent) x 2 (deviance vs. typicality) ANOVA was additionally conducted. It was as-
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sumed that judgments for incongruent and supercongruent IQ-scores would differ on typi-
cality but not on perceived deviance. The analysis yielded the expected interaction, F(1,17) 
= 9.48, p < .05, η² = .36. This interaction was due to the fact that the two exemplars were 
judged differently in terms of typicality, whereas no difference appeared on perception of 
deviance.  
 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations on perceived deviance and perceived typicality of incon-
gruent, congruent and supercongruent exemplars (Study 1) 
Dependent 
measure 
 ic cong sc cong - ic cong - sc  
deviance   2.44 
(1.98)a 
 6.78 
(2.39)a,b 
 3.50 
(2.48)b 4.35 3.28 
 
typicality   1.94 
(1.21)c 
 7.22  
(1.80)c 
 4.39 
(2.61)b,c 5.28 2.83 
 
Note. N = 18. ic = incongruent; cong = congruent, and sc = supercongruent. Higher scores represent less devi-
ance and more typicality. Means in one row or column with the same index are significantly different from 
each other with sidak adjustment. 
 
To sum up, the results of Study 1 confirmed that a difference exists between con-
gruent and supercongruent exemplars. People are able to detect a deviance in direction of 
the stereotype as much as they detect a deviance in the opposite direction. The paradigm of 
the present study allowed for precise control over the degree of deviance from the central 
tendency of incongruent and supercongruent exemplars in that IQ-values deviated to the 
same amount from the congruent exemplar. Thereby, a comparison between the perception 
of incongruent and supercongruent exemplars seems to be justified. Although the objective 
deviance from the prototype was the same for both exemplars, participants perceived the 
supercongruent exemplar as more typical than the incongruent exemplar. The same objec-
tive amount of deviance seems to correspond to different degrees of subjective deviance, 
which is reflected in the typicality ratings.  
Given that the results of Study 1 demonstrated this difference between the two dif-
ferent kinds of deviating exemplars, the assumption that their impact on the central ten-
dency of the stereotype might differ as well ought to be addressed in the next studies. I ar-
gued in the theoretical introduction of this thesis that supercongruent exemplars should be 
used to accentuate differences between groups. Study 2 was designed to test this hypothe-
sis.  
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7.3 Study 2: Accentuation within Stereotype Change 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Previous studies on the accentuation principle typically used non-social categories 
(e.g., Krueger et al., 1989) or artificial, social categories (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990, Exp. 
3). Participants were confronted with a long list of exemplars which deviated in one or the 
other direction. Memory processes were assumed to be responsible for the accentuation ef-
fect. Because supercongruent exemplars are likely to be quite extreme, it is rather unlikely 
to assume that someone will encounter several supercongruent exemplars at once. Study 2 
was designed to test the accentuation principle with one deviating exemplar, and within a 
similar paradigm Garcia-Marques and Mackie used to study stereotype change (1999; Exp. 
2). The present study particularly aimed at studying the impact of super – and incongruent 
exemplars on the difference between two groups with contrasting stereotypes. The stereo-
type of computer programmers as being relatively intelligent was used again. As a measure 
of central tendency Garcia-Marques and Mackie (1999) asked participants to generate IQ 
scores for a random sample of members of the target category. Participants in their study 
and the present study received a first score of one computer programmer as an example. 
This score was either congruent, incongruent, or supercongruent. In contrast to the study of 
Garcia-Marques and Mackie, participants in the following study additionally had to gener-
ate IQ-scores for a comparison category with an opposing stereotype (house painters). 
Thereby, the effect of the exemplar on the perceived difference between the two groups 
could be investigated. Supercongruent exemplars should lead to an increase in difference, 
while incongruent exemplars should not affect the difference.  
7.3.2 Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-three students from the University of Jena, Germany, participated in the ex-
periment. They received a chocolate bar for participation. Three conditions varied between 
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participants, namely the direction of deviance with an incongruent, congruent, and super-
congruent exemplar10.  
Procedure  
Participants were told that the study was about the ability to deal with numerical 
concepts. The problem they had to face concerned IQ scores. Introduction to the IQ-test 
was the same as in Study 1. Furthermore, participants received a list of 30 names which 
were ostensibly randomly sampled from an exhaustive list of the employment union of 
computer programmers. Participants were asked to generate IQ-scores that could plausibly 
result if 30 members of that group were randomly sampled. The first IQ score was given as 
an actual example and constituted the critical manipulation (82 for an incongruent, 110 for 
a congruent, and 138 for a supercongruent computer programmer). Both deviating values 
were lying outside the range for computer programmers generated in the pretest. Next, par-
ticipants had to perform the same task on the same page for a list of 30 house painters 
(comparison category). No first score was presented for this category. After performing this 
task, all participants had to rate the intelligence of computer programmers on a scale rang-
ing from 1 (not at all intelligent) to 9 (extremely intelligent).  
Dependent measure  
In order to test the impact of the exemplar on the perceived difference between the 
groups, one measure of accentuation was created by averaging the generated IQ scores for 
computer programmers and averaging the generated IQ scores for house painters and creat-
ing a difference score. Additionally, one item captured the central tendency of the target 
category, namely the intelligence rating.  
7.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Four participants were excluded from the analysis. One did not estimate IQ-values 
for the comparison category and three were identified as outliers on the criterion of z > 2 on 
                                                 
10 The pretest was the same as in Study 1. I chose house painters as comparison category (M = 91.38, SD = 
9.04) because they were approximately equidistant from the standardized IQ average of 100. Participants fur-
thermore rated the expected minimum and maximum IQ-scores for those groups (Min (programmers) = 
93.05; Max (programmers) = 125.27; Min (painters) = 77.22; Max (painters) = 108.61). Dispersions were of 
similar size. 
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the intelligence rating.  
Difference score of generated IQ scores 
The question is whether supercongruent and incongruent exemplars have a different 
impact on the perceived differences between social categories. As Table 2 reveals, super-
congruent exemplars do, in fact, change the perceived difference between two categories 
more than incongruent exemplars. To assess the impact of the first score on the difference 
measure, a one-way ANOVA was performed comparing the 3 first-score conditions. The 
analysis yielded a significant main effect, F(2, 46) = 5.83, p < .05, η² = .20. Means are de-
picted in Table 2. Simple comparisons with sidak adjustment showed that participants in-
creased the difference between the two categories when confronted with a supercongruent 
first score (M = 15.66) compared with the congruent control condition (M = 7.20), p < .05. 
An incongruent first score, on the contrary, did not lead to a decrease in the difference be-
tween the two groups (M = 7.40), p > .05. 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations on difference score (IQ-estimations for both groups) and 
trait judgment for the target category after confrontation with either an incongruent, congruent, or 
supercongruent exemplar (Study 2). 
Dependent 
measure 
 ic cong sc cong - ic cong - sc  
difference   7.40 
(6.40)a 
 7.20  
(5.72)b 
 15.66 
(10.99)a, b -0.20 -8.46 
 
trait judgment   6.65 
(1.66)c 
 6.93    
(0.83)d 
 7.53    
(0.74)c,d 0.28 -0.60 
 
Note. N = 49. ic = incongruent; cong = congruent, and sc = supercongruent. Higher scores represent 
greater difference and more stereotypicality for target category. Means in one row with the same index 
are significantly different from each other with sidak adjustment. 
 
Central tendency by trait ascription 
To assess the impact of the critical score on the judgment of computer programmers’ 
intelligence, the same ANOVA as above was computed. The analysis yielded a marginally 
significant main effect, F(2,46) = .2.38, p = .10, η² = .09. As means in Table 2 show, com-
puter programmers’ intelligence was judged to be lowest when an incongruent critical score 
was depicted (M = 6.65), while it was highest when a supercongruent score was given (M = 
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7.53). Ratings in the congruent condition fell in-between (M = 6.93). Two t-tests for inde-
pendent samples revealed that the supercongruent condition was different from the congru-
ent condition, t(30) = 2.16, p < .05, d = .77, while the incongruent condition did not differ 
from the congruent condition, t < 1.  
The results of Study 2 confirmed the hypothesis: Presenting participants with an in-
congruent first score did not decrease the difference between a target and a comparison 
category, whereas a supercongruent first score led participants to increase the difference in 
IQ estimation between the two categories. By creating difference scores, I wanted to dem-
onstrate the accentuation effect due to a single deviating exemplar.  
Equivalently, trait ratings became more extreme after the presentation of a super-
congruent first score while no change occurred for an incongruent first score. However, on 
the trait judgment task the effect was rather small. But, although people generally try to 
avoid the extremes of a scale (Cronbach, 1950), it was still possible to detect polarization 
instead of change in the opposite direction. 
Although this paradigm has been used in stereotype change research before, one 
might argue that at least the results on the generated IQ scores can be better explained in 
terms of anchor effects (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). However, the anchoring ap-
proach can not explain the difference between the supercongruent and incongruent condi-
tion. This difference must be due to a differential usage of the two anchors. In further stud-
ies I wanted to make use of other means to capture stereotype change which might be more 
typical for the research on stereotype change.  
7.4 Study 3: Stereotype Change Following In- and Supercongruent Ex-
emplars  
7.4.1 Introduction 
Study 3 aimed at demonstrating the effect of direction of deviance on perceived 
typicality and stereotype change within one design. The former studies relied on a compe-
tence related stereotype which was positive. In this study, a warmth related stereotype 
which has a rather negative connotation (i.e., lack of warmth) was used. A pre-post design 
was implemented. Hence, the experiment consisted of two sessions: a first one to assess the 
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stereotype and a second one containing exemplar information followed by a second as-
sessment. 
7.4.2 Method 
Pretest 
A pretest was conducted in order to confirm the assumption that students of com-
puter science (target category) are perceived as lacking warmth whereas social science stu-
dents (comparison category) are perceived as relatively warm. Pretest-participants were re-
quested to estimate the results of an ostensible survey on job-qualifications of students with 
different majors. Participants had to make judgments related to four subtests concerned 
with social competence (social orientation, capacity for teamwork, helpfulness, sociability). 
Each attribute was accompanied by a scale from 0 (very low on that attribute) to 100 (very 
high on that attribute) on which they had to indicate how many points an average student of 
computer science and an average student of social science would gather on a test measuring 
that attribute. Fifteen students from the University of Jena, Germany, served as pretest par-
ticipants. To test the difference of the resulting ratings a 4 (Attribute) x 2 (Group) within-
subjects ANOVA was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant difference for group, 
F(1,14) = 17.06, p < .05, η² = .55. Students of computer science were perceived as less 
warm (M = 47.82) than students of social science (M = 74.35). Yet, a significant interaction 
between group and attribute indicated that the effect might differ according to attribute, 
F(3,12) = 19.84, p < .05, η² = .83. Four separate repeated measures analyses for each attrib-
ute showed that the difference was significant on all attributes except for helpfulness, 
F(1,14) = 1.43, p = .25, η² = .09. However, mean values indicated that the pattern does not 
differ essentially from the other attributes (Msocial science = 69.14 vs. Mcomputer science = 59.00).  
Participants and Design 
One-hundred-twenty students from the University of Applied Science Jena, Ger-
many, participated in the time 1 and forty-eight students in the time 2 data collection, two 
weeks later.11 They were all attending a course for business administration students. At 
                                                 
11 The difference in sample is due to the fact that participants were randomly assigned at time 2 to two differ-
ent studies and just one study is presented here. Questionnaire at time 1 was the same for all participants.  
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both measurement points participants received a chocolate bar for participating and they 
could take part in a lottery for book vouchers. The design of the experiment was a 2 (Direc-
tion of deviance: incongruent vs. supercongruent) x 4 (Stereotype time 2: target cate-
gory/warmth vs. target category /competence vs. comparison category /warmth vs. com-
parison category /competence) design with the first variable being manipulated between 
participants and the second variable within. An effect of deviance was expected to occur 
only for the target category and the manipulated dimension (warmth). The stereotype 
measure from the first assessment was used as baseline to detect change.  
7.4.3 Procedure  
At time 1, all participants received the same questionnaire. Participants were told 
that the study was part of a bigger survey on job qualifications of students with different 
majors. Participants were told that, for reasons of simplification, only two different majors 
were included at this stage of the survey: students of computer science (target category) and 
students of social science (comparison category). At time 1 participants were asked to esti-
mate the results of an ostensible first part of the big survey, in which the public opinion 
about job qualifications of different majors were supposedly assessed. They had to rate stu-
dents of computer science and students of social science on traits related to warmth and 
competence. At time 2 participants were told that they would take part in another part of the 
survey, which included the confrontation with the test profile of one student. Their task was 
to predict his/her professional future. Participants were first made familiar with the test and 
the scales used in the questionnaire. They were then presented with the test results of an 
alumnus of computer science on different subtests related to warmth (same subtests and 
scales as in the pretest). Depending on the experimental condition, the results deviated ei-
ther in an incongruent or in a supercongruent manner from the average pretest rating. A su-
percongruent deviant was created by subtracting the difference between the two groups 
from the value for computer science students. The results of an incongruent exemplar 
matched the stereotypical expectations for social science students. As a means to check for 
the manipulation and in order to reinforce the cover story, participants were asked to take 
job-related decisions for the exemplar (e.g., I think this person could fulfil a leading posi-
tion) and evaluate her/him on several traits related to warmth (e.g., social competence).  
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Under the pretence of gathering some control variables for the exemplar ratings, 
participants were asked next to judge both groups included in the survey on several traits. 
Attributes, rank order, and introduction to the task were the same as at time 1. Finally, par-
ticipants had to answer the typicality measure. They were told that the student has to com-
pete with alumni of her/his major in finding a job. That is why they should compare the 
single exemplar with other people of her/his respective group. 
Dependent measure  
To measure stereotype change, the same trait ratings were included at time 1 and 
time 2 (warm, capable, good-hearted, intelligent, sociable, ambitious, helpful, analytical, 
good teamworker, efficient, sensitive, motivated for achievement, outgoing). Participants 
were asked not to state their own opinion but rather to try to estimate the results of a public 
opinion poll. “I think, that society judges students of computer science to be …”.12 Judg-
ments were made on 9-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). The same 
ratings had to be performed for the comparison group (students of social science). The 
questionnaire furthermore contained three items with 9-point scales measuring perceived 
typicality (e.g., “How well does the exemplar fit the image of his/her group?”).  
7.4.4 Results and Discussion 
Two cases of the time 2 session were excluded from further analyses. One did not 
fill out the trait ratings and one was detected as an outlier based on the criterion of z > 2 on 
the target stereotype measure (computer science students/warmth). Due to reluctance of 
participants to fill in codes, cases could not be matched for time 1 and time 2. Therefore, 
warmth ratings of time 1 were just used as a baseline to detect change. Eight items measur-
ing the exemplars social competence were averaged (α = .86) and served as a mean index 
of exemplars assumed warmth. Each participant rated both groups on traits concerning the 
warmth and competence dimension at time 1 and time 2. One index was created for warmth 
of computer science students at time 1 (α = .76)13, one for warmth of computer science stu-
dents at time 2 (α = .80), one for competence of computer science students at time 2 (α = 
                                                 
12 The same way of indirectly measuring the stereotype was used by Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu (2002). 
13 Since the time 1 value was just needed as a baseline to detect change, I just computed an index for warmth 
of computer science students. 
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.86), one for warmth of social science students at time 2 (α = .85), and one index for com-
petence of social science students at time 2 (α = .85). The three items measuring typicality 
of the exemplar were averaged after one item had been recoded (α = .82). Higher values 
indicate higher perceived typicality.  
Manipulation check 
The mean index of exemplars’ assumed warmth was submitted to a t-test for inde-
pendent samples comparing the incongruent and supercongruent condition. Incongruent 
computer science students were perceived as more social and warm (M = 5.99) than super-
congruent computer science students (M = 3.64), t(44) = -7.23, p < .05, d = 2.13. 
Typicality 
According to the hypotheses, supercongruent exemplars should be perceived as 
more typical than incongruent exemplars even if they share the same amount of deviance 
from the prototype. The t-test revealed that a computer science student with fairly high re-
sults in a social competence test (incongruent) was indeed perceived as less typical (M = 
3.67) than a computer science student with extremely low results on the same test (super-
congruent) (M = 5.59), t(44) = 4.38, p < .05, d = 1.32. 
Stereotype change 
It was hypothesized that supercongruent exemplars will lead to an assimilation of 
the stereotype, whereas the impact of an incongruent exemplar is expected to be smaller 
and thus will not lead to a significant assimilation of the stereotype. I did not expect to find 
any impact of the manipulation on the stereotype judgment of the comparison group (social 
science students) and on the stereotype judgment of the unmanipulated dimension (compe-
tence). First, an ANOVA was conducted with four stereotype measures as repeated meas-
ures (warmth of computer science students, competence of computer science students, 
warmth of social science students, and competence of social science students) and deviance 
(incongruent vs. supercongruent) as independent variable. The ANOVA yielded a margin-
ally significant Stereotype x Deviance interaction, F(3,42) = 2.29, p = .09, η² = .14. Sepa-
rate t-tests for the four stereotype measures revealed that this interaction was due to a sig-
nificant effect of deviance on the focal stereotype measure of computer science students’ 
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warmth. A supercongruent exemplar led to more stereotypic ratings (M = 3.84) compared 
with an incongruent exemplar (M = 4.42), t(44) = -1.79, p < .05 (one-tailed), d = .54. No 
impact of deviance occurred for the other three stereotype measures, ts < 1.46, ps ≥ .15. So 
far, we just know that the exemplar affected the stereotype rating for computer science stu-
dents on the warmth dimension. To test whether participants changed their stereotype in 
one or in both conditions, two separate t-tests were conducted, which compared the stereo-
typic ratings of time 2 against the mean of time 1 (M = 4.25, SD = 1.13). Ratings in the su-
percongruent condition were significantly more stereotypic compared with this baseline 
value, t(19) = -2.06, p = .05, d = .41. Ratings in the incongruent condition did not differ 
from the baseline value, t(25) = .70, p = .49.  
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations on perceived typicality and stereotype judgment after con-
frontation with either an incongruent or supercongruent exemplar (Study 3). 
Dependent measure ic sc  pre - ic pre - sc 
typicality  3.67 
(1.62) 
 5.59  
(1.26) 
   
Target group warmth  4.42 
(1.08) 
 3.83  
(1.11) 
 -0.17 0.42 
Target group warmth
(pre)   
 4.25  
(1.13)   
Note. N = 46. ic = incongruent; sc = supercongruent, and pre = time 1 value. Higher scores represent higher 
perceived typicality and lower levels of stereotyping. 
 
In sum, the results of this study support both hypotheses. They replicate the typical-
ity effect for a different stereotype on the second central dimension, namely warmth. Addi-
tionally, it was shown that the supercongruent exemplar led to an assimilation of the stereo-
type, while the incongruent exemplar had no impact. Stereotypes seem to be more likely to 
get polarized than attenuated. 
Although I created the deviating exemplars in a way that they are equally distant 
from the prototype, the comparability of supercongruent and incongruent exemplars is still 
not perfect. Confounded with the direction of deviance is a difference in extremity: Super-
congruent exemplars are lying closer to the end-pole of the scale, while incongruent exem-
plars are rather pale. Extreme information has been demonstrated to be perceived as more 
diagnostic (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) and this in turn could lead to a stronger im-
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pact on the stereotype. Study 4 aimed at testing whether the difference in extremity is driv-
ing the effect.  
7.5 Study 4: Supercongruent or Incongruent by Means of Different 
Comparison Categories  
7.5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introduction, incongruent exemplars deviate in direction of a 
comparison category, while supercongruent exemplars deviate in the other direction, away 
from the comparison category. In Study 4, the same exemplar information was used for a 
group, about which people hold average expectations regarding competence, and super- or 
incongruency of the exemplar was manipulated by rendering different kinds of comparison 
categories salient. The comparison category was either expected to be rather incompetent or 
to be rather competent (for a similar paradigm see Krueger & Rothbart, 1990). Hence, if 
comparison category and exemplar are situated on different sides of the continuum, the ex-
emplar should be regarded as supercongruent, while an exemplar lying on the same side as 
the salient comparison category is equivalent to an incongruent exemplar. I assumed that 
assimilation in the case of supercongruent exemplars should be stronger than for incongru-
ent exemplars. 
A pre-post design was used again and questionnaires were matched via codes across 
sessions. To have more control about the pre-manipulation stereotype and to decrease the 
effect of social desirability concerns, I decided to use the stereotype of an artificial group. 
Hence, the experiment consisted of a stereotype formation phase in the pre-manipulation 
session. The same stereotype formation phase was administered in the second session to 
refresh memory and was followed by a stereotype change phase.  
7.5.2 Method 
Participants and Design 
One-hundred-twelve students from the University of Jena, Germany, participated in 
the time 1 data collection on the campus of the university. Participants were told that the 
study consisted of two parts of which the second one would take place online within the 
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following two weeks. One-hundred-and-five students participated in time 2 data collection. 
Ninety-one cases could be matched successfully over the two measurement points. At time 
1 participants received a chocolate bar for participating and at time 2 they could take part in 
a lottery for book vouchers. The design of the experiment was a 2 (Exemplar: low vs. high 
in competence) x 2 (Comparison group: low vs. high in competence) between-subjects de-
sign. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that the study was on impression formation and their task 
would be to form an impression about a certain group or a certain person belonging to one 
group. 
Session 1: Stereotype formation phase. First, participants were introduced to three 
groups which had been given artificial labels, like group “Green”, group “Blue”, and group 
“Red”. Allegedly, members of all three groups had been asked about their habits and typi-
cal characteristics. Participants were given a set of sixteen randomly sorted cards each con-
taining a question about preferred activities, habits or characteristics and three bar charts 
indicating how much members of each group on average like that activity or show that 
characteristic. Six questions were such that a high percentage indicates high competence 
(e.g., “Would you refrain from holidays in order to take part in further education?”), six 
were such that a high percentage indicates incompetence (e.g., “Did you take extra lessons 
in school?”), four questions were neutral regarding competence (e.g., “Do you like to go to 
the swimming pool?”). By means of the bar charts group “Blue” should leave the image to 
be rather incompetent, group “Red” should seem to be very competent, while group 
“Green” was placed on all competence-related items around the midpoint. Participants were 
asked to go through the cards individually once or twice till they had formed an impression 
of the three groups. After having read the cards, participants were told that the study would 
further deal with two of the three groups. All three groups were presented at the very be-
ginning of the study so that group “Green” was really perceived as average on competence. 
The subsequent selection of groups depended on the experimental condition participants 
were in: either group “Red” (high) and group “Green” (average), or group “Blue” (low) and 
group “Green” (average). Next, participants were asked to write a paragraph-long descrip-
tion about each of the two groups the study would be dealing with. This was done to solid-
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ify their impressions. Participants then rated group “Green” (focal group) on thirteen 9-
point scales asking participants how much each trait was true for members of that group 
with response options from 1 (not at all true) to 9 (very much true). The traits included 
seven competence related traits and six warmth related traits (as in Study 3). The same task 
had to be fulfilled for the second group (“Red” or “Blue” depending on the condition). Par-
ticipants were thanked and reminded of session two before they left the lab.  
Session 2: Stereotype formation phase. The second session was conducted online. 
Students who took part in the first part were invited via email to take part in the second ses-
sion as well. Exactly the same procedure as in Session 1 was repeated to refresh partici-
pants’ memory about the three groups. They went through all the cards, describing the three 
groups and were asked to briefly note their impression of the two groups the study would 
be dealing with.  
Session 2: Stereotype change phase. Participants were told that members of both 
groups (“Red” and “Green” or “Blue” and “Green”) were tested on several competence-
related tests. By means of a wheel of fortune the results of one member of one of the two 
groups would be selected and presented to the participant. Actually, it was always a mem-
ber of group “Green” whose test results were depicted. Test results were presented for three 
subtests related to the competence dimension (problem solving abilities, ambition, compre-
hension) on scales ranging from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high) points. Dependent on the 
condition, this individual had rather high results (between 80 and 100 points) or low results 
(between 0 and 20 points) in all three subtests. Low and high results were equally distant 
from the midpoint of the scale. After this presentation, participants were asked to answer 
the dependent variables. First, they completed the same trait ratings as in Session 1 for both 
groups. Following that, they answered three items measuring the perceived typicality of the 
exemplar (e.g., “How typical is this member for his/her group?”) on scales ranging from 1 
to 9. As a manipulation check participants had to rate exemplars’ competence on two items 
(intelligent, analytical) with the same type of scale.  
7.5.3 Results and Discussion 
Two items measuring exemplars’ competence were highly correlated and therefore 
averaged (r = .93, p < .05). Eleven cases distributed equally over all four conditions were 
excluded from further analyses based on their ratings of exemplars’ competence: Either 
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they had rated a high exemplar below the midpoint of the scale or a low exemplar above the 
midpoint of the scale. Each participant rated both groups on traits concerning the warmth 
and competence dimension at time 1 and time 2.14 Two indices were created: one for the 
competence of group “Green” at time 1 (α = .77) and one for the competence of the same 
group at time 2 after the manipulation (α = .97). Three typicality items were averaged after 
the first two items had been recoded (α = .87). Higher values indicate higher perceived 
typicality.  
For all analyses except the manipulation check the design was treated as one with 
two conditions. One condition represents supercongruent combinations (low exemplar in 
case of a high comparison category or high exemplar combined with a low comparison 
category) and one condition represents incongruent combinations (low exemplar in case of 
a low comparison category or high exemplar in case of a high comparison category). The 
derived variable was called “deviance”.  
Manipulation check 
To check whether the perception of group „Green“ differed according to the com-
parison category, the competence ratings at time 1 were compared between participants in 
the condition with group “Blue” salient and participants in the condition with group “Red” 
salient. A t-test for independent samples yielded a marginal significant difference, t(78) = -
1.69, p = .10, d = .38. When group “Blue” was salient, group “Green” was judged slightly 
more competent (M = 5.30) compared with the condition when group “Red” was salient, 
(M = 5.01).  
To check whether the manipulation of group “Blue” and “Red” worked as intended, 
a t-test for independent samples was carried out on the index of comparison groups’ com-
petence at time 1. The analysis showed that participants judged group “Blue” (M = 3.45) as 
less competent than group “Red” (M = 8.07), t(78) = 12.41, p < .05, d = 2.79. Both means 
differed significantly from the midpoint of the scale, both ts ≥ 4.94, ps ≤ .05, ds ≥ .77.  
The index of exemplar’s assumed competence worked as a manipulation check and 
was submitted to a two-way ANOVA with position of exemplar and position of comparison 
                                                 
14 I did not expect an impact on the comparison category ratings and on the non-manipulated dimension (cf. 
Study 3). For simplification, results on these variables are not reported for the present study. They were 
mainly included in the questionnaire for ecological validity and to increase reliability for the warmth ratings. 
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category as independent variables. The analysis yielded a significant impact of “position of 
exemplar”, F(1,76) = 428.47, p < .05, η² = .85. Exemplars with high test results were per-
ceived as more competent (M = 7.21) than exemplars with low test results (M = 2.62). 
Comparison group had neither alone nor in interaction any impact on perception of the ex-
emplars’ competence, both Fs ≤ 2.10, ps ≥ .15 (exemplar high: Msupercongruent = 7.02 vs. Min-
congruent= 7.42; exemplar low: Msupercongruent = 2.50 vs. Mincongruent = 2.75). Results indicate that 
the manipulation of high and low test results was successful in that participants experienced 
them as equally extreme. The perception of the single deviating exemplar was not distorted. 
Typicality 
I hypothesized that supercongruent exemplars will be perceived as more typical than 
incongruent exemplars even if they share the same amount of deviance from the prototype. 
To account for any pre-test differences of group perception according to comparison cate-
gory the typicality index was submitted to an ANCOVA with deviance as independent 
variable and the pre-manipulation stereotype as a covariate. A non-significant interaction 
term between deviance and the covariate pre-stereotype in a first ANCOVA shows that the 
presumption of equal regression slopes across conditions is fulfilled, F < 1. The analysis 
yielded a significant effect of deviance, F(1,77) = 3.32, p < .05 (one-tailed), η² = .04. The 
covariate pre-stereotype showed no significant impact, F < 1. Adjusted mean values are 
shown in Table 4. Supercongruent exemplars were perceived as more typical than incon-
gruent exemplars (M = 4.25 vs. M = 3.51).  
 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations on perceived typicality and assimilation of the stereotype 
after confrontation with either an incongruent or supercongruent exemplar (Study 4). 
Dependent measure incongruent supercongruent 
typicality  3.51 (1.84) 4.25 (1.75) 
assimilation 1.08 (1.08) 1.60 (1.11) 
Note. N = 80. Higher scores represent higher perceived typicality and stronger assimilation. Typicality ratings 
are adjusted for time 1 stereotype ratings of group “Green”. 
 
 
Stereotype change 
Gelöscht: .
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Because I was interested in the average assimilation effect across conditions, a 
change index was created the following manner: For participants confronted with a low ex-
emplar the post manipulation stereotype measure was subtracted from the pre-manipulation 
measure. For participants confronted with a high exemplar the pre-manipulation value was 
subtracted from the post manipulation value. This assimilation index was subjected to a t-
test to compare the two deviance combinations. More change was expected to occur in the 
supercongruent conditions. Indeed, supercongruent exemplars led to more assimilation 
compared with incongruent exemplars (M = 1.60 vs. M = 1.08), t(78) = 2.11, p < .05, d = 
.47. As two separate t-tests indicate both degrees of assimilation are significantly different 
from 0, both ts ≥ 6.13, ps ≤ .05, ds ≥ 1.40. Participants assimilated their impression of the 
target category to supercongruent as well as incongruent exemplars, but they did so to a 
higher extent in the case of supercongruent exemplars.  
Typicality and stereotype change 
I tested a model of stereotype change using the multiple regression mediation ap-
proach suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Judd and Kenny (1981). Three condi-
tions must be met to infer mediation. In the first step, deviance affected the proposed me-
diator (perceived typicality15), ß = .24, p < .05. In the second step, deviance affected the 
dependent variable (amount of assimilation), ß = .23, p < .05. In the third step, the proposed 
mediator affected the dependent variable, ß = .22, p = .06, while controlling for the inde-
pendent variable. When typicality was controlled, the effect of deviance was reduced, ß = 
.18, p = .11, but the difference between the two ßs (uncontrolled and controlled for typical-
ity) was not significant at the .05 level (Sobel test; see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). 
Thus, the results do not support the assumption of a mediation by perceived typicality.  
Several other studies, have found support for a bidirectional link between stereotype 
change and typicality and not one causally preceding the other (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2000; 
Hewstone & Hamberger, 2000; Maurer et al., 1995). To examine the possibility of media-
tion in the reversed direction (from assimilation to perceived typicality), typicality was re-
gressed on deviance, controlling for assimilation. This analysis showed a similar pattern. 
The effect of deviance on typicality was slightly reduced when controlling for assimilation, 
                                                 
15 The mediator was log-transformed before the analysis because a scatter-plot indicated that the relationship 
between the mediator and the dependent variable was non-linear. 
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ßuncontrolled = .24, ßcontrolled = .19, but the difference between ßs was not significant at the .05 
level (Sobel test).  
To sum up, the results of Study 4 confirmed the hypotheses of higher perceived 
typicality and greater assimilation in case of supercongruent exemplars compared with in-
congruent exemplars. In this study, comparability of incongruent and supercongruent ex-
emplars was increased, but the findings of Study 1, 2 and 3 were nevertheless replicated. 
The results of this study strengthen the assumption that accentuation principles are respon-
sible for the effect. The difference in the amount of assimilation, however, does not seem to 
be explained by perceived typicality.  
With this study, I wanted to exclude the possibility that the difference in extremity 
of the information and thereby differential diagnosticity is responsible for the effect. One 
might argue that even Study 4 cannot totally rule out this explanation because dependent on 
the comparison category the same exemplar differs more or less from the grand mean of all 
salient stimuli. The same exemplar differs more from all other salient stimuli, when the 
comparison category renders it supercongruent. However, if participants had perceived su-
percongruent information as more diagnostic than incongruent information, exemplar 
judgments should have differed dependent on the kind of comparison category. A non-
significant interaction on exemplar judgment makes this alternative account less plausible.  
7.6 Discussion of Part I  
With this line of studies, I aimed at investigating how direction of deviance influ-
ences the central tendency of a stereotype. While researchers within social psychology have 
already gained some insights into the effect of incongruent exemplars on stereotypes, evi-
dence about the impact of extreme, overly stereotypic exemplars, called supercongruent, is 
relatively scarce. So far stereotypes appeared to be quite resistant to change. I argued that 
this could be an effect of focusing on just one kind of deviance, incongruency. Including 
the other kind of deviance, supercongruency, into the research on stereotype change, might 
leave us with a different picture.  
Incongruent and supercongruent exemplars with the same amount of objective devi-
ance from the prototype were compared. The main assumption was that the same objective 
deviance will have a different subjective meaning. Based on the meta-contrast principle, it 
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was hypothesized that supercongruent exemplars will be perceived as more typical than 
incongruent exemplars. Furthermore, I assumed, based on the higher perceived typicality 
and the accentuation principle, that supercongruent exemplars will lead to stronger assimi-
lation of the stereotype than incongruent exemplars. The four studies presented largely con-
firmed these hypotheses. The findings were replicated for different stereotypes related to 
the warmth and competence dimensions. By using stereotypes with opposite valence the 
possibility that the effects are just due to differences in valence could be ruled out. By using 
warmth and competence related stereotypes, generalizability of the findings was increased.  
The results of Study 1 are in line with the idea that deviance exists in two versions 
and that people are able to detect the well known incongruent deviance but also the intro-
duced supercongruent deviance. Moreover, although equally distant from the prototype, the 
two exemplars in Study 1 were judged differently when it came to perceived typicality. The 
findings can be, on the one hand, regarded as a precondition for this line of research be-
cause they indicate that deviance exists in two versions (incongruent and supercongruent). 
On the other hand, they confirmed the first hypothesis of higher perceived typicality in case 
of supercongruent exemplars compared with incongruent ones. For Study 2, a paradigm 
was used which has been applied before within stereotype change research. By adding the 
salience and ratings of a comparison category I aimed at demonstrating accentuation prin-
ciples. Participants used the supercongruent information to increase the difference between 
two groups, while incongruent information had no impact. This is one hint that supercon-
gruent exemplars are more likely to affect the central tendency of a stereotype than incon-
gruent exemplars. Study 3 was carried out to test this more directly. And indeed, the pres-
ence of a supercongruent exemplar affected the stereotype more than the presence of an in-
congruent exemplar. At the same time supercongruent exemplars were again rated as more 
typical than incongruent exemplars. A fourth study was carried out to exclude the possibil-
ity that this effect is driven by the greater extremity of supercongruent compared with in-
congruent exemplars. The aim of Study 4 was to make the two deviating exemplars more 
comparable. Therefore, direction of deviance was manipulated for the same exemplar by 
varying the salient comparison category. Either it was one lying on the same side of the 
continuum as the exemplar implying an incongruent relation, or it was one situated on the 
opposite side, entailing a supercongruent relation. Both, the typicality and the stereotype 
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change hypotheses were confirmed within this paradigm. Globally, the data provides un-
equivocal evidence that deviant exemplars are likely to influence our stereotypes, however, 
direction of deviance matters. Stereotypes are not as “stubborn and resistant to change” as 
believed so far (Allport, 1954, p. 17).  
I assumed that the stronger impact of supercongruent exemplars on the stereotype is 
at least partly due to their greater perceived typicality. Results in Study 4, however, pro-
vided no evidence for mediation. Evidence for a reverse mediation, which has been pro-
posed by several researchers, is also not supported by the present data.  
 Results related to perceived typicality as a mediator of stereotype change are quite 
mixed in stereotype change research so far. Not all studies tested (or reported) the media-
tional hypothesis, some could provide evidence for perceived typicality as a mediator of 
change (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Yzerbyt et al. 1999), and others provided evi-
dence for the reverse mediation (e.g., Hewstone & Hamberger, 2000; Maurer et al., 1995). 
Some have argued that typicality and stereotype change probably occur simultaneously 
without one causally influencing the other (e.g., Hewstone & Hamberger, 2000; Hewstone 
et al., 2000). Richards and Hewstone assumed that perceived typicality “rather covaries 
with than mediates change” (2001, p. 55). Within all that research typicality has been ma-
nipulated and measured in rather different ways. Some have manipulated typicality via 
other stereotypical attributes besides the one on which the exemplar is incongruent, while 
others have varied typicality by means of the extremity of deviance. For the latter way of 
conceptualizing typicality the relation between typicality and stereotype change seems to be 
rather complex. Rothbart (1996) has already pointed to this contradiction: “On the one 
hand, the more disconfirming an individual exemplar's behavior is of the group stereotype, 
the greater potential force exerted on the stereotype to change. On the other hand, stereo-
type disconfirming information, associated with an exemplar, also decreases the “goodness 
of fit” between exemplar and category, reducing the likelihood that the exemplar will be 
activated” (p. 308). Hence, the relation between perceived typicality and stereotype change 
might not be as straight forward as we sometimes assume.  
Another problematic issue concerning the relation between perceived typicality and 
stereotype change is the order of measurement. So far, typicality was measured after the 
stereotype because I wanted to avoid to draw participants’ attention towards the deviance of 
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the exemplar. In the second empirical part of this dissertation it will be demonstrated that 
especially for supercongruent exemplars the order of stereotype and typicality measurement 
is influential. However, measuring the mediator after the outcome variable is less than op-
timal (Kenny et al., 1998, p. 262).  
The present results are rather worrying, because they imply that stereotypes are very 
likely to get more and more extreme. The latitude of acceptance for deviating exemplars 
seems to be larger in one than in the other direction. And even if people are able to detect 
the deviating nature of supercongruent exemplars they are ready to generalize from them to 
the group as whole. Additional studies should address how subtyping processes can be trig-
gered in case of supercongruent exemplars to prevent stereotypes from becoming more and 
more polarized. Part II and Part III will deal with this question. By testing a moderation hy-
pothesis, Part II will additionally help to clarify the underlying mechanism of the presented 
effects. 
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8. Part II: Investigating the Underlying Process (Moderator 1: 
Mind the Deviance) 
8.1 Introduction 
 An asymmetry in the processing of deviating information has become apparent 
within the first part of this dissertation: Whereas incongruent information usually is not 
generalized to the stereotype of a category, a supercongruent deviance is likely to lead to an 
assimilation of the stereotype whereby stereotypes become polarized. The question re-
mains, why does this asymmetry occur? One potential explanation for the differential im-
pact of supercongruent and incongruent information is provided by social judgment mod-
els, like the selective accessibility model (SAM; Mussweiler, 2001; 2003; Mussweiler & 
Strack, 2000). SAM makes several assumptions about the impact of accessible information 
during the judgment of the self or of others. Like the inclusion/exclusion model (Schwarz 
& Bless, 1992) SAM also explains when a judgment is likely to be assimilated to and when 
it is likely to be contrasted away from the present context. It has been assumed that assimi-
lation occurs if judges engage in a process of similarity-testing, and contrast results if they 
engage in dissimilarity testing. Both kinds of hypotheses were assumed to render different 
kinds of knowledge about the judgmental target accessible. Whether a judge engages in 
similarity or dissimilarity testing depends on several moderators. One of those is psycho-
logical closeness (Mussweiler, 2003). If target and standard are perceived as close, assimi-
lation is more likely to occur, whereas contrast should result when they are not.  
I argue for more psychological closeness between a supercongruent exemplar and 
the prototype than between an incongruent exemplar and the prototype. The deviance be-
tween a supercongruent exemplar and the prototype should be perceived more as a quanti-
tative deviance (cf. chapter 3). Exemplar and prototype share the same attributes or fea-
tures, they just differ in extremity. Incongruent exemplars, on the contrary, do not possess 
the attribute in question. Therefore, the deviance implies a qualitative difference. Presuma-
bly, a qualitative difference is easier and more automatically recognized and leads to the 
perception of less psychological closeness than a quantitative difference.  
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As a consequence, supercongruent exemplars might trigger more similarity testing 
because they are perceived as qualitatively similar to the category, whereas perceivers 
might engage in a process of dissimilarity testing when exposed to an incongruent exem-
plar because of the qualitative difference.  
If this assumption holds, any manipulation that draws people’s attention to the devi-
ance, should render assimilation of the stereotype to a supercongruent exemplar less likely 
to occur. Asking people to reflect upon the difference between a certain exemplar and a 
category by letting them judge the typicality of the exemplar might be one mean to call 
their attention to the deviance of the exemplar and thereby prevent assimilation of the 
stereotype. The two studies summarized in chapter 8 were carried out to test this modera-
tion effect.  
Typicality and Stereotype Judgment: Order of Measurement 
As outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, several researchers working in 
the domain of stereotype change or the inclusion/exclusion model have stressed the link 
between typicality and stereotype change (e.g., Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Johnston & 
Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; 
Wilder, 1984; Yzerbyt et al., 1999). In most of the studies the stereotype was assessed first 
and typicality of the exemplar thereafter. Yet, they were arguing for a mediational role of 
typicality in stereotype change which suggests a measurement of the two constructs in a 
vice versa order. Very few studies actually varied the order of the stereotype and typicality 
judgment. Johnston and Hewstone (1992, Exp. 2) found no impact of the order of meas-
urement on the stereotype rating. They concluded from that finding that participants judge 
the typicality of incongruent exemplars automatically (see also Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & 
Milberg, 1987). However, another study that demonstrated an impact of famous, positive 
exemplars on the stereotype of an otherwise rather negatively evaluated group could show 
that this effect vanishes by letting participants judge the typicality of the exemplars in-
between (Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Waenke, 1995, Exp. 3). Authors argued that 
typicality ratings have made people conscious about the atypicality of the exemplars, which 
in turn led to an exclusion or subtyping of the exemplars. Or, as Park, Wolsko and Judd put 
it: “One potential problem with the typicality task is that it forces participants to explicitly 
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think about the fit of confirming and disconfirming instances to the group. Thus, it may ac-
tually call attention to the poor fit” (2001, p. 331). 
Study 1 of the present dissertation demonstrated that participants are able to detect 
the deviance of a supercongruent exemplar as well as they could judge the deviance of an 
incongruent exemplar. Although supercongruent exemplars are judged as more typical, 
their extremity and deviance is realized when attention is directed to it. But because they 
just pose a quantitative deviance, this difference in extremity between prototype and super-
congruent exemplar might be easily overlooked. Confronted with this kind of exemplar 
typicality or deviance might not be judged automatically.  
It is hypothesized that unless participants' focus is not directed to the deviance, they 
should generalize from supercongruent exemplars to the category. This generalization 
process, however, is expected to be impeded by making people reflect upon the deviance 
and extremity of the exemplar. Asking participants to rate the typicality of these exemplars 
should fulfil this purpose.  
To sum up, I assume that the deviance of supercongruent exemplars is more unob-
trusive and that participants do not judge their typicality automatically. Order of typicality 
and stereotype assessment should therefore have a bigger impact when dealing with super-
congruent than when dealing with incongruent exemplars. Asking participants to rate the 
typicality of the exemplar before they judge the stereotype should prevent them from as-
similating their stereotype to the supercongruent information. Study 5 was carried out to 
test these assumptions. With Study 6 the assumed processes were tested more directly by 
manipulating the focus of comparison through different kinds of typicality questions.  
8.2 Study 5: Can Typicality Judgments Impede Generalization? 
8.2.1 Introduction 
Study 5 compared the perception and impact of an incongruent and supercongruent 
exemplar for the stereotype of business administration students as being relatively compe-
tent. The supercongruent exemplar was one with very high results on competence related 
tests, whereas the incongruent exemplar was one with fairly low results on the same tests. 
The objective deviance (in test points) from the prototype (captured in a pretest) was identi-
cal for the incongruent and supercongruent exemplars. As a point of reference for change a 
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control condition was included in which participants were confronted with a congruent ex-
emplar (equalled the pretest ratings). In the pretest as well as in the main study a category 
with the opposing stereotype was made salient in order to hold the standard of comparison 
constant for all participants. 
Additionally, the order of measurement has been manipulated. As a matter of fact, 
order of measurement was expected to influence stereotype ratings in case of supercongru-
ent exemplars, but less so in case of incongruent exemplars. Asking participants first about 
the typicality of a supercongruent exemplar should prevent them from assimilating their 
stereotype which should occur when participants judge the stereotype right after the ma-
nipulation. No generalization of an incongruent exemplar was expected to occur whatso-
ever order of measurement because their typicality has been shown to be judged more 
automatically (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Exp. 2).  
As an ancillary question, the impact of the two deviating exemplars on aspects of 
perceived variability has been studied as well. As briefly outlined within chapter 2.2, 
stereotypes are not just represented by their central tendency, they are supposed to include 
dispersion parameters as well (e.g., Linville et al., 1989). Hamburger (1994) has argued that 
the dispersion parameters are more sensitive to change than the central tendency parame-
ters. His model is based on the assumption that people mentally locate group members 
along an attribute dimension and that they record the frequency with which each value oc-
curs. Even if a deviant exemplar is subtyped and located at the tails of the distribution, it 
should still influence a group’s dispersion by stretching the distribution (see also Garcia-
Marques & Mackie, 1999; Paolini et al., 2004). According to findings of Garcia-Marques 
and Mackie (1999) supercongruent exemplars should not affect perceived homogeneity, 
whereas incongruent exemplars should lead to a decrease. In short, perceived variability 
was expected to be influenced by incongruent exemplars only. Since their typicality was 
assumed to be rated automatically, which renders their impact independent of order of 
measurement, order was not expected to moderate this impact.  
8.2.2 Method 
Pretest 
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A pretest was conducted in order to establish the population's stereotype about busi-
ness administration (target category) and educational science (comparison category) stu-
dents on the competence dimension. I assumed that business administration students would 
be perceived as relatively high in competence whereas educational science students would 
be perceived as relatively low in competence. Besides the rank order of the two groups, I 
was interested in the exact stereotypical expectations (i.e., the prototype) of the two catego-
ries on the competence dimension in order to create deviating exemplars. Procedure of this 
pre-test and the main study were similar to Study 3. Participants of this pretest learned that 
a survey had been conducted on a representative sample. This alleged study was supposed 
to assess participants’ judgments of different student groups regarding five job-qualifying 
attributes related to the competence dimension (i.e., problem-solving abilities, competence, 
ambition, efficiency, comprehension). As such, participants of the present study had to 
guess the results of the alleged survey.16 Every attribute was accompanied by two identical 
scales from 0 (very low on that attribute) to 100 (very high on that attribute). One scale was 
to convey their guess for business administration students and one to indicate their guess 
for educational science students. Fourteen students from the University of Jena, Germany, 
served as pretest participants. A 5 (Attribute) x 2 (Group) Repeated Measure ANOVA re-
vealed a highly significant effect for group, F(1, 13) = 10.92, p < .05, η² = .46. Globally, 
students of business administration were perceived as more competent (M = 57.81) than 
students of educational science (M = 44.94). The variable attribute and the interaction did 
not yield a significant impact, both Fs ≤ 2.74, both ps ≥ .09. The pattern was the same on 
all the attributes, but simple comparisons with sidak-adjustment revealed that the difference 
between the two groups was not significant on competence, p = .32, and on efficiency, p = 
.14.  
Participants and Design 
One-hundred-eighty-four students from the University of Jena, Germany, took part 
in the main study. They were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions of a 3 (Direc-
tion of deviance: incongruent vs. congruent vs. supercongruent) x 2 (Order: stereotype 
                                                 
16 I chose this rather indirect way of measuring stereotypes in order to reduce social desirability tendencies. 
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measures first vs. typicality measures first) between participants design. Everyone received 
a chocolate bar in exchange for participation.  
Procedure 
Each participant was assigned individually to an experimental condition when 
handed the booklet that contained instructions, stimulus materials, and dependent measures. 
After an introduction informing about the cover story, all participants were presented with 
the individual test results of an alumnus of business administration. The results on each 
subtest (problem solving abilities, ambition and comprehension) were communicated on 
scales ranging from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high). Depending on the experimental condi-
tion, the results either matched the stereotypical expectation for that group or deviated ei-
ther in an incongruent or supercongruent way. A supercongruent deviance was created by 
multiplying by 1.5 the pretest difference between the two groups and adding this number to 
the results of the pretest. This exemplar thus showed very high results on the competence-
related subtests. The results of an incongruent exemplar were created symmetrically by 
subtracting this number from the category prototype17. This exemplar had fairly low results 
on the same subtests. Participants had to evaluate the exemplar on two attributes (intelli-
gence, analytic abilities) in order to check the manipulation. Several other questions about 
the exemplar were asked in order to reinforce the coverstory (e.g., “I think tests like this are 
very valid in predicting the professional performance of a person.”). All answers had to be 
given on 9-point rating scales.  
Half of the participants rated the stereotype of the group next under the pretence of 
validating a new scale. The stereotype measure was followed by some items assessing per-
ception of typicality. Participants were told that the student would have to compete with 
alumni of her/his major in finding a job. For this reason, they should compare the single 
exemplar with other members of the group. For the other half of the participants the order 
of the dependent measures was reversed. Participants were carefully debriefed at the end of 
the study.  
                                                 
17 For instance, the prototypical business student was expected to achieve 62 points on “ambition”. In contrast 
the prototypical educational science students was expected to gain 39 points on that subtest. Hence, a super-
congruent business student had 96 points, while an incongruent business student had 28 points on ambition. 
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Dependent measures 
Several measures were included for the assessment of the group’s central tendency, 
perceived group homogeneity, and perceptions of exemplar’s typicality. According to the 
aim of this study, the main dependent variable was the central tendency stereotype measure. 
This measure consisted of seven competence related traits which were taken from Fiske et 
al. (2002). Participants rated how characteristic each of those traits was of business admini-
stration students in general. They were asked not to state their own opinion but rather to try 
to estimate the results of a public opinion poll. “I think, that society believes students of 
business administration to be …”. This sentence was followed by seven stereotype-relevant 
traits (capable, competent, efficient, intelligent, independent, analytic, and ambitious). 
Judgments were given on a rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Next, 
participants had to indicate how similar they perceive business administration students to 
be to each other. Answers had to be given on a rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all simi-
lar) to 9 (extremely similar). The same ratings followed for the group of educational sci-
ence students. In order to measure perceived typicality, participants had to judge how much 
the exemplar deviated from the majority of the group (recoded), how well the exemplar fit-
ted the image of the group, and how typical they perceived the exemplar to be for the 
group. All answers to the typicality items were given on 9-point scales, with high numbers 
indicating higher perceived typicality.  
8.2.3 Results and Discussion 
The responses of twelve participants equally distributed over all six conditions had 
to be discarded from the analyses because they were identified as outliers based on the cri-
terion of z > 2 on the main dependent variable, namely the central tendency ratings for the 
target group. Two items measuring exemplar’s assumed competence were averaged, r(172) 
= .62, p < .05, and served as a manipulation check. Higher values indicate higher perceived 
competence. Each participant rated both groups on traits concerning the competence di-
mension18. One index was created for the competence of business administration students 
(α = .68). The three items measuring typicality of the exemplar were averaged (α = .81). 
Higher values indicate higher perceived typicality. All simple comparisons in the following 
                                                 
18The ratings for the comparison group were included to keep the frame of reference constant and to increase 
ecological validity but were not analyzed. 
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analyses have been carried out with sidak adjustment. All means and standard deviations 
reported below are depicted in Table 5. 
Manipulation check 
A successful manipulation would lead to the judgment of incongruent business stu-
dent as being less competent than the supercongruent business student. The judgment of the 
congruent exemplar should fall in-between. Because the manipulation check occurred in all 
conditions directly after the exemplar manipulation, order should have neither alone nor in 
interaction any impact. Therefore, I just expected to find a main effect of kind of deviance. 
A 3 (Kind of deviance) x 2 (Order) ANOVA with exemplar’s perceived competence as de-
pendent variable yielded a significant main effect for kind of deviance, F(2,166) = 73.35, p 
< .05, η² = .47. The incongruent exemplar was perceived as less competent (M = 4.20) than 
the supercongruent exemplar (M = 6.80) and the congruent exemplar fell in-between (M = 
5.90). All ratings differed significantly from one another, all ps < .05. Order had neither 
alone nor in interaction any impact, both Fs ≤ 1.10. Although the deviant exemplars have 
been constructed in such a way that they were equally different from the congruent exem-
plar, mean levels revealed that the difference between the incongruent and the congruent 
exemplar seems to be bigger than the difference between the congruent and the supercon-
gruent exemplar. A -1 2 -1 -1 2 -1 contrast, comparing the congruent with the two deviating 
conditions, supports this observation statistically, F(1,166) = 4.50, p < .05, η² = .03. I will 
come back to this finding in the discussion of this study.  
Typicality 
It has been hypothesized that the supercongruent business student would be per-
ceived as more typical than the incongruent business student even if they display the same 
objective amount of deviance from the prototype. The same 3 x 2 ANOVA as above was 
carried out and yielded a significant effect of kind of deviance, F(2,166) = 48.72, p < .05, 
η² =.37. The incongruent exemplar was indeed perceived as less typical than the supercon-
gruent exemplar (M = 4.17 vs. M = 6.04). The congruent exemplar was perceived as most 
typical (M = 6.26). Moreover, the analysis yielded a significant interaction between kind of 
deviance and order, F(2,166) = 4.62, p < .05, η² =.05. While order had no impact on the 
typicality ratings of the congruent exemplar, p = .13, order had a significant impact in the 
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supercongruent condition, p < .05, and a marginal significant impact in the incongruent 
condition, p = .06. In both cases, deviant exemplars have been judged as more typical after 
the stereotype had been rated. When typicality was rated first, the typicality ratings of the 
supercongruent and congruent exemplar differed, p < .05, with the congruent exemplar be-
ing perceived as more typical. Yet, there was no difference when the stereotype was as-
sessed first, p = .43.  
The supercongruent exemplar has been clearly judged as more typical than the in-
congruent exemplar. This difference was independent of the order of measurement. Both of 
the deviating exemplars, incongruent and supercongruent ones, have been judged as more 
typical when participants rated the stereotype of the group first. However, the difference 
due to order was even bigger for the supercongruent exemplar. This could be due to an as-
similation of the stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar, thereby decreasing the distance 
between the prototype and the deviant exemplar.  
Central tendency 
I expected to find an impact of exemplar manipulation on the central tendency rat-
ing of the group. Participants should assimilate their perception of business administration 
students to the supercongruent exemplar, which means that they are perceived as more 
competent than in the other conditions. This assimilation, however, should be blocked by 
asking participants to judge the typicality of the supercongruent exemplar in-between. Or-
der of measurement was assumed to have less of an impact for incongruent exemplars. The 
same ANOVA as in the two previous sections was carried out and yielded a significant 
main effect for direction of deviance, F(2,166) = 5.38, p < .05, η² = .06. This main effect 
was qualified by an interaction with order, F(2,166) = 3.03, p = .05, η² = .04. When typical-
ity was assessed first, stereotype ratings did not differ according to exemplar, all ps ≥ .74. 
However, when the stereotype was assessed first, business administration students in gen-
eral were judged as more competent after a supercongruent exemplar (M = 5.60) compared 
with a congruent (M = 5.16), or incongruent one (M = 4.96), both ps < .05. Ratings in the 
congruent and incongruent condition did not differ, p = .51. Just in the supercongruent con-
ditions stereotype ratings differed significantly depending on the order of measurement, p < 
.05 (other ps ≥ .27). Ratings were more stereotypical when participants rated the stereotype 
first (M = 5.60) compared with the condition when they rated the typicality first (M = 5.26).  
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Homogeneity measure 
The same ANOVA as in the previous sections was carried out. The analysis yielded 
a significant main effect for direction of deviance, F(2, 166) = 3.48, p < .05, η² = .04. Busi-
ness students were judged to be less homogeneous when participants had been confronted 
with an incongruent business student (M = 6.08), and more homogenous when the exemplar 
was supercongruent (M = 6.87), p < .05. Homogeneity ratings of participants confronted 
with a congruent exemplar fell in-between (M = 6.63) but did not differ significantly from 
one of the other two, both ps ≥ .22. Order had neither alone nor in interaction any signifi-
cant impact, Fs < 2.74, ps ≥ .10. Mean levels are indicating a slight tendency to judge the 
group as more homogeneous when typicality was assessed first.  
 
Table 5. Means and standard deviations on exemplar judgment, perceived typicality, central ten-
dency and perceived homogeneity dependent on direction of deviance (incongruent, congruent, or 
supercongruent) and order of measurement (Study 5). 
 Order of Measurement 
 Stereotype first Typicality first 
 direction of deviance  direction of deviance 
 ic cong sc ic cong sc 
        
Competence Ex. 4.09 
(1.32) 
5.98 
(0.70) 
6.96 
(1.08) 
4.31 
(1.17) 
5.83 
(1.55) 
 6.64 
(0.99) 
 
Typicality 
 
4.47 
(1.09) 
 
6.00 
(1.16) 
 
6.47 
(1.17) 
 
3.85 
(1.09) 
 
6.51 
(1.40) 
  
5.63 
(1.60) 
 
Competence Gr. 
 
 
Homogeneity 
 
4.96 
(0.56) 
 
5.90 
(1.76) 
 
5.16 
(0.60) 
 
6.25 
(1.51) 
 
5.60 
(0.58) 
 
6.81 
(1.64) 
 
5.14 
(0.63) 
 
6.28 
(1.65) 
 
5.29 
(0.63) 
 
7.00 
(1.65) 
  
5.26 
(0.58) 
 
6.93 
(1.27) 
Note. N = 172. Except for the stereotype ratings means presented are rated on a 1-9 scale. Stereotype ratings 
were made on a scale ranging from 1-7. Higher values indicate higher perceived competence, higher per-
ceived typicality, higher levels of stereotypes, and higher perceived homogeneity.  
 
To sum up, results confirmed the first hypothesis regarding typicality. A rather in-
competent business student (incongruent) was perceived as less typical than a highly com-
petent business student (supercongruent). Order of measurement influenced the perception 
of typicality of the supercongruent business student. He was perceived as equally typical as 
the congruent business student when the stereotype was assessed first. Yet, asking partici-
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pants to judge the typicality in the first place, led them to judge the supercongruent busi-
ness student as less typical than the congruent one. It seems as if people are able to notice 
the deviance of supercongruent exemplars if their attention is drawn to it. But when they 
judged the stereotype in-between and assimilated the prototype to the supercongruent ex-
emplar, perceived typicality was higher. And indeed participants seemed to have assimi-
lated their stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar but just if they are not asked to judge 
the typicality in-between. Hence, as expected, in case of a supercongruent exemplar the 
stereotype judgement was affected by the order measurement. Order did not have a signifi-
cant impact on the stereotype rating following incongruent exemplars. This is in line with 
earlier findings by Johnston and Hewstone (1992, Exp. 2), who argued that people sponta-
neously judge the typicality of an incongruent exemplar and therefore order of measure-
ment does not have any impact. The present results on the homogeneity measure are repli-
cating previous research by Garcia-Marques and Mackie (1999). Perceived homogeneity 
was lower in the incongruent condition than in the supercongruent condition. Although 
both levels did not differ significantly from the congruent condition, means are pointing to 
a higher change in the incongruent condition than in the supercongruent one.  
Although exemplars were created in a way, that they were equally distant from the 
prototype of the category, the difference in perceived competence seems to be bigger be-
tween the incongruent and the congruent exemplar compared with the difference between 
the congruent and the supercongruent exemplar. A first possible explanation could be ceil-
ing effects. The supercongruent exemplar was more extreme than the incongruent exemplar 
and therefore trait ratings for the supercongruent exemplar could have been subject of ceil-
ing effects. No evidence was found for this explanation, because variance was not restricted 
for the trait ratings of supercongruent exemplars and answers seem to be normally distrib-
uted. A second possible explanation is based on the assumption that person perception is 
equally context dependent as group perception whereby the context leads either to an as-
similated or contrasted judgment (e.g., Eiser, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Whether or 
not the exemplar judgment is affected by the information about the group-membership 
might rest on the same processes involved (and described before) in the stereotype judg-
ment. Since typicality was rated in all conditions after the manipulation check (i.e., exem-
plar ratings), the findings should parallel the stereotype ratings in the stereotype first condi-
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tion. That means, the judgment of a supercongruent exemplar might be assimilated to the 
prototype, whereas the judgment of an incongruent exemplars might not be affected by the 
prototype of the category. Although this assumption cannot be tested by means of a post-
hoc test with a different sample, it could be examined at least whether the exemplar judg-
ments were indeed influenced by the information about the group-membership and whether 
distances would be equal when no such information is provided. Therefore, I presented the 
same exemplars as in the main study to 30 participants without mentioning any group 
membership. Participants were asked to judge the competence of the exemplar in the same 
manner as in the main study. Deviance of exemplars was manipulated between participants. 
The two items (intelligent, analytical abilities) were again highly correlated, r(30) = .61, p 
< .05, and therefore averaged. Two orthogonal contrasts have been created: One comparing 
the congruent with the two deviating conditions (C1: -1 2 -1), and the other one comparing 
the incongruent and supercongruent condition (C2: -1 0 1). The first contrast revealed that 
the distance between the competence rating of the incongruent exemplar and the congruent 
exemplar was as big as the distance between the congruent and the supercongruent exem-
plar, C1: t(27) = -.17, p = .86. As expected, the second contrast yielded significant, C2: 
t(27) = -6.67, p < .05. The supercongruent exemplar (M = 7.25) was perceived as more 
competent than the congruent exemplar (M = 5.65), which in turn was perceived a more 
competent than an incongruent exemplar (M = 3.90). Hence, if the information was pre-
sented without categorical information, the deviant exemplars seem to be equally distant 
from the prototype. The pre-condition of creating exemplars with an equal distance to the 
prototype was successful. Presumably, the supercongruent exemplar was assimilated to the 
prototype in the main study. This assimilation, though, was probably not strong enough to 
render the supercongruent exemplar congruent otherwise no assimilation of the stereotype, 
no order effect, and especially no difference between the supercongruent and congruent ex-
emplar on the exemplar judgment should have occurred.  
One of the major aims of this study was to test whether an assimilation in case of 
supercongruent exemplars is inevitable or whether it can be blocked by drawing people’s 
attention towards the deviance. The order effect demonstrates that drawing participants’ 
attention towards the deviance makes generalization less likely to occur. But is it enough to 
let participants compare the exemplar with the category? Or has the focus of comparison 
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been manipulated through the kind of typicality question? The first item in the row of typi-
cality items asked participants to judge how much the exemplar is deviating from the proto-
type of the category. The selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2001; 2003; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) assumes that the nature of the hypothesis that is tested influ-
ences whether assimilation or contrast is likely to occur. Asking participants about the de-
viance of the exemplar, could trigger the hypothesis that exemplar and category are dissimi-
lar. This in turn, could have prevented participants from assimilating the prototype to the 
exemplar. Instead, if the first item would have asked participants to judge the similarity of 
the supercongruent exemplar and the category, results on the stereotype measure could 
have been similar to those in the stereotype first condition. Asking to judge the similarity 
might trigger a similarity focus and thereby leading participants to assimilate the stereotype 
to the supercongruent exemplar. This assumption was tested within Study 6. In the absence 
of any typicality item, we expected to replicate the assimilation effect obtained in Study 5.  
8.3 Study 6: Can Typicality Judgments Draw Focus on Similarities or 
Dissimilarities? 
8.3.1 Introduction 
Hewstone and colleagues tested in one study the impact of processing instructions 
on subtyping versus generalization of an incongruent exemplar (Hewstone et al., 2000). 
They demonstrated that a focus on differences leads to similar results as no focus manipula-
tion, which is no change, whereas a focus on similarities leads to less pronounced stereo-
types. This result suggests that the instruction to focus on dissimilarities seems to resemble 
what people are already doing when confronted with an incongruent exemplar. As men-
tioned before, I assume that the default process when dealing with supercongruent exem-
plars is similarity testing. Focus of comparison was manipulated through different kinds of 
typicality items in Study 6 to test this idea. The aims of the study were twofold. First, it 
aimed at replicating the findings of Study 5 with a different stereotype. A stereotype was 
chosen that is related to warmth. Study 6 makes use of the stereotype of physics students as 
lacking warmth. I expected to replicate the finding that the stereotype is assimilated to the 
supercongruent exemplar if the stereotype is assessed directly after the manipulation with-
out participants having to judge the exemplar's typicality in-between. The second aim of 
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Study 6 was to test, whether participants' tendency to generalize from a supercongruent ex-
emplar to the category will be influenced by the kind of typicality judgment they have to 
make. Assimilation of the stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar should be attenuated 
by asking participants to rate the typicality of the exemplar in terms of deviance (i.e., dis-
similarity). However, if participants have to rate the typicality in the first place but in terms 
of similarity, they should still assimilate the stereotype to the exemplar. An incongruent 
exemplar condition was not realized as the focus of this study is on the processes that are 
triggered by supercongruent exemplars. 
8.3.2 Method 
Pretest 
A pretest has been conducted in order to figure out the stereotype about physics stu-
dents (target category) compared with students of social science (comparison category) on 
the warmth dimension. The assumption was that physics students would be perceived as 
lacking warmth whereas social science students would be perceived as relatively warm. 
The procedure of the pretest was equivalent to the one of Study 5. Pretest-participants were 
again requested to estimate the results of an ostensible survey on job-qualifications of stu-
dents with different majors, but this time on subtests related to social competence or 
warmth (social orientation, capacity for teamwork, helpfulness, sociableness). Seventeen 
students from the University of Jena, Germany, served as pretest participants. A 4 (Attrib-
ute) x 2 (Group) Repeated-Measure ANOVA revealed a significant effect for group, 
F(1,16) = 68.40, p < .05, η² = .81. Physics students were perceived as less warm (M = 
37.61) than students of social science (M = 75.95) over and above the single attributes. Fur-
thermore, the analysis yielded a significant interaction with attribute, F(3,14) = 3.57; p 
<.05, η² = .43, but simple comparisons demonstrated that the difference between the two 
groups was significant on all the attributes, all ps < .05.  
Participants and Design  
 One-hundred-fifty-two students from the University of Jena, Germany, participated 
in the data collection. Data of two participants was not inserted because they took part in 
many similar studies before, leaving a sample size of one-hundred-fifty students. All par-
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ticipants received a chocolate bar for participation and they could take part in a lottery for 
book vouchers. The design of the experiment was a 2 (Exemplar: congruent vs. supercon-
gruent) x 3 (Order: stereotype first vs. typicality first/similarity vs. typicality 
first/difference) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
Procedure and cover-story were by and large the same as in Study 5. Participants 
were presented with the individual test results of an alumnus of physics. All results for each 
subtest (social orientation, helpfulness, capacity for teamwork, sociableness) were adminis-
tered on a scale ranging from 0 (very low) to 100 (very high). Depending on the experimen-
tal condition of the participant, the results either deviated from the pretest value (supercon-
gruent) or did not deviate (congruent). A supercongruent deviance was created by subtract-
ing the difference between the two groups from the value expected for physics students 
leading to a lower level of social competence. Participants had to judge the exemplar on 
several attributes (e.g., social competence, orientation towards his associates) in order to 
check the manipulation. Several other questions about the exemplar were asked in order to 
backup the cover-story (e.g., “I think tests like this are very valid in predicting the profes-
sional performance of a person”).  
Two third of the participants had two rate the typicality of the exemplar before they 
were asked about the stereotype. In the typicality first/similarity condition the typicality 
item was framed in a similarity mode (“How similar, do you think, is this exemplar to other 
members of his/her group?”). Participants in the typicality first/difference condition had to 
answer the following question instead: “How different is this exemplar from the majority of 
his/her group?” In both exemplar conditions participants had to rate the stereotype of both 
groups (target and comparison) on attributes pertaining to warmth and competence next.19 
Competence related traits were included to increase reliability. We did not expect the ma-
nipulation to have any impact on this dimension. Participants in the stereotype first condi-
tion answered the stereotype measure directly after the manipulation of the check. All par-
ticipants were carefully debriefed before leaving.  
Dependent measures 
                                                 
19 Comparison group ratings were just included for ecological validity and were not analyzed (cf. Study 3). 
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To measure stereotype change attributes were selected based on the research of 
Fiske et al. (2002) and were covering the warmth and competence dimension. Introduction 
and scales were identical to the ones used in Study 5. In addition to the competence-related 
traits of Study 5, several warmth-related traits (warm, good natured, companionable, help-
ful, capable of teamwork, sensitive, sociable) were added. Traits pertaining to the two di-
mensions were alternated.  
8.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Three items measuring the exemplar’s social competence (e.g., “I think this person 
would be able to lead a team”) were averaged (α = .74) and served as a mean index of ex-
emplar’s assumed warmth. The seven attributes capturing the warmth judgment of physics 
students were averaged and served as the main dependent variable (α = .72). Eight cases 
distributed over all six conditions had to be discarded from the analyses because they were 
identified as outliers based on the criterion of z > 2 on the main dependent variable, the 
warmth rating of physics students. The six competence related traits were averaged as well 
(α = .77). All simple comparisons in the following analyses have been carried out with si-
dak adjustment. All means and standard deviations reported below are depicted in Table 6. 
Manipulation check  
 Like in Study 5 the manipulation check item (mean index of exemplar’s assumed 
warmth) was submitted to a 2 (Exemplar) x 3 (Order) ANOVA. As expected, a main effect 
of exemplar occurred, F(1,136) = 24.59, p < .05, η² = .15. The supercongruent exemplar 
was perceived as less warm and less suited for jobs with a lot of social contact (M = 2.39) 
compared with the congruent exemplar (M = 3.33). Order was not expected to have any 
impact, because it has not been manipulated at the time of exemplar rating, both Fs ≤ 2.04, 
ps ≥ .14.  
Stereotype 
The supercongruent exemplar was assumed to lead to an assimilation of the stereo-
type as long as people are not forced to think about the typicality of the exemplar in-
between or if people are made to think about the typicality in-between but with a focus on 
similarities. Hence, higher levels of stereotyping (i.e., lower warmth ratings) were expected 
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in these conditions compared with the congruent condition. No assimilation of the stereo-
type or even contrast was assumed to occur when participants were made to think about the 
difference between exemplar and category. The manipulations were not expected to show 
any effect on the non-manipulated dimension (i.e., competence). An ANOVA with repeated 
measures on physics students’ warmth and competence yielded a significant three-way-
interaction of exemplar x typicality/order x dimension, F(2,136) = 3.15, p <.05, η² =.04. In 
order to explore the three-way interaction further, I conducted separate analyses for the 
warmth and the competence judgment. While no significant effects emerged for the compe-
tence judgement, all Fs ≤ 1.2620, the analysis on the warmth judgment yielded a main effect 
of exemplar, F(1,136) = 4.69, p <.05, η² =.03. Physics students were judged as less warm in 
the supercongruent conditions compared with the congruent conditions (M = 3.96 vs. M = 
4.26). Additionally, a marginally significant effect of order emerged, F(2,136) = 3.04, p = 
.05, η² = .04. Simple comparisons indicated that physics students were judged as less warm 
when participants had to judge the similarity between the exemplar and the category (M = 
3.87) compared with those conditions, when they immediately rated the stereotype (M = 
4.27), p = .06. The predicted interaction, however, did not render significant, F(2,136) = 
2.06, p = .13, η² =.03. At least, the expected pattern emerged by testing simple compari-
sons: Kind of exemplar had a significant impact on the judgment of physics students 
warmth when stereotype was assessed first, p < .05, or when typicality was assessed in a 
similarity mode, p < .05 (one-tailed). No significant differences emerged when typicality 
was assessed in a difference mode, p = .71. When the stereotype was assessed first, partici-
pants judged physics students as less warm in the supercongruent condition (M = 4.00) than 
in the congruent condition (M = 4.54). The same difference emerged when typicality was 
assessed first, but in a similarity mode (M = 3.67 vs. M = 4.09). No difference was ob-
served when typicality was assessed first in a difference mode (M = 4.22 vs. M = 4.14).  
Although the simple comparisons revealed the expected pattern, the two-way inter-
action did not yield significant. To check whether all selected warmth traits are actually 
loading on the same underlying factor, a principal component analysis with varimax rota-
tion was conducted. The analysis yielded two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. 
One was summarizing the traits “warm” and “good-natured”, the other factor was summa-
                                                 
20 Means for competence ratings are therefore not depicted in Table 6.  
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rizing the traits “capable of teamwork”, “companionable”, “helpful”, “sensitive”, and “so-
ciable”. According to Leach (2007) the warmth dimension can be further differentiated into 
morality (e.g., honest, sincere), sociability (e.g., warm, good-natured, sociable), coopera-
tiveness (e.g., helpful), compatibility (e.g., companionable). Although his distinction does 
not seem to fit the results of the present factor analysis, it still suggests that warmth might 
consist of different characteristics. For the present results a different interpretation might be 
suitable. The study was framed as one concerning job-qualifying attributes. The first factor, 
however, consists of traits which might be less relevant in a professional context and can be 
summarized more as general warmth, while the second factor seems to comprise traits 
which are often times demanded in job advertisements and are referred to as social skills. 
This distinction might have been even more stressed by the competence related traits which 
occurred in-between. Based on the factor analysis, I created two indices, one for warmth 
(“warm”, “good-natured”, r = .47) and one for social skills (“capable of teamwork”, “so-
ciable”, “companionable”, “helpful”, and “sensitive”21, α = .68). 
Separate analyses on these two indices revealed that results on the second factor 
(i.e., social skills) were fairly similar to the results on the general index: A main effect of 
exemplar emerged, F(1,136) = 3.56, p = .06, η² = .03, in the expected direction, but the in-
teraction was not significant, F < 1. However, results on the first factor (i.e., warmth) were 
in line with the predictions. Besides a main effect for typicality, F(2,136) = 5.19, p < .05, η² 
= .07, the expected interaction occurred, F(2,136) = 4.19, p < .05, η² = .06 (see Table 6). 
Simple comparisons revealed that judgments differed between the congruent and supercon-
gruent condition when typicality was assessed first with a focus on similarities, p < .05. 
Physics students were judged to be more warm in the congruent condition than in the su-
percongruent condition (M = 4.52 vs. M = 3.80). The same significant pattern emerged 
when the stereotype was assessed first, p = .05 (one-tailed), with physics students being 
judged as more warm in the congruent condition than in the supercongruent condition (M = 
4.71 vs. M = 4.17). A marginal significant difference in the opposite direction occurred 
when typicality was assessed first and was formulated in a difference manner, (M = 4.64 vs. 
M = 5.15), p = .06 (one-tailed), providing evidence for a contrast effect.  
 
                                                 
21 In order of their factor loadings (attribute with the highest factor loading first) 
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations on stereotype judgment dependent on kind of exemplar 
(congruent or supercongruent) and focus of comparison (similarity, dissimilarity, default) (Study 6). 
 Direction of deviance 
 congruent supercongruent 
 order  order 
 Typicality 
first/Sim. 
Typicality 
first/Diff. 
Stereotype    
first 
Typicality 
first/Sim. 
Typicality 
first/Diff. 
Stereotype  
first 
        
Warmth (general) 4.09 (0.76) 4.14 (0.76) 4.54 (0.86) 3.67 (0.87) 4.22 (0.84) 4.00 (0.63) 
F1 (warmth) 4.52 (1.27) 4.64 (0.90) 4.71 (1.14) 3.80 (1.08) 5.15 (1.38) 4.17 (0.91) 
F2 (social skills) 3.92 (0.88) 3.94 (1.01) 4.47 (0.95) 3.62 (1.07) 3.85 (0.93) 3.93 (0.89) 
Note. N = 142. Mean ratings are made on 1 - 9 scales. Lower values indicate stronger stereotypes.  
 
To sum up, Study 6 shed some further light on the role of order of measurement in 
stereotype change and the processes that are triggered by a supercongruent exemplar. The 
stereotype of physics students as lacking warmth was assimilated to a supercongruent phys-
ics student, and thereby polarized, when the experimental task did not lead participants to 
focus on dissimilarities. Letting participants judge the deviance of the exemplar from the 
other members of the category fulfilled the purpose of drawing participants’ attention to-
wards the extremity of the exemplar, thereby triggering a focus on dissimilarities.  
Warmth traits in this study were loading on two different factors. The expected pat-
tern just occurred on the factor which consisted of the traits “warm” and “good-natured”. 
On the second factor a main effect of exemplar emerged, but not the expected interaction. 
Results especially differed between the two indices in the condition with the manipulation 
to focus on dissimilarities. A repeated measurement ANOVA with both factors confirmed 
this observation statistically. The analysis yielded a significant interaction between factor 
and typicality, F(2,136) = 4.04, p < .05, η² = .06. Just in those conditions in which partici-
pants’ focus was directed on differences, ratings on factor 1 (warmth) were higher than on 
factor 2 (social skills) (M = 4.90 vs. M = 3.89), indicating that the dissimilarity focus ma-
nipulation led participants to rate physics students as quite warm (factor 1) providing evi-
dence even for a contrast effect, whereas the social skills ratings (factor 2) do not seem to 
be much affected by the dissimilarity focus manipulation. The two traits which were load-
ing on the first factor were the first two traits in the questionnaire. The manipulation with 
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which a focus on dissimilarities was induced might have been not strong enough to affect 
all the traits. But since content and time of measurement are confounded here, I cannot 
draw any firm conclusions about why the expected results only occurred on one subdimen-
sion and not on the other one.  
8.4 Discussion of Part II 
 Studies summarized in Part II investigated the basic process of stereotype polariza-
tion due to supercongruent information. One way of gaining further knowledge about a 
process is to identify those situations in which the process is interrupted and the effect does 
not occur. I postulated that perceivers might not be easily aware of the deviance of super-
congruent exemplars because their deviance is just a matter of degree, and, hence, can be 
understood as a quantitative deviance. Incongruent exemplars, on the contrary, might con-
stitute more of a qualitative deviance because they are likely to do not possess the stereo-
typic attribute. Based on this reasoning, I expected the default process when dealing with 
supercongruent exemplars to be a focus on similarities instead of dissimilarities. This in 
turn could lead to the assimilation process which has been demonstrated in Part I. If this 
assumption holds, people should be less likely to assimilate the stereotype to a supercon-
gruent exemplar when their attention is drawn towards the deviance of the exemplar. Ask-
ing perceivers to judge the degree of an exemplar’s deviance before judging the category, 
was assumed to make them aware of the deviating nature and, hence, should render assimi-
lation of the stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar less likely to occur. Technically 
speaking, the order of typicality and stereotype measurement should have a moderating im-
pact on the basic effect of supercongruent exemplars on the stereotype.  
Study 5 and 6 replicated the results summarized in Part I in demonstrating that gen-
eralization of supercongruent exemplars is very likely to occur when the stereotype is as-
sessed directly after the exemplar presentation. This generalization however was blocked 
by asking participants to judge the deviance of the exemplar from other members of the 
category before the stereotype was assessed. This effect appeared for two different stereo-
types and seems to be independent of valence and content of the stereotype. Furthermore, 
when the typicality question implied a similarity judgment, generalization occurred inde-
pendent of order of measurement (Study 6). The parallel effects of direct stereotype as-
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sessment and stereotype assessment after similarity judgment suggest that engaging in simi-
larity testing seems to be the default reaction when confronted with supercongruent mem-
bers of a category. On the contrary, order of measurement did not affect reactions when 
confronted with an incongruent exemplar (no change; Study 5). This finding replicates pre-
vious research (Johnston and Hewstone, 1992, Exp. 2; Hewstone et al., 2000) and suggests, 
on the one hand, that typicality of incongruent exemplars is judged automatically, and on 
the other hand, that incongruent exemplars are likely to trigger a focus on dissimilarities. 
Hewstone and colleagues have mentioned this before: “The instruction to focus on differ-
ences between exemplars should merely encourage perceivers to do what they already seem 
to do” (2000; p. 402).  
The basic aim of the present studies was to investigate the impact of direction of de-
viance on the central tendency facet of a stereotype. But stereotypes probably do not just 
consist of beliefs about the central tendency. Several researchers pointed to the necessity of 
studying perceived variability as another facet of stereotypes (Hamburger, 1994; Linville et 
al., 1989; Judd et al., 1991). And, not just on the central tendency facet of a stereotype, also 
on perceived dispersion, supercongruent and incongruent led to diverging effects in Study 
5. Incongruent exemplars led to higher perceived variability than supercongruent exem-
plars. This finding is replicating previous research (e.g., Garcia-Marques & Mackie; 1999).  
In Study 5, the assimilation of the stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar was 
paralleled by the finding that exemplar judgments have been also biased in a way that the 
supercongruent exemplar deviated less from the prototype than the incongruent exemplar. 
If we expect supercongruent exemplars to be processed with a focus on similarities between 
exemplar and prototype, an assimilation of the exemplar judgment to the prototype ought to 
be expected. These results open up an additional possibility how to study the processes in-
volved in dealing with incongruent vs. supercongruent information. In contrast to stereo-
type judgments which are always inflicted with social desirability concerns, exemplar 
judgments should be less threatening to participants. Future studies might provide partici-
pants with exemplar information that is accompanied or not with information on group 
membership. This information should be just affecting the judgment of a supercongruent 
exemplar and this effect should be mediated by focus of comparison, which could be meas-
ured in an unrelated task (see for a similar procedure Mussweiler et al., 2003).  
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Why do people react differently to incongruent and supercongruent information? 
Usually, questions like this are answered by a mediational model. But, the order effect ob-
tained for the measurement of typicality and stereotype poses an additional reason why it 
might be difficult to show a mediation by perceived typicality (see also chapter 7). Usually, 
the mediator is conducted before the outcome variable (Kenny et al., 1998). However, this 
procedure is not possible in the present context because the measurement of the mediator 
prevents the effect. But the present studies are, yet, a first step in answering the process 
question. They suggest that the process might not be driven purely by a motivation to pro-
tect and strengthen the stereotype. Instead, they point to a rather cognitive process (for a 
further discussion on the process see chapter 10.2).  
Since stereotypes often-times imply negative consequences, like discrimination, 
they might want to be prevented from polarization in many circumstances. The present ex-
periments, at least, point to peoples' ability to detect a deviance in case of supercongruent 
exemplars. Yet, this does not seem to happen automatically. In real life it might be often 
difficult to make people aware of the deviance. But maybe, there are other, more practical 
means how people can be prevented from assimilating their stereotype to a supercongruent 
exemplar. In the third empirical chapter I would like to present one more study which in-
vestigates whether subtyping of supercongruent exemplars can be triggered. 
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9. Part III: The Positive Side of Subtyping (Moderator 2: Get-
ting to Know the Deviant) 
9.1 Introduction 
Studies summarized so far within this dissertation indicated that an assimilation to 
supercongruent exemplars is very likely to occur and is independent of the content (warmth 
vs. competence) and valence of the stereotype. Since many social stereotypes are rather 
negative, the next aim was, to learn how exclusion or subtyping of those exemplars from 
our picture of a social group could be reinforced.  
Subtyping has been defined before as the process by that exemplars who disconfirm 
the stereotype are treated as exceptions that prove the rule, get mentally clustered together 
and do not affect the stereotype (Maurer, et al., 1995). Previous research has shown that 
one factor influencing whether subtyping or generalization of an incongruent exemplar is 
likely to occur, is the absence or presence of neutral information. Participants in a study of 
Kunda and Oleson (1995; Exp. 4) were presented with an unpromiscuous gay man who 
contradicted the stereotype of gay men being rather promiscuous (incongruent). Either par-
ticipants received no additional information about the target, or the pseudo-relevant infor-
mation that he works as an accountant. It turned out that participants viewed gay men in 
general to be less promiscuous when they received no additional information about the ex-
emplars' profession. But generalization from the incongruent exemplar was blocked when 
participants were provided with information about the profession. Promiscuity of gay men 
was rated in this condition just like in a baseline condition. Kunda and Oleson reasoned that 
the subtyping attempt is either triggered by the experience of surprise or by the motivation 
to maintain the stereotype. In any case, people seem to use the neutral information in order 
to justify subtyping.  
Kunda and Oleson (1995) included an overly stereotypic condition in the very same 
study to rule out some alternative explanations. Although their study provides evidence that 
generalization of supercongruent exemplars can not be blocked by providing neutral addi-
tional information, I believe a second test is worthwhile. First, because Kunda and Oleson, 
since they were mainly interested in the effect of incongruent exemplars, did not provide 
evidence that the overly stereotypic exemplar they chose was actually deviating from proto-
9. Part III: The Positive Side of Subtyping  87 
 
typical expectations. Therefore, we do not know whether the exemplar was actually super-
congruent or whether it was just congruent. Second, null-effects can occur due to several 
reasons. The additional information Kunda and Oleson provided was that the target works 
as an accountant. The picture typically painted of accountants is that they are orderly, me-
thodical, introverted, and unsociable (see Bedeian et al., 1986). A pretest in which Kunda 
and Oleson tested whether a gay man who works as an accountant is perceived as more or 
less promiscuous than gay men in general showed no significant difference but a tendency 
towards gay men working as an accountant being perceived as less promiscuous. The addi-
tional information Kunda and Oleson chose might thus have been more applicable to ex-
plain away an incongruent deviance than a supercongruent one.  
9.2 Study 7: The Impact of Additional Information 
One additional aim of the present study was to introduce a new paradigm for study-
ing stereotype change, one which is rather unobtrusive and more realistic. Participants be-
lieved that they were playing a game against several other students with whom they were 
ostensibly connected via the server. Their group membership was manipulated by provid-
ing participants with some information about their co-players. I manipulated the perception 
of exemplars warmth by giving feedback about the other players' decisions. Thereby an en-
counter with a supercongruent exemplar was established.  
9.2.1 Method 
The stereotype of business students as being not very social and warm was used for 
this study. Through feedback in a fictitious experimental game, participants were brought 
into contact with a supercongruent business student who behaved selfish in this game. Half 
of the experimental participants received the additional information about the business stu-
dent that could be used to exclude the exemplar: He was said to be specialized in marketing 
and production management.  
Pretest 
In a pretest fifteen students of the University of Jena with different majors were 
asked to rate the social orientation of several groups of students (biologists, psychologist, 
law students, educational science students, and business students) on a scale from 0 (very 
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low) to 100 (very high). Groups were judged differently, F(4, 11) = 20.45, p < .05, η² = .88. 
Means revealed that business students were judged as the group that is the least social (M = 
38.67) and educational science students were judged as the group which is the most social 
(M = 68.07). Ratings for law (M = 48.93), biology (M = 54.27) and psychology students (M 
= 62.00) fell in-between. Simple comparisons with sidak adjustment revealed that ratings 
for business students were significantly lower than for all other groups, all ps < .05, except 
for law students, p = .50.  
Participants and Design  
Seventy-five students from the University of Jena, Germany, participated in the data 
collection in a laboratory based on the campus of the university. Participants were students 
of different majors. After the experiment participants received money for their participa-
tion. The experiment was run on computers using Authorware software in individual cubi-
cle spaces. The experiment consisted of a 2 (Information: no additional information, addi-
tional information) x 2 (Category: business student, student of Romance languages) mixed 
design with the latter variable being manipulated within subjects. Additionally, I ran a con-
trol group in which participants did not get any feedback.  
Procedure 
After arriving in the laboratory participants were placed in closed cubicles so that 
they could not take notice of other people in the laboratory. Participants in the two experi-
mental conditions were told that they would take part in a game through which they could 
earn money dependent on their own and the other player’s decisions. They would earn 
points throughout the game which would be transferred to money at the end of the experi-
ment. They were further informed that the experiment is run simultaneously in several 
laboratories around the campus and that they would be connected in each round of the 
game with another participant from one of the laboratories. The game consisted of a re-
source allocation task and went on for three rounds. In fact decisions were made by a pre-
programmed computer and participants in each round got either the feedback of a fair or 
unfair decision of their “co-player”.  
At the beginning of each round participants received 12 points. In each round they 
were allegedly connected with another player via the server and they were presented with 
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some information about the fictitious other player (e.g., the major). This was followed by a 
faked lottery to distribute the two roles in the game. In two of the three rounds participants 
got the role of Player A. Player A was not allowed to take any decisions. His/her 12 points 
were transferred to Player B and while transferring points were tripled. Participants were 
informed that Player B now has to take a decision how to distribute the 48 points (his/her 
12 points plus 36 transferred points) between herself/himself and Player A. While waiting 
for the decision, Player A was asked how many points he/she expects to get back. Then, 
Player A got informed about Player B’s decision. This feedback was followed by a series of 
questions. First of all, participants had to write down in an open-ended format how they 
explain to themselves the decision of Player B; next, they had to rate students with the same 
major like Player B in general; next, they indicated how much they were surprised by the 
feedback, and at the end of each round, participants could comment on the events.  
During the first round, participants got the feedback to play against a student of the 
biology department. As pretests have shown, this seems to be a group about which people 
hold rather average expectations regarding warmth. In this first round, participants were 
placed in the role of Player A and received 24 points from Player B. This round has been 
included to reinforce fairness norms and to make participants familiar with the game. In 
round 2 participants were allegedly connected with a business student (target category), a 
group which is regarded as rather low on warmth. In one experimental condition partici-
pants just learned that the other player is aged 21 and studies business administration. In the 
other experimental condition, they additionally learned that he/she is specialized in market-
ing and production management. This fictitious Player B transferred 0 points back, which 
was supposed to be a supercongruent behaviour. In round 3 participants were assigned to 
the role of Player B. Hence, it was their turn to take a decision. This round was included to 
check whether participants will generalize the negative experience they just made in round 
2 to all different kinds of categories. They were connected with a student of Romance lan-
guages, a category about which people might hold rather average expectations regarding 
warmth22. First, they had to judge the group in general, with respect to the same attributes 
than in the rounds before. Then, participants took a decision about the back-transfer to 
                                                 
22 This category was not been included in the pre-test. It was still assumed that students might not have any 
firm opinion about this category related to warmth. Results in the main study confirmed this assumption.  
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Player A. They had to explain their decision. After the game had been finished, participants 
were carefully debriefed and got 3 Euros for compensation. 
Participants in the control group went through the same procedure with the only dif-
ference that they should just imagine playing a game like this and they received no feed-
back from other players.  
Dependent measure 
Participants had to estimate in round 2 how many points they will receive from the 
other player who was told to be a business student. At the end of round 2, participants were 
asked to judge business students in general on five traits measuring warmth (trustworthy, 
fair, capable of teamwork, moral, warm). All ratings were given on scales ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). The same trait ratings followed in round 3 for students of Ro-
mance languages.  
9.2.3 Results 
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because they were identified as 
outliers based on the criterion z > 2 on one of the central dependent variables. One of them 
was outlying on the warmth and two on the expectancy rating for the business student. The 
first round just fulfilled the purpose of making participants familiar with the game. Results 
of this round will, hence, not be reported. Six traits capturing warmth were averaged for 
business students (α = .72), and for students of Romance languages (α = .90). All simple 
comparisons reported below were conducted with sidak adjustment.  
Expectancies 
An ANOVA with the dependent variable ‘expected pay-back from business student’ 
was conducted comparing 3 conditions (no additional information vs. additional informa-
tion vs. control group).23. The Analysis yielded no significant effect, F(2,69) = 2.23, p = .12 
(see Table 7). Simple comparisons revealed that the difference between the expectation for 
the business student in the experimental condition without additional information and for 
the business student with additional information was not statistically reliable (M = 9.88 vs. 
                                                 
23 Students of Romance languages are not included since participants were put in the role of Player B when 
connected with these students. Hence, there is no expectancy rating. 
9. Part III: The Positive Side of Subtyping  91 
 
M = 12.78), p = .40, which supports the assumption that the chosen information was neu-
tral.  
 
Table 7. Means and standard deviations on expectancy values dependent on experimental condition 
(no exemplar, exemplar without additional information, exemplar plus additional information) 
(Study 7) 
Category  No additional in-formation 
Additional informa-
tion Control 
Business  9.88 (7.68) 12.27 (7.24) 8.48 (5.79) 
Note. N = 72. Numbers represent the expected payback from the business student. 
 
Expectancy violation 
In order to check whether the false feedback in round 2 differs from what people 
would have expected from a business student, I carried out a t-test comparing the expec-
tancy value against 0. The t-test revealed that the expectancy differed significantly from 
what participants received in the feedback, t(72) = 12.23, p < .05, d = 2.04. This finding 
indicates that the information in the feedback was indeed deviating from participants’ 
stereotypical expectations in direction of the stereotype and thereby can be regarded as su-
percongruent.  
Warmth stereotypes 
In order to analyze the effect of the supercongruent feedback in the second round on 
the stereotype of the categories a 3 (no additional information vs. additional information vs. 
control group) x 2 (Business, Romance) ANOVA was carried out with the latter factor be-
ing varied within subjects. A significant main effect for category occurred, F(1,69) = 
170.51, p < .05, η² = .71. Business students were judged as less warm than students of Ro-
mance languages (M = 2.78 vs. M = 4.85). Additionally, the expected interaction with con-
dition rendered significant, F(2,69) = 3.27, p < .05, η² = .09 (see Table 8).  
In order to understand the interaction, two ANOVAs were carried out for each 
stereotype separately. While the analysis was marginally significant for the category of 
business students, F(2, 69) = 2.82, p = .067, η² = .08, no effect occurred for the other 
stereotype, F(2, 69) = 1.47, p = .238. Finally, the specific hypothesis was tested, namely 
that in the no-additional-information experimental condition business students will be 
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judged as less warm than in the other two conditions (C1: -2 1 1). No difference should oc-
cur between the additional information experimental condition and the control condition 
(C2: 0 -1 1). The first contrast yielded a significant effect, F(1,69) = 5.52, p < .05, η² = .07, 
whereas the second contrast did not, F < 1. Participants perceived business students as less 
warm after they received the negative feedback and had no additional information about the 
player (M = 2.45), but they did not change their stereotype when they additionally learned 
about the other player’s specialization (M = 2.90) compared with a control condition (M = 
2.99).  
 
Table 8. Means and standard deviations on warmth ratings for different categories dependent on 
experimental condition (exemplar without additional information, exemplar plus additional infor-
mation, no exemplar) (Study 7) 
Category No additional in-formation 
Additional informa-
tion Control 
Business 2.45 (.92) 2.92 (.62) 2.99 (.98) 
Romance languages 4.83 (1.39) 4.36 (.72) 4.85 (.99) 
Note. N = 72. Means presented are rated on a 1-7 scale with higher numbers indicating more warmth..  
 
Surprise 
Participants in the control group did not get any feedback, therefore they were not 
asked to indicate their level of surprise. The surprise item was subjected to a t-test to com-
pare the two experimental conditions (no additional information vs. additional informa-
tion). The analysis did not provide evidence for a significant difference between the condi-
tion without additional information (M = 3.04) and the condition with additional informa-
tion (M = 3.96), t(47) = 1.38, p = .17. Mean pattern reveals that participants were somehow 
less surprised by the supercongruent business student when they received no additional in-
formation.  
9.3 Discussion of Part III 
The main purpose of this study was to test whether assimilation of the stereotype to 
a supercongruent exemplar can be blocked by providing additional, neutral information 
about the exemplar. More precisely, it has been tested whether a) the stereotype of business 
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students as lacking warmth would be polarized when confronted with an unfair and selfish 
business student, and b) whether this polarization can be blocked by additional information 
about the specialization of the student (i.e., neutral information). The results first of all sup-
port the findings of part I and part II. People seem to be prone to assimilate their stereotype 
to supercongruent exemplars which implies that stereotypes easily get polarized. After par-
ticipants received the information that a business student has treated them in an unfair 
manner, they rated business students as less warm compared with a control condition. More 
importantly, results of this study show that the polarization does not seem to be inevitable. 
The additional, pseudo-relevant information that the business student is specialized in mar-
keting and production management blocked the generalization process. Participants in this 
condition judged business students in total as equally warm as the control condition.  
 Several accounts have been mentioned by Kunda and Oleson (1995) to explain the 
exclusion of an incongruent exemplar due to additional information. Not all of these ac-
counts seem plausible to explain the present finding of an exclusion of a supercongruent 
exemplar as will be outlined below. 
Subtyping triggered by surprise 
Kunda and Oleson (1995) reasoned that people use the neutral information to ex-
plain away the surprise they experience through incongruent exemplars. They further ar-
gued that supercongruent exemplars will lead to generalization no matter if neutral informa-
tion is present or not since they assumed this kind of information not to come as a surprise. 
The present study provided support for their assumption that people are not very surprised 
by a supercongruent exemplar. Mean levels of surprise were below the mid-point of the 
scale (M = 3.47 vs. 4). These rather low levels of surprise are in line with the findings of 
previous studies within this dissertation which demonstrated that supercongruent exemplars 
are perceived as more typical than incongruent exemplars. It is also in line with the reason-
ing that supercongruent deviance can be best explained in terms of a quantitative deviance 
– prototype and exemplar differ in terms of extremity –, while incongruent deviance is 
likely to imply more of a qualitative deviance - prototype and exemplar do not possess the 
same trait. However, although people were not very surprised by supercongruent informa-
tion, because it seems to be in line with their stereotype, additional, pseudo-relevant infor-
mation still blocked generalization. Surprise might certainly be a reasons for subtyping in 
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case of incongruent information, but the exclusion of supercongruent exemplars cannot be 
explained by this feeling.  
Subtyping triggered by motivation to maintain the stereotype 
Kunda and Oleson (1995) reasoned that people use the additional information in or-
der to explain away the incongruent deviance and thereby protect their stereotype. Assimi-
lating the stereotype towards supercongruent exemplars does not imply to give up or 
weaken the stereotype. Instead, it becomes even stronger and differences between groups 
become accentuated. Hence, people should not feel the urge to explain away the deviance 
in order to protect their stereotype.  
Subtyping due to reduced feature-based similarity 
Besides surprise and motivation to maintain, two alternative explanations for the ef-
fect have been mentioned by Kunda & Oleson (1995): One account is based on Tversky's 
model of similarity (1977). Neutral information that is not included in the representation of 
the stereotype decreases the similarity between the deviant exemplar and the stereotype. If 
the number of attributes increases that is unique to either of them, the exemplar should ap-
pear less typical of the stereotype. This should result in reduced generalization. Analo-
gously, it has been shown that the impact of stereotypes on the perception of individuals is 
reduced by neutral attributes (the dilution effect, see Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981). 
However, the additional, neutral attributes chosen for the present study – specialization 
within the subject – is not really unique to the exemplar. A large amount of members of the 
category might possess this attribute. Furthermore, no evidence for a dilution effect oc-
curred. If similarity between the exemplar and the stereotype would have been considerably 
reduced due to the additional information, participants in the present study should have ex-
pected a higher pay-back in this condition compared with the experimental condition with-
out additional information. Although there was a slight tendency to expect more in the ad-
ditional-information condition, this tendency was not significant. Peters and Rothbart 
(2000) have demonstrated that not all information that is neutral to the outcome of predic-
tions is able to create a dilution effect. In their studies dilution just occurred if the addi-
tional information influenced the interpretation of the categorical information and rendered 
the individual less typical for the group. It is rather unlikely to assume that the information 
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about the specialization in marketing and production management should appear untypical 
for business students in general. Nevertheless, I checked this possibility in a post-hoc test 
by asking 15 participants to rate the goodness of fit of this information with their image of 
business students (1 = very strongly disagrees with my image of a typical business student 
to 7 = very strongly agrees with my image of a typical business student, with 4 = unrelated 
to my image of a typical business student). A mean value of M = 5.33, SD = 1.23, which 
significantly deviated from the scale-midpoint 4, p < .05, indicates that participants did not 
find this additional information untypical for business students in general; to the contrary, 
they perceived it as rather typical. Based on these results and arguments, I find it rather im-
plausible to assume that the generalization was blocked because of reduced similarity be-
tween the stereotype and the deviant.  
Attenuated generalization due to an increase in perceived variability 
Another account draws back to the finding that people generalize less from exem-
plar to category when the category is believed to be variable (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & 
Kunda, 1983). The additional information could have made participants aware of the possi-
bility that the category can vary on additional dimensions. The additional information that 
was provided in the present study shares some similarities with subgrouping manipulations. 
Subgrouping instructions encourage subjects to make discriminations within the context of 
an activated category (Rothbart & Park, 2004). A typical example of a subgrouping instruc-
tion would be to classify a list of occupations, all engaged in by women, into subcategories. 
To realize that business students can specialize in different subdisciplines within their field 
has probably increased the perceived variability, like subgrouping instructions also increase 
the perceived variability (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). Some researchers have argued that 
people generalize less from group members to their groups when the group is perceived to 
be variable (Nisbett et al., 1983; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Yet, other researchers have 
demonstrated that the manipulation of variability interacts with pattern of disconfirming 
information in the sense that stereotypes became attenuated even due to concentrated dis-
confirmers when the group was believed to be variable. Concentrated disconfirmers had no 
impact when the group was perceived to be less variable (Hewstone & Hamberger, 2000). 
The relation between perceived variability and the impact of deviant exemplars has not 
been clearly understood yet. The present results imply the possibility that an increased vari-
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ability through drawing attention to the subgroup level could buffer a stereotype against 
getting polarized due to supercongruent exemplars. Future research should test this assump-
tion more directly by 1) manipulating a group's perceived variability and testing in which 
way this manipulation affects the generalization of a supercongruent exemplar and 2) pro-
viding evidence that additional, neutral information actually increases perceived variability. 
Because of the diverging effects of super- and incongruent information (one strengthens the 
stereotype and one attenuates it), it would be also interesting to cross pattern of a variability 
manipulation with the two directions of deviance. Perceived variability might impact gen-
eralization of a supercongruent and an incongruent exemplar differently since one leads to a 
more stereotypic view and one to a less stereotypic view of the category.  
Futures studies, additionally, should test, whether a generalization occurs on the 
sub-group level. Participants in the present study have not been asked to indicate their be-
lief regarding business students specialized in marketing and production management. 
Hence, we do not know, whether the supercongruent information got associated with the 
additional information.  
The present paradigm constitutes a promising way of studying stereotype change 
because it is more unobtrusive than the previously used paradigms. But it still can be im-
proved. The rules of the game, for example, were quite complicated and some participants 
might have not understood them entirely. The game might be simplified by leaving out the 
first transfer and triplication of the points. Instead, one of the players, drawn by lot, re-
ceives all the points and is asked to distribute them among him-/herself and the other player 
(dictator game).  
While in direct contact we certainly almost always receive additional information 
about a member of a group, indirect contact via the media (e.g., in newspaper announce-
ments) many times just provides us with the misdeeds and the group affiliation (e.g., na-
tionality) of someone. The present results provide first evidence that it might be of great 
value to find out more about the possibilities how stereotypes can be buffered against the 
impact of supercongruent information. Although we still have to learn more about the proc-
ess and whether all kinds of additional information may have this buffering effect, it is 
clearly a positive news to state that polarization of stereotypes is not inevitable. 
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10. General Discussion 
10.1 Overview 
The research question of the present dissertation developed upon the observation 
that stereotypes might be more likely to get polarized than attenuated. I was basically 
interested in the perception of one-single supercongruent exemplar and its impact on the 
central tendency of a stereotype. In order to explore the processes involved in stereotype 
maintenance and change, I was specifically aiming at (1) comparing the perception and 
impact of one single supercongruent exemplar to that of one single incongruent exem-
plar with the same objective amount of deviance from the prototype. Assuming that su-
percongruent information is likely to be generalized to the group as a whole, I addition-
ally wanted to explore (2) in which kind of situations this generalization does not occur. 
Learning about these circumstances should help to (a) clarify the underlying mechanism 
to the basic effect and (b) develop strategies how an assimilation of the stereotype to 
supercongruent information can be circumvented whenever its unwanted (i.e., stereo-
types might be protected from getting polarized).  
Two lines of research stimulated the development of the present hypotheses: re-
search on stereotype change and models based on the accentuation principle, such as the 
accentuation theory and self-categorization theory (SCT). The first hypothesis is based 
on the meta-contrast-ratio (Turner & Oakes, 1989; cf. chapter 5) which states that the 
typicality of category members depends upon an intra- and intergroup comparison. In-
congruent exemplars have been previously defined as deviating in the direction of a 
comparison category (Brewer et al., 1981), whereas supercongruent exemplars were de-
fined now as deviating in the opposite direction (cf. chapter 3). Based on this notion and 
the meta-contrast principle the first hypothesizes states: Supercongruent exemplars 
should be perceived as more typical than incongruent exemplars.  
Goodness-of-fit (or perceived typicality) of an exemplar has been shown before 
to be one of the main determinants of generalization from the exemplar to the group as a 
whole (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Rothbart & John, 
1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984; cf. chapter 4). Based on this finding and 
the first hypothesis concerning perceived typicality, the second hypothesis states: One 
supercongruent exemplar should exert a stronger influence on the categories’ stereo-
type than one incongruent exemplar. Since assimilation of the prototype to supercon-
gruent exemplars increases the difference between groups (target and comparison cate-
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gories), whereas assimilation to incongruent exemplars decreases the difference, this 
assumption is also in line with accentuation theory which states that people strive to 
maximize differences between groups (e.g., Krueger, 1991; 1992; Krueger & Rothbart, 
1990; Krueger et al., 1989; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; cf. chapter 4). The first two hypothe-
ses were tested in the studies summarized in Part I.  
Study 1 examined the perception of congruent and deviating exemplars and pro-
vided evidence that supercongruent exemplars can be distinguished from congruent 
ones. Participants did differentiate between a congruent and a supercongruent exemplar, 
especially when asked about the perceived deviance of the exemplar from the stereo-
type. The supercongruent exemplar was perceived as more deviating than the congruent 
one and as equally deviating than the incongruent one. This finding constitutes a rele-
vant precondition for the present research because it confirms that deviance does exist 
in two versions: in direction of the stereotype (supercongruent) and in direction of a 
contrast category (incongruent). However, when it comes to perceived typicality, the 
two deviating exemplars were judged differently. The supercongruent exemplar was 
perceived as more typical than the incongruent one. Hence, the same objective deviance 
seems to translate to different degrees of subjective deviance.  
This finding of higher perceived typicality in case of supercongruent exemplars 
compared with incongruent ones, supports the first hypothesis and was replicated by 
findings in Study 3, 4, and 5.24 Study 4 demonstrated that even the same exemplar is 
perceived differently depending on the judgmental context. It thereby excludes the al-
ternative hypothesis that differences in perception of the two kinds of deviating exem-
plars are just due to differences in their extremity. When the contrast category rendered 
the exemplar supercongruent by being situated on the opposite side of the continuum, 
the exemplar was perceived as more typical than in those conditions when the context 
rendered the exemplar incongruent by lying on the same side of the continuum. This 
effect occurred although the stereotype was learned with both contrast categories being 
salient. Study 5 once more replicated the difference in perceived typicality between the 
incongruent and supercongruent exemplar. In this study, however, the manipulation 
check indicated that the difference between the incongruent and congruent exemplar 
was bigger than between the congruent and supercongruent exemplar. A post-hoc test, 
in which the same exemplars were presented without information about group-
                                                 
24 The other studies either did not measure perceived typicality (Study 2), did not include an incongruent 
condition (Study 6, 7), or/and used typicality items as a focus manipulation and hence they differed be-
tween conditions (Study 6). 
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membership, revealed equal distances. This finding is inconsistent with Study 4, in 
which exemplar ratings were not influenced by the kind of comparison category. Be-
cause the experimental paradigms of Study 4 and 5 differed in various respects, I cannot 
draw firm conclusions about the cause for this differential effect. One reason might be, 
that Study 5 employed a pre-existing stereotype, whereas Study 4 used a stereotype-
learning paradigm and, furthermore, the target group was believed to be average on the 
target dimension compared with the other categories. The expectations in Study 4 might 
have been less firm than in Study 5 and this could be one reason why the exemplar 
judgment was not influenced by the overall prototype.  
The second hypothesis, which states that one supercongruent exemplar should 
exert a stronger influence on a category’s stereotype than one incongruent exemplar, 
was supported by findings of Study 2, 3, 4, and 5.25 Study 2 showed that perceived in-
ter-group differences increased when confronted with a supercongruent exemplar, 
whereas they remained constant when participants were confronted with an incongruent 
exemplar. In Study 3 a paradigm was used that is more common to research on stereo-
type change. Compared with a baseline, the prototype was polarized after learning about 
a supercongruent exemplar. No changed occurred due to an incongruent exemplar. In 
Study 4 the same exemplar led to stronger assimilation tendencies when the context 
rendered it supercongruent than when the context rendered it incongruent. Different 
from all the other studies within this dissertation, assimilation occurred in Study 4 in all 
conditions, in the incongruent ones as well. Two explanations seem plausible to account 
for this finding. Either it is due to the greater sensitivity to detect change in this study 
based on the repeated measurement design, or, this effect occurred because the study 
did not employ a pre-existing stereotype. As mentioned before, the strength of the artifi-
cial stereotype, which developed during phase 1, might have been lower compared with 
the one of pre-existing stereotypes, and hence, participants used any additional kind of 
information about the category. In Study 5 the prototype was assimilated to the super-
congruent exemplar when the stereotype measurement directly followed the exemplar 
presentation, whereas no change could be detected in case of an incongruent exemplar. 
In sum, Part I provided evidence that people perceive a supercongruent exemplar 
as more typical than an incongruent exemplar and that the first one has a larger impact 
on a category’s stereotype than the latter one. The same results were demonstrated for 
stereotypes with negative as well as positive valence. Part II and Part III of the present 
                                                 
25 Study 1 did not comprise a stereotype measure; Study 6 and 7 did not include a comparison between an 
incongruent and supercongruent conditions.  
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dissertation dealt with the question whether this stereotype polarization is inevitable. Or, 
to put it differently: What are the circumstances in which generalization from a super-
congruent exemplar to the category is less likely to occur?  
It has been assumed that incongruent exemplars are likely to pose a qualitative 
deviance to the prototype because the exemplar is likely to not possess the stereotypic 
attribute. Therefore, the deviance might be easily recognized by perceivers and lead 
them to engage in a process of dissimilarity testing. Supercongruent exemplars, on the 
contrary, might trigger more similarity testing because they are perceived as qualita-
tively similar to the category. Their deviance is just a matter of degree and might be eas-
ily overlooked. Confronted with this kind of exemplar typicality or deviance might not 
be judged automatically. Directing participants’ focus towards the supercongruent devi-
ance should render generalization of the exemplar to the category less likely to occur. 
Letting participants rate the typicality of these exemplars could fulfil this purpose. 
Technically speaking, order of typicality and stereotype assessment should have a big-
ger impact for supercongruent exemplars than for incongruent ones.  
Study 5 demonstrated that asking participants to judge the deviance and typical-
ity of a supercongruent exemplar before the stereotype was assessed, indeed prevented 
them from generalizing to the category. Incongruent exemplars did not influence the 
prototype no matter which order of measurement. This finding speaks to the fact that the 
deviance of an incongruent exemplar is detected more automatically. The goal of Study 
6 was to test the processes involved in generalization from supercongruent exemplars 
more directly. Firstly, it aimed at replicating the findings obtained in Study 5, and sec-
ondly, focus of comparison (similarity vs. dissimilarity) was manipulated more directly 
by posing different kinds of typicality questions. Parallel results occurred in the condi-
tion in which the stereotype was assessed directly after the manipulation, and in the 
condition in which participants were induced to focus on similarities. In both condi-
tions, an assimilation to the supercongruent exemplar occurred. Participants who were 
asked to judge the deviance of the exemplar from the prototype (dissimilarity focus) ex-
hibited no generalization on some of the stereotypic traits and showed a slight contrast 
effect on others. In general, findings of Study 6 speak to the fact that a focus on simi-
larities is the default process people engage in when confronted with a supercongruent 
exemplar.  
The finding that stereotype assimilation to supercongruent exemplars does not 
occur once people process the new information with a focus on differences, is informa-
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tive about the mechanisms involved in stereotype polarization. Part III summarizes one 
study that also demonstrates circumstances in which polarization does not occur, but 
this time the basic aim was to develop strategies how stereotype polarization can be cir-
cumvented. Previous research has shown that additional, neutral information about in-
congruent exemplars is used to justify subtyping and, hence, makes generalization less 
likely to occur (Kunda & Oleson, 1995, Yzerbyt et al., 1999). In contradiction to previ-
ous research (Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Exp. 4), Study 7 demonstrates that additional, 
neutral information also decreases generalization from a supercongruent exemplar. Par-
ticipants in Study 7 were confronted within a game with a very egoistic co-player who 
was told to be a business student (supercongruent information). This experience made 
them rate business students in total as less warm compared with a control group which 
did not receive any exemplar information. Hence, participants assimilated their proto-
type to the supercongruent exemplar. This assimilation did not occur when participants 
received the additional information that their co-player was specialized in marketing 
and production management. This effect might have occurred due to an increase in per-
ceived variability. Previous research dealing with the effect of incongruent exemplars 
has demonstrated that people seem to generalize less when they perceive the group to be 
very heterogeneous (Nisbett et al., 1983; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Unfortunately, this 
interpretation can not be tested with the present data. Alternative accounts, however, do 
not seem to fit some of the results of Study 7 (cf. chapter 9.3).  
In sum, I presented evidence that supercongruent and incongruent exemplars are 
perceived differently concerning typicality and lead to different consequences for the 
stereotype. Assimilation of the stereotype seems to be the default process when facing 
supercongruent information. Concerning incongruent information, no impact was ob-
served in the present studies with one exception: The stereotype of an artificial category 
was also assimilated to incongruent exemplars as well.  
10.2 Underlying Processes 
The present research found convincing support for the assumed asymmetry in 
the processing of information that mismatches the stereotype. Incongruent information 
did by and large not influence the judgment of the group as a whole, whereas the default 
reaction when dealing with supercongruent information was a generalization to the 
stereotype, which is why stereotypes easily get polarized. In contradiction to the hy-
potheses, the present data does not support the idea that this asymmetry is caused by 
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differences in perceived typicality since no mediation occurred in Study 4. The relation 
between the assumed mediator (perceived typicality) and the outcome (assimilation), 
was not quite strong, and as data suggests it might not be linear. As argued in the dis-
cussion of Part I, this result might be due to a paradox which has been previously men-
tioned by Rothbart and colleagues: “Disconfirming information associated with exem-
plars may have two contradictory effects on stereotype change. First, as the disconfirm-
ing nature of the information increases, the potential to modify the stereotype also in-
creases. Second, as the magnitude of disconfirmation increases, the associated exemplar 
decreases in its goodness-of-fit to the stereotype” (Rothbart, Sriram, & Davis-Stitt, 
1996, p. 311). Goodness-of-fit has been shown to be one of the key determinants 
whether to include or not an exemplar into the representation of a category. Perceived 
typicality might be more likely to mediate stereotype change, when typicality varies as a 
function of additional attributes compared with when it varies as a function of extremity 
of deviance or direction of deviance. To make this more obvious: Those people who 
hold a rather extreme stereotype might perceive a supercongruent exemplar as highly 
typical because it might not deviate from their expectations at all.26 But since they do 
not receive deviating information, there is no reason for them to change their stereotype. 
The relationship between perceived typicality and stereotype change might be by far 
more complicated as sometimes assumed. Previous research, which demonstrated a 
bidirectional link between perceived typicality and stereotype change, suggested to re-
gard perceived typicality also as an outcome of categorization (Richards & Hewstone, 
2001). Furthermore, the finding that the stereotype judgment as well as the typicality 
judgment was dependent on the order of measurement between the two constructs 
(Study 5), also speaks to the fact that their relation might be quite complex which makes 
it difficult to detect a mediation even if it exists. Due to the order effect, typicality can 
only be assessed after the stereotype judgment otherwise it prevents the effect from oc-
curring. Yet, the mediator ideally should be measured before the outcome variable 
(Kenny et al., 1998, p. 262). Due to this reasons, it might be a more promising way to 
test a moderation hypothesis in order to investigate the underlying process of the present 
effect (e.g., Spencer et al., 2005).  
Theories dealing with accentuation, thus with the tendency to increase differ-
ences between groups (SCT and accentuation theory), have rarely specified the process. 
                                                 
26 Remember that supercongruent exemplars in the present studies were not created for each participant 
individually based on their pre-values. Hence, an exemplar which is on average supercongruent might be 
congruent for some of the participants (for those who’s stereotype was extreme from the beginning).  
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Three plausible mechanisms, namely biased encoding, biased retrieval and differential 
or biased integration of the information, have been suggested to explain the accentua-
tion principle (Krueger et al., 1989; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990). Biased encoding oper-
ates at the stage of exemplar perception, biased retrieval refers to memory processes, 
and biased integration operates at the stage of information usage in forming an overall 
judgment. As outlined below, biased encoding and retrieval seem rather unlikely to ex-
plain the present findings. In fact, results rather suggest that the provided information 
might have been integrated in a biased manner. 
Biased encoding refers to distortions in the perception of individual stimuli 
which in turn lead to a distorted perception of the category. By providing participants 
with numerical information I tried to decrease ambiguity of the exemplar information. 
Still, participants had to interpret the test results and translate them into trait judgments. 
Thus, exemplar judgments might have been biased. However, the present data suggests 
that this was not the case. First of all, incongruent and supercongruent exemplars were 
perceived as equally deviating (Study 1). Secondly, range and standard deviation in the 
exemplar judgment were not bigger for the incongruent exemplar than for the supercon-
gruent one (Study 3). Third, although Study 4 used the same exemplar and manipulated 
direction of deviance by means of the comparison category, still greater assimilation 
was obtained in case of supercongruent information. Fourth, the exemplar judgment in 
Study 4 was not affected by type of comparison category. And fifth, exemplar judg-
ments in Study 5 seem to be affected by the group-membership, but in a way that made 
supercongruent exemplars less deviating than incongruent exemplars.  
Summarized by the term biased retrieval are several mechanism dealing with 
impaired memory. Firstly, information that confirms expectations has been demon-
strated to be better remembered than information that is contradicting (e.g., Rothbart, 
Evans, & Fulero, 1979). Secondly, difference-enhancing stimuli might be recalled better 
and their frequency might be overestimated due to their greater extremity and thereby 
salience (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1973). Thirdly, difference-attenuating stimuli might 
be erroneously recalled as contextual stimuli. Krueger and Rothbart (1990) showed that 
category-enhancing information was remembered better than category-attenuating in-
formation. Participants in their studies were confronted with a whole list of exemplars. 
Since participants in the present studies were just presented with one exemplar and were 
not distracted by some other task it seems rather unlikely that they might have “forgot-
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ten” about the incongruent information. Hence, it seems rather unlikely that memory 
processes could have driven the effect. 
Among the afore mentioned three plausible mechanisms, biased integration 
seems most promising. Biased integration takes place at the time of forming an overall 
judgment. But why is it that incongruent and supercongruent information is used differ-
ently in forming a judgment? One potential explanation for the differential impact of 
supercongruent and incongruent information is provided by social judgment models, 
like the selective accessibility model (SAM; Mussweiler, 2001; 2003; Mussweiler & 
Strack, 2000). SAM explains when a judgment is likely to be assimilated to and when it 
is likely to be contrasted away from the present context. Assimilation should occur if 
judges engage in a process of similarity-testing, and contrast results if they engage in 
dissimilarity testing. Both kinds of hypotheses will render different kinds of knowledge 
about the judgmental target accessible. Results of Study 5 and 6 suggest that generaliza-
tion of supercongruent information to the category was affected by an intermediate fo-
cus manipulation. Assimilation of the stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar did not 
occur when participants had to judge the deviance of the exemplar from the category in-
between. This kind of judgment might have served the function of directing partici-
pants’ focus to the deviance and triggering a dissimilarity focus. The fact that the same 
results, namely generalization, were obtained when participants had to judge the stereo-
type directly and when they had to judge perceived similarity in-between, indicates that 
the default process when confronted with a supercongruent exemplar is to focus on 
similarities. The processing of an incongruent exemplar, on the contrary, does not seem 
to be affected by a deviance judgment. This suggests that their deviance is acknowl-
edged more automatically triggering some sort of dissimilarity testing. Yet, it remains to 
be tested whether focus of comparison indeed mediates the impact of direction of devi-
ance on stereotype change. Do supercongruent exemplars actually lead to a focus on 
similarities between exemplar and category? And, do incongruent exemplars indeed 
lead to a focus on differences? Further research might test these processes more directly 
for example by measuring the focus of comparison in an unrelated task after participants 
had been confronted with a supercongruent or incongruent exemplar. According to the 
procedural priming logic a certain focus of comparison dominating in a certain situation 
carries over to a subsequent comparison, even if they are unrelated (see Mussweiler et 
al., 2003).  
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According to SAM (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000), assimilation is the outcome of 
biased search for similar evidence. The model, hence, focuses on knowledge activation. 
In the present context, that would imply that a supercongruent exemplar leads to a 
memory search for similar exemplars. The inclusion/exclusion model, then again, re-
gards assimilation as the outcome of an inclusion of the contextual stimuli into the rep-
resentation of the judgmental target (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). This model, hence, fo-
cuses on knowledge use. Accordingly, a supercongruent exemplar does not necessarily 
influence the retrieval of stored exemplars, but leads to an assimilation of the stereotype 
by its addition to other chronically accessible exemplars. It seems rather implausible 
that just the first process, suggested by the SAM model, should be involved in the as-
similation of the stereotype to supercongruent exemplars, without the second one, sug-
gested by the inclusion/exclusion model. However, it remains to be tested whether su-
percongruent exemplars influence the set of retrieved exemplars, and additionally, 
whether supercongruent exemplars happen to change abstract knowledge. One first step 
to investigate these questions might be to test the durability of the observed assimilation 
of the stereotype. Whether or not the stereotype is still polarized some time after the 
manipulation in a different context, might tell us something about the nature of the ef-
fect. If stereotypes go back to the initial level as soon as the supercongruent exemplar is 
not salient anymore, then abstractions might have remained unchanged. To my knowl-
edge, no study has so far tested the duration of experimentally induced stereotype 
change. In order to circumvent ethical concerns and avoid additional experience with 
the category in-between, this could possibly be tested by employing an artificial stereo-
type.  
But why is it that supercongruent information is processed with a focus on simi-
larities, whereas incongruent information is processed with a focus on dissimilarities? 
The selective accessibility model assumes that whether a judge engages in a process of 
similarity or dissimilarity testing depends on several moderators. One of those is psy-
chological closeness (Mussweiler, 2003). If target and standard are perceived as close, 
assimilation is more likely to occur, whereas contrast appears when they are not. It has 
been argued within the present dissertation that the asymmetry in the processing of the 
two kinds of deviating information might be due to the different nature of their devi-
ance: Incongruent exemplars are likely to pose a qualitative deviance, whereas super-
congruent exemplars are likely to constitute a quantitative deviance. This difference 
might even hold for Study 4, where the same exemplar was rendered super- or incon-
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gruent by different comparison categories. But in this case the difference is probably 
due to the fact that the target category is represented differently according to the con-
text: Although the target category was judged as average in both conditions, it might be 
still represented as “the higher category” in context of a low comparison category, and 
as “the lower category” in context of a high comparison category. Unfortunately, the 
present data does not allow to test this assumption.  
The present differentiation between a quantitative and a qualitative difference 
shares some similarities with the notion of a psychological mid-point within research on 
persuasion (Fishbein & Lange, 1990; Lange & Fishbein, 1983; Nemeth & Endicott, 
1976). This research has shown that persuasion is less successful if the position of the 
source and the receiver of a persuasive communication fall on different sides of a re-
sponse dimension then if the positions fall on the same side. A midpoint was character-
ized as the “the marker that identifies different substantive categories” (Fishbein & 
Lange, 1990, p. 189) and that allows the receiver to “categorize the communicator’s po-
sition into ‘same side’ or ‘opposite side’ of the issue” (Nemeth & Endicott, 1976; p. 12). 
Comparably, the psychological midpoint on the dimensions used to present exemplar 
information in the present context might be the point that divides values into those that 
indicate possession of the stereotypic attribute and those indicating that someone does 
not possess the attribute, or is even characterized by its antonym (e.g., the IQ-value that 
constitutes the border between intelligent and non-intelligent). It has been argued and 
demonstrated before that receivers of a persuasive communication change their initial 
attitude more when confronted with a ‘same side’-persuasive position than when con-
fronted with an ‘opposite side’ message (Nemeth & Endicott, 1976). This difference in 
persuasive power especially occurred when the qualitative difference was made salient. 
Within most of the present studies, participants had to judge the exemplar on the stereo-
typic dimension first. 27 While thinking about whether the exemplar possesses the 
stereotypic attribute or not the qualitative difference might have become apparent. It 
remains to be tested whether the same asymmetry in the processing of super- and in-
congruent information appears when no exemplar judgment precedes.  
The present research constitutes a first test of accentuation principles in the con-
text of stereotype change due to one additional exemplar. While researchers within so-
cial psychology have focused on explaining accentuation principles with motivational 
                                                 
27 An exception was Study 2. But in this study the “psychological mid-point” might have been quite obvi-
ous because the IQ-value of 100 was mentioned in the introduction as the general average. Prototype and 
supercongruent exemplar were above 100, whereas the incongruent exemplar was below 100.  
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forces (e.g., Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), other researchers have argued for cogni-
tive mechanisms (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Krueger, et al., 1989; Krueger & Rothbart, 
1990). Results should be regarded as a first step in answering the process question. 
They suggest that the process might not be driven purely by a motivation to protect and 
strengthen the stereotype. Instead, they point to a rather cognitive process. Further stud-
ies are needed to understand the involved mechanisms in dept. These studies might in-
clude measures or manipulations of focus of comparison and markers of category acti-
vation (e.g., repetition priming; Quinn & Macrae, 2005), Additionally, it might be 
worthwhile to include measures of subtyping beyond perceived typicality (see Park et 
al., 2001).  
10.3 Results in Light of Previous Findings and Theories 
The present dissertation builds upon diverse lines of research which are all ex-
plaining in one way or another the phenomenon of categorization. The “stereotype 
change”-paradigm has focused on change due to incongruent exemplars of the target 
group. Most of the studies have shown support for the subtyping model of stereotypes 
(e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Johnston et al., 1994; Weber & Crocker, 1983; see 
Hewstone, 1994, for a review), which is in fact a model of non-change because it as-
sumes that incongruent exemplars lead to the creation of subtypes, which are regarded 
as exceptions and, hence, leave the stereotype unchanged.  
The present studies which were conducted in order to compare the impact of su-
percongruent and incongruent exemplars, replicate previous research in showing that 
incongruent exemplars hardly affect the central tendency aspect of a stereotype. This 
general lack of influence has often been thought to be a consequence of the humble fit 
between exemplar and category as a whole (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & 
Oleson, 1997; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984). Incon-
gruent exemplars were perceived in the present studies as less typical than congruent or 
supercongruent exemplars, but the data does not support the idea of a mediation by per-
ceived typicality (see 10.2). Consistent with previous research, Study 5 showed a ten-
dency that incongruent exemplars lead to a less homogenous picture of the group (Gar-
cia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; Paolini et al., 2004). The lack of impact of incongruent 
information on the stereotype obtained ion the present studies is inconsistent with the 
inclusion/exclusion model (Schwarz & Bless, 1992; 2007), which regards assimilation 
as the default process when dealing with exemplar information. Interestingly, studies 
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supporting the inclusion/exclusion model often employ affective outcomes (e.g. favora-
bility; Bless & Schwarz, 1998; Bless & Wänke, 2000; Bodenhausen et al., 1995). By 
conducting a meta-analysis Tropp and Pettigrew (2005) provided evidence that affective 
dimensions of inter-group attitudes are more likely to change due to contact experience 
than cognitive dimensions. Other studies that did include a stereotype judgment and 
support the inclusion/exclusion model did not comprise a control group without exem-
plar information (Bless et al., 2001). Hence, it is difficult to tell whether just assimila-
tion, or contrast, or both occurred. Due to these reasons the comparability of the present 
results regarding incongruent exemplars and the ones obtained within research on the 
inclusion/exclusion model might be limited.  
Deviating exemplars, however, do not always lack influence on the stereotype. 
A host of factors, like for example the extremity of deviance, the cognitive resources or 
the availability of neutral information to legitimate subtyping, have been shown to mod-
erate the emergence of generalization or subtyping (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995; 1997; 
Yzerbyt et al., 1999). The present research expands the list by adding direction of devi-
ance. It has been demonstrated that supercongruent exemplars are more likely to gener-
alize to the group as a whole than incongruent exemplars. This asymmetry in likelihood 
for generalization was paralleled by an asymmetry in perceived typicality which was 
higher for supercongruent exemplars than for incongruent ones. These findings are in 
line with accentuation theory and the meta-contrast-principle put forth by the self-
categorization theory.  
The self-categorization theory and the accentuation theory were built up on a 
classic experiment by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) in which they demonstrated that per-
ceivers who had to estimate the length of lines tended to overestimate the difference be-
tween lines that belonged to different categories. Although the accentuation effect has 
seldomly been replicated with the original paradigm (see McGarty, 1999), similar ef-
fects were demonstrated for attitude statements (Eiser, 1971; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; 
Eiser & van der Pligt, 1982; McGarty & Penny, 1988), trait valences (Krueger & 
Rothbart, 1990), body weights (Krueger et al., 1989), perception of colors (Goldstone, 
1995), or judgments of multi-faceted stimuli (Corneille & Judd, 1999; Ford & Stangor, 
1992; Goldstone, 1994; 1996; Goldstone, Steyvers, & Rogosky, 2003). A variety of dif-
ferent measures has been used to demonstrate the accentuation effect: 1) categorization 
accuracy for stimuli that deviate from the category’s average (Goldstone, 1996), 2) es-
timated values for specific stimuli (Eiser, 1971; Krueger & Clement, 1994), 3) proto-
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type judgments (Krueger et al., 1989; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990), or 4) judgments of 
stimulus typicality (Corneille & Judd, 1999). The present studies are demonstrating ac-
centuation tendencies by use of the latter two measures: perceived typicality and central 
tendency judgment.  
The results regarding perceived typicality are convincingly supporting meta-
contrast-principles developed within the SCT (Turner & Oakes, 1989; cf. chapter 5). 
They replicate previous research which has demonstrated the meta-contrast-principle in 
the context of a salient ingroup-outgroup-differentiation. Abrams and colleagues have 
shown that members who deviate in their opinion towards an opposing group, called 
“anti-norm deviants”, are perceived as more atypical than those who deviate away from 
the opposing group, called “pro-norm deviants” (e.g., Abrams et al., 2000). To my 
knowledge the present studies constitute the first attempt to apply meta-contrast-
principles to the context of social stereotypes without an ingroup-outgroup differentia-
tion being salient.  
The finding that contrast categories determine typicality has previously also 
been shown in the context of artificial category learning (Corneille & Judd, 1999; Gold-
stone, 1996; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001). By using portraits and applying morphing 
techniques, it has been demonstrated that caricatures are more easily categorized than 
centroids if the concepts’ representation is dependent on some other concept (Gold-
stone, 1996; Nosofsky, 1991; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 2001). Caricatures were thereby de-
fined as those stimuli that depart from the central tendency of the category in the oppo-
site direction of the central tendency of other, simultaneously acquired concepts. This 
definition sounds very much like the definition of supercongruent exemplars, but there 
is one important difference: Within research on caricatures ‘central tendency’ refers to 
the genuine average of the category which can be easily defined when dealing with 
morphed pictures. In the context of social stereotypes, however, ‘central tendency’ usu-
ally refers to the belief people hold about the average group member. Compared with 
the real average group member, this belief might already be distorted in direction of a 
caricature. Hence, the present results and these previous findings are not dealing with 
the same question, but both are a demonstration of the fact that typicality depends not 
just on within-group similarity. Especially Study 4 indicates that perceived typicality is 
dependent on the salient frame of reference. This finding is especially challenging for 
pure-prototype models which assume categories to be represented by one fixed proto-
type (see also Medin, 1989). It is more in line with the context sensitivity claimed by 
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exemplar-based models (Smith & Medin, 1981; Smith & Zárate, 1992) and the self-
categorization theory (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, 1987; Turner & 
Oakes, 1989).  
The results regarding central tendency judgments are also in line with research 
on accentuation. Within all the presented studies the likelihood for polarization of the 
stereotype (or accentuation of between-category differences) was greater than for at-
tenuation. Among the research on the accentuation effect the work by Krueger and col-
leagues shares most similarity with the present line of research because it was con-
ducted in the context of category learning and change (e.g., Krueger et al., 1989; 
Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; for a review see Krueger, 1992). The present research, how-
ever, adds evidence that for category accentuation to occur one single deviant exemplar 
is sufficient. This demonstration sheds some light on the underlying processes as dis-
cussed in chapter 10.2. Furthermore, it also extends the scope by employing existing 
social stereotypes.  
The lack of empirical support for contrast effects in the present studies, is in line 
with the fact that contrast effects have been demonstrated less often in previous research 
and therefore it was argued that assimilation seems to be the default process 
(Mussweiler, 2003). Presumably, the manipulation of one incongruent exemplar was too 
weak to trigger contrast effects and just attenuated the initial focus on similarities. The 
previously mentioned suggestion for further research (including a measurement of fo-
cus) could also help clarifying this question. 
In sum, this dissertation provides evidence supporting the accentuation theory 
(Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) and the meta-contrast-ratio put forth by the self-categorization 
theory (Turner & Oakes, 1989). It points to the context sensitivity of social stereotypes 
and thereby adds up to a long list of criticism on pure-prototype-based models (see 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Medin, 1989; Roth & Shoben, 1983; Smith, 1990). As 
mentioned in the introduction, most researchers within social psychology recently al-
lude to a hybrid model of category representation, which assumes that stereotype repre-
sentation contains a mix of both, exemplars along with abstract knowledge (Judd & 
Park, 1988; Park & Hastie, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981; Smith & Zárate, 1990). Which 
storage mode dominates was assumed to depend on diverse factors, such as familiarity 
with the category, or ingroup/outgroup status and valence of the stereotype (e.g., 
Sherman, 1996; Sherman, Klein, Lasky, & Wyer, 1998). Furthermore, the kind of in-
formation people rely on when making a judgment (stored prototype vs. stored exem-
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plars) might also depend on the kind of judgment they have to make. When asked to 
judge whether a category possesses a certain trait or not, people might rely more on the 
prototype and might not retrieve single exemplars from memory. When asked to pre-
cisely judge to what degree members of a category possess that trait, they might addi-
tionally rely on stored exemplars because people are probably less familiar with making 
that kind of judgment. Perhaps, both, prototype and exemplars, are involved in the kind 
of judgment participants of the present studies had to give. Maybe people use the proto-
type for an initial, qualitative comparison between an exemplar and a category in order 
to decide whether to include or exclude the exemplar from the representation. Subse-
quently, they might retrieve exemplars from memory in order to come up with a precise 
judgment. Dependent on the outcome of the initial comparison, the retrieval might be 
guided by the salient exemplar or not. Obviously, the present data does not allow testing 
this idea, but it would fit the processes described in chapter 10.2.  
10.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
One of the main limitations of the present studies is the fact that central mecha-
nisms assumed to underlie the demonstrated effects need further investigation (for de-
tailed discussion see chapter 10.2). A related shortcoming is the fact that the only study, 
in which pre- and post manipulation values could be matched, is Study 4. Study 4, how-
ever, is exceptional due to the fact that it employed an artificial stereotype about a group 
which was believed to be rather average on the central dimension. Unfortunately, cer-
tain questions could only be tested by employing a pre-post design and matching cases. 
For example, in order to test a mediational hypothesis, an assimilation index is needed. 
Another interesting question, which might be investigated in further studies is the im-
pact of the original stereotype strength. Firstly, because this could be one way to study 
the impact of extremity of deviance, and secondly, to clarify the potential role of moti-
vation in the process of stereotype polarization.  
Although different paradigms have been used within the present set of studies, 
they still share some similarities which narrow generalizability. First, all studies dealt 
with the stereotype of different professions, or majors. This class of stereotypes has 
been chosen because it was expected that the present sample (students) should be famil-
iar with these stereotypes. Furthermore, social desirability concerns were expected to be 
not as strong concerning these stereotypes because students were assumed to be kind of 
used to employ and, most importantly, to express them. Yet, the present research ques-
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tion developed upon a different, and perhaps socially more relevant categorization, 
namely according to cultural background (Muslims vs. Westerners). It can not be con-
cluded with certainty that the same processes demonstrated in the present studies, are 
involved in stereotype maintenance and change related to different classes of stereo-
types, which might differ in their relevance, function, or strength. At least, the present 
research suggests that the processes are independent of valence and content of the 
stereotype.  
One reason for studying the effects with relatively less threatening stereotypes is 
the fact that the studies necessarily involve two sources of reactance. First, participants 
feel reluctant to express their stereotypes, and second, they react reluctant towards ob-
vious sources of manipulation of their beliefs. By employing those stereotypes whose 
expression is less threatening, the first source of reactance was aimed to be decreased. 
In order to decrease the second source of reactance, complicated cover-stories and pro-
cedures (e.g., Study 7) were developed. Future research, might additionally, decrease 
awareness of the manipulation process by using more unobtrusive measures of stereo-
types. For example, one way to unobtrusively measure the certainty or strength of the 
stereotype might be to measure its application. Study 7, for example, could have in-
cluded in further rounds a re-concourse with another business student. By changing the 
game into a trust game one could assess whether the experience with a supercongruent 
business student affects trust in other business students. This way of measurement might 
be interesting to combine with the manipulation of incongruent information as well. Al-
though, the incongruent information did not change the prototype in the present studies, 
it might change the certainty with which the stereotype is applied due to the increase in 
perceived variability. An additional way of studying the underlying processes in a way 
that might provoke less reactance, was suggested in the discussion of Part II and builds 
upon the finding that exemplar judgments are affected by the same kind of processes as 
stereotype judgments (see Study 5, but also Schwarz & Bless, 1992). The reason why 
supercongruent exemplars are more likely to lead to an assimilation of the stereotype 
than incongruent exemplars, could possibly be studied as well by relying on exemplar 
judgments as an outcome variable.  
10.5 Conclusions 
“The first reference to "stereotype", in its modern, English use was in 1850, in 
the noun, meaning ‘image perpetuated without change’" (Online Etymology Diction-
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ary). The present research, however, suggests that stereotypes do change. Stereotypes 
seem to be rigid in the sense that it might be hard to change their content; however, 
gradual change in the extremity or strength of the stereotype, seems to be more likely to 
occur. Present research suggests that stereotypes are especially likely to get polarized. 
The apparent asymmetry in processing of deviating information is probably one reason 
for the continuity of social stereotypes. One single supercongruent exemplar is likely to 
be taken as a good example for the category and to lead to a polarization of the stereo-
type. One single incongruent exemplar, on the contrary, is perceived as less typical and 
hardly influences the overall-stereotype. Given that social stereotypes have been shown 
to be a breeding ground for discriminative behaviour, the present results are rather wor-
rying since they imply that stereotypes are very likely to get more and more extreme. As 
long as the media tends to focus on issues of crime and violence, press guidelines, men-
tioned in the introduction, are right by pointing to the jeopardy of stirring up prejudice 
when mentioning “religious, ethnic or other minority membership.” To much pessimism 
seems, however, also inappropriate because the present studies also provided evidence 
that this process of stereotype polarization does not seem to be inevitable. Furthermore, 
not all stereotypes are negative in valence. Harvard professors, for example, might ap-
preciate this tendency towards polarization whensoever one of Harvard’s faculty mem-
bers gets awarded with the Noble prize.  
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APPENDIX 
Instance of manipulation: Study 5 incongruent (similar manipulation used in 
Study 3, 4, 5, and 6) 
 
Individuelles Testergebnis 
 
 
Teilnehmer-Code: KH476DF  
Studiengang: Studium der Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
(Abschlussnote: gut) 
 
Problemlösefähigkeit 
Befähigung zu abstraktem Denken; logisches Schlussfolgern 
                             
      
niedrig                mittel             hoch 
0          10  20    30        40            50      60         70     80       90        100 
 
 
Streben nach Erfolg 
Ehrgeiz; Bereitschaft für Erfolg extrem viel zu leisten.  
                
      
niedrig                mittel             hoch 
0   10     20        30           40        50 60      70    80       90         100 
 
 
Verständnis 
Fähigkeit komplexe Sachverhalte möglichst schnell zu erfassen 
                
      
niedrig                mittel             hoch 
0   10     20        30           40        50 60      70    80       90         100 
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SUMMARY 
Given the immense amount of research on stereotypes, one might expect that the 
nature of stereotypes and the processes involved in stereotype change are fairly well un-
derstood. Yet, some questions remain unsolved. For example, research on stereotype 
change has so far mainly focused on stereotype attenuation and accordingly studied the 
impact of stereotype-incongruent exemplars, that is exemplars that are contradicting the 
stereotype of their category. Stereotype-inconsistent exemplars, however, are just one 
side of the coin. The present dissertation investigated whether information that deviates 
in one or the other direction from the stereotype is processed in the same way.  
Research so far has demonstrated that stereotype-incongruent exemplars of a 
category typically do not change a stereotype („subtyping“; e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 
1992; Johnston, Hewstone, Pendry, & Frankish, 1994; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber 
& Crocker, 1983; for an overview see Hewstone, 1994; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). 
Yet, we do not know whether this is also the case with exemplars deviating in direction 
of the stereotype, which means the exemplar exceeds the stereotypical expectation (su-
percongruent). The present research investigated whether supercongruent and incongru-
ent information trigger the same kind of processes or not, and thereby aimed at broaden-
ing the knowledge about stereotype maintenance and change.  
To date, research has demonstrated that one of the main determinants whether an 
exemplar will exert influence on the over-all stereotype or not, is the perceived typical-
ity of the exemplar (e.g., Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Rothbart 
& John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984). Whether supercongruent and 
incongruent exemplars differ in perceived typicality was examined within the present 
dissertation. Self-categorization-theory has postulated that perceived typicality of an 
exemplar depends upon an intra- and intergroup comparison (meta-contrast-principle; 
Turner & Oakes, 1989). Accordingly, the similarity of an exemplar to other members of 
the same category as well as to members of contrasting categories should be involved in 
this judgement. Incongruent exemplars have been defined as deviating in the direction 
of comparison categories (Brewer, Lui, & Dull, 1981). Supercongruent exemplars can 
be defined accordingly as those exemplars that deviate in the opposite direction, away 
from comparison categories. Supercongruent exemplars should therefore be perceived 
as more typical than incongruent exemplars because the latter one share more similarity 
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with members of contrasting categories. A series of studies has been conducted to test 
this assumption.  
All of the present studies were preceded by a pre-test which assessed the average 
expectancies concerning a certain category in relation to a certain comparison category. 
Participants of this pretest were asked to express their expectancies numerically by indi-
cating expected IQ-values (Study 1, 2), or test points in competence and social compe-
tence related tests (Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6), or expected points shared in a game by their 
co-player (Study 7). Based on these data, deviant exemplars were constructed which 
either matched the expectations for the comparison category (incongruent), or deviated 
with the same amount from the prototype but in the opposite direction (supercongru-
ent).28  
The first assumption concerned with differences in perceived typicality was t-
ested and supported in Study 1, 3, 4, and 5. Supercongruent exemplars were perceived 
consistently as more typical than incongruent exemplars. Employing different kinds of 
stereotypes, with different valence and content dimensions increased the generalizabil-
ity of the finding. Study 4 furthermore supported the meta-contrast-principle by demon-
strating that even the same exemplar is perceived as typical to different degrees depend-
ing on the kind of comparison category. Still, people seem to be able to detect a devi-
ance in a supercongruent direction as soon as their attention is drawn to it. Supercon-
gruent exemplars were judged as less typical than congruent exemplars. This difference 
was especially pronounced when participants had to judge perceived deviance (Study 1) 
and when typicality was measured before the stereotype assessment, thus before they 
had the chance to assimilate their stereotype to the supercongruent exemplar (Study 5).  
Beyond differences in perceived typicality, I was especially interested in the im-
pact of these kinds of exemplars on the stereotype of their category. It has been hy-
pothesized that supercongruent exemplars should lead to more assimilation of the 
stereotype compared with incongruent exemplars. This assumption is based on two lines 
of argumentation: 1) Differences in perceived typicality should lead to different 
amounts of generalization, and 2) the general tendency to accentuate differences be-
tween groups speaks to a stronger influence of supercongruent exemplars compared 
with incongruent exemplars (accentuation theory; for a review see Krueger, 1992).  
Results of Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5 supported the assumption that stereotypes are 
more likely to change in direction of supercongruent exemplars than in direction of in-
                                                 
28 Slightly different procedures have been employed in Study 6 and 7 (e.g., no incongruent condition).  
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congruent exemplars, and that supercongruent information changes perceived differ-
ences between group whereas incongruent information does not (Study 2). Furthermore, 
Study 4 provided evidence that this asymmetry is not just due to the greater extremity of 
supercongruent information compared with incongruent information. However, results 
of the same study did not support the idea that differences in perceived typicality are 
responsible for the asymmetric impact the exemplars have. Hence, the question re-
mained, why supercongruent exemplars exert a bigger influence than incongruent ex-
emplars. Results of Study 5 and 6 contain first hints concerning this issue.  
In order to shed some further light on the underlying processes, Studies 5 and 6 
investigated the circumstances in which no assimilation to a supercongruent exemplar 
occurs. It was assumed that a supercongruent exemplar posits a quantitative deviance. 
Both exemplar and prototype share the same attributes, their difference is just a matter 
of degree. Incongruent exemplars, though, oftentimes do not possess the stereotypic at-
tribute at all. Their deviance therefore can be understood as a qualitative deviance. Pre-
sumably, a qualitative deviance is easier recognized than a quantitative deviance and 
therefore should lead to a perception of less psychological closeness between both stim-
uli (exemplar and category). According to the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler 
& Strack, 2000) a comparison that focuses on dissimilarities should follow, and lead to 
a contrast effect, whereas a comparison that focuses on similarities should result from a 
quantitative (supercongruent) deviance, which in turn should lead to an assimilation of 
the stereotype. If this assumption holds, any manipulation which draws people attention 
towards the deviance of supercongruent exemplars, should impede generalization from 
the exemplar to the category. And indeed, no generalization occurred in Study 5 and 6, 
when participants had to judge the deviance of the exemplar from the category before 
the stereotype assessment took place.  
As stereotypes often involve negative consequences, like discrimination, it is 
rather worrying to learn, that they easily get polarized. Study 7 was conducted to inves-
tigate a simple mechanism that could prevent generalization of supercongruent exem-
plars to the category. Previous research in the field of stereotype change has shown that 
additional, neutral information about an incongruent exemplar normally entails that the 
stereotype is not assimilated to the exemplar. Additional information is used in this con-
text to justify subtyping. Study 7 demonstrated a similar result for supercongruent ex-
emplars, although different mechanism might form the basis of this effect.  
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In sum, the present studies contribute to the understanding of stereotypes. Previ-
ous research dealt with the impact of incongruent exemplars. The present dissertation 
broadens that knowledge by studying the impact of supercongruent exemplars and com-
paring it to that of incongruent ones. Replicating previous research, the impact of in-
congruent exemplars was rather small within the present set of studies. Supercongruent 
exemplars, by contrast, generally led to an assimilation and thereby polarization of the 
stereotype. This process, however, does not seem to be inevitable. The present studies 
additionally provided first hints how the polarization of a stereotype due to supercon-
gruent information could be counteracted. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Angesicht einer Vielzahl an publizierten Studien zum Thema Stereotype, sollte 
man annehmen, dass das Wesen von Stereotypen und die Prozesse bei der Veränderung 
von Stereotypen relativ wohlverstanden sind. Einige Fragen sind jedoch noch immer 
ungeklärt. So wurde beispielsweise die Veränderung von Stereotypen bislang nur in ei-
ne Richtung untersucht: Wie sehr können Mitglieder einer Kategorie, die dem Stereotyp 
widersprechen (inkongruent), das Bild der Kategorie beeinflussen? Dabei haben sich 
Stereotype als relativ resistent gegenüber widersprechender Information erwiesen (siehe 
Hewstone, 1994; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Ein Grund für diese Änderungsresistenz 
könnte eine Asymmetrie in der Verarbeitung von Information sein, die von der stereo-
typen Erwartung abweicht. Inkongruente Information wird häufig als Ausnahme behan-
delt und trägt nichts zu einer Veränderung bei (z.B. Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Johns-
ton, Hewstone, Pendry & Frankish, 1994; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 
1983). Doch was passiert eigentlich wenn Exemplare, die stereotypen Erwartungen ein-
deutig übertreffen, also noch extremer sind als erwartet (superkongruent)? Wie sehr 
sind Menschen in der Lage, eine Abweichung in superkongruenter Richtung als solche 
zu erkennen? In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde untersucht, ob superkongruente 
und inkongruente Information vergleichbare Prozesse auslöst, mit dem Ziel das Wissen 
über die Aufrechterhaltung und Veränderung von Stereotypen zu erweitern.  
 Die bisherige Forschung hat gezeigt, dass eine Generalisierung von einem Ex-
emplar auf die jeweilige Kategorie vor allem dann stattfindet, wenn das Exemplar als 
typisch für die Kategorie wahrgenommen wird (z.B. Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kun-
da & Oleson, 1997; Rothbart & John, 1985; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984). 
Entsprechend wurde innerhalb der vorliegenden Arbeit zunächst untersucht, ob sich in-
kongruente und superkongruente Exemplare in ihrer wahrgenommenen Typikalität un-
terscheiden. Innerhalb der Selbstkategorisierungstheorie wurde postuliert, dass die Ty-
pikalität eines Exemplars sowohl von einem Intragruppenvergleich als auch von einem 
Intergruppenvergleich abhängt (Meta-Kontrast-Prinzip; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Dem-
nach wird die Ähnlichkeit eines Exemplars zu anderen Mitgliedern derselben Kategorie, 
als auch zu den Mitgliedern anderer Kategorien beurteilt. Inkongruente Exemplare 
wurden bereits früher als diejenigen Exemplare definiert, die in Richtung relevanter 
Vergleichskategorien vom Prototyp abweichen (Brewer, Lui, & Dull, 1981). Superkon-
gruente Exemplare lassen sich entsprechend als solche Exemplare verstehen, die in die 
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entgegen gesetzte Richtung, weg von Vergleichskategorien, abweichen. Demnach soll-
ten superkongruente Exemplare als typischer wahrgenommen werden als inkongruente 
Exemplare, denn die Ähnlichkeit zu Nicht-Mitgliedern ist bei letzteren größer. Eine 
Reihe von Studien wurde durchgeführt, um diese Annahme zu testen.  
 Allen Studien der vorliegenden Arbeit ging jeweils ein Vortest voraus, der die 
stereotype Erwartung bezüglich einer Kategorie im Vergleich zu einer anderen Katego-
rie erfasste. Teilnehmer dieser Vortests sollten ihre Erwartungen numerisch ausdrücken, 
bezüglich IQ-Werte (Studie 1, 2) oder Testwerte in Kompetenz oder Sozialkompetenz-
tests (Studie 3, 4, 5, 6), oder erwartete Punkteaufteilung in einem Spiel (Studie 7). An-
hand dieser Erwartungswerte wurden abweichende Exemplare konstruiert, die entweder 
dem Erwartungswert der Vergleichsgruppe entsprachen (inkongruent) oder in gleichem 
Ausmaß, aber in entgegen gesetzter Richtung vom Prototyp abwichen (superkongruent).  
Diese Annahme wurden in den Studien 1, 3, 4 und 5 getestet und bestätigt. Su-
perkongruente Exemplare wurden durchweg als typischer wahrgenommen als inkon-
gruente Exemplare mit derselben objektiven Abweichung vom Prototyp. Dass diesen 
Studien ganz unterschiedliche Stereotype, sowohl mit positiver als auch mit negativer 
Valenz, zu Grunde lagen, erhöht die Generalisierbarkeit der vorliegenden Befunde. Stu-
die 4 bekräftigt ebenfalls das Meta-Kontrast-Prinzip. Das gleiche Exemplar wurde in 
dieser Studie als unterschiedlich typisch bewertet je nachdem welche Vergleichskatego-
rie salient war. Menschen scheinen jedoch in der Lage, auch eine Abweichung in Rich-
tung des Stereotyps zu erkennen, wenn ihre Aufmerksamkeit darauf gelenkt wird. Su-
perkongruente Exemplare wurden in Studie 1 und 5 als weniger typisch bewertet als 
kongruente Exemplare. Dieser Unterschied trat besonders dann auf, wenn nach der 
wahrgenommenen Abweichung gefragt wurde (Studie 1), oder die Typikalität vor der 
Stereotypbewertung abgefragt wurde, bevor die Wahrnehmenden also die Chance hat-
ten, ihr Stereotyp an das superkongruente Exemplar anzupassen (Studie 5).  
 Über Unterschiede in der Typikalität hinaus interessierte mich jedoch vor allem 
der Einfluss der Exemplare auf das jeweilige Stereotyp. Es wurde vorhergesagt, dass 
superkongruente Exemplare viel eher zu einer Anpassung des Stereotypes an das Ex-
emplar führen sollten als inkongruente Exemplare. Diese Annahme gründet auf ver-
schiedenen Argumentationssträngen: 1) Unterschiede in der wahrgenommenen Typika-
lität sollten zu einem unterschiedlich starken Einfluss führen; und 2) das generelle Stre-
ben, Unterschiede zwischen sozialen Gruppen zu akzentuieren, sollte zu einem stärke-
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ren Einfluss der superkongruenten Exemplare führen (Akzentuierungstheorie, Krueger, 
1992).  
 Ergebnisse der Studien 2, 3, 4 und 5 bestätigen die Annahme, dass Stereotype 
sich leichter in Richtung superkongruenter Exemplare verändern als in Richtung inkon-
gruenter Exemplare, und dass wahrgenommene Unterschiede zwischen Gruppen sich 
durch superkongruente Exemplare vergrößern, während inkongruente Exemplare keinen 
Einfluss darauf ausüben. Ergebnisse der Studie 4 zeigen darüber hinaus, dass diese A-
symmetrie nicht nur über die unterschiedliche Extremität der Exemplare zu erklären ist. 
Allerdings weisen die Ergebnisse derselben Studie auch daraufhin, dass die unterschied-
liche Typikalität der beiden Exemplare nicht die Ursache für den unterschiedlichen Ein-
fluss ist. Da auch die Akzentuierungstheorie keine eindeutigen Aussagen bezüglich des 
Prozesses macht, bleibt die Frage offen, warum superkongruente Exemplare einen stär-
keren Einfluss ausüben. Die Studien 5 und 6 liefern hier jedoch erste Hinweise.  
 Um den Prozess genauer zu beleuchten, wurde in Studie 5 und 6 untersucht, un-
ter welchen Bedingungen keine Anpassung des Stereotyps in Richtung superkongruen-
ter Exemplare stattfindet. Es wurde angenommen, dass eine superkongruente Abwei-
chung eher als eine quantitative Abweichung aufzufassen ist. Prototyp und Exemplar 
weisen beide dasselbe stereotype Attribut auf, sie unterscheiden sich nur im Ausmaß, 
mit dem das Attribut auftritt. Inkongruente Exemplare besitzen dagegen das stereotype 
Attribut häufig gar nicht. Die Abweichung kann daher als qualitativer Unterschied auf-
gefasst werden. Vermutlich wird ein qualitativer Unterschied leichter als Abweichung 
erkannt und führt somit zu der Wahrnehmung einer geringeren psychologischen Nähe 
zwischen den beiden Stimuli als ein quantitativer Unterschied. Basierend auf dem Se-
lective Accessibility Model (Strack & Mussweiler, 2000) sollte es im ersten Fall eher zu 
einem Unähnlichkeitstesten kommen, und als Folge zu einem Kontrasteffekt, während 
man im zweiten Fall eher Ähnlichkeitstesten und damit Assimilation erwarten kann. 
Trifft diese Annahme zu, so müsste jede Manipulation, die den Fokus der Aufmerksam-
keit auf die Abweichung der superkongruenten Exemplare lenkt, eine Generalisierung 
verhindern können. Tatsächlich trat in Studie 5 und 6 keine Anpassung des Stereotyps 
an das superkongruente Exemplar auf, wenn die Teilnehmenden zuvor die Abweichung 
der Exemplare von der Mehrheit der Kategorie einschätzen sollten.  
 Da Stereotype häufig mit negativen Konsequenzen, wie Diskriminierung, ver-
bunden sind, ist es ein beunruhigendes Ergebnis, dass Stereotype sich leicht polarisieren 
lassen. Mit Studie 7 ist die Frage verbunden, ob es einfache Mechanismen gibt, die zur 
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einer Verhinderung der Generalisierung beitragen können. Aus der bisherigen For-
schung zur Veränderung von Stereotypen weiß man, dass zusätzliche, eigentlich neutra-
le Information über ein inkongruentes Exemplar, häufig dazu führt, dass das Stereotyp 
nicht an das Exemplar angepasst wird. Studie 7 zeiget einen ähnlichen Befund für su-
perkongruente Exemplare, auch wenn andere Mechanismen zugrunde liegen mögen.  
 Zusammenfassend liefern die vorliegenden Studien einen Beitrag zum Ver-
ständnis von Stereotypen. Bisherige Befunde zum Einfluss von inkongruenten Exemp-
laren auf Stereotype konnten um den Einfluss von superkongruenten Exemplaren erwei-
tert werden. In Übereinstimmung mit früheren Studien war der Einfluss von inkon-
gruenten Exemplaren in den vorliegenden Studien eher gering, superkongruente Ex-
emplare dagegen führten häufig zu einer Anpassung, und damit Polarisierung des Ste-
reotyps. Allerdings scheint dieser Prozess nicht unaufhaltsam zu sein. Die vorliegenden 
Studien liefern gleichzeitig erste Anhaltspunkte wie einer Polarisierung von Stereotypen 
entgegengewirkt werden kann. 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE  139 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
Persönliche Angaben 
Name:     Mirjam Katharina Dolderer 
Geburtsdatum:  07.04.1978  
Geburtsort:   Schwäbisch Gmünd, Baden-Württemberg 
Familienstand:  ledig 
 
Werdegang  
1984 –1988    Uhland-Grundschule, Schwäbisch Gmünd 
1988 –1997   Scheffold-Gymnasium, Schwäbisch Gmünd 
1997    Abitur 
1997 - 2003    Universität Mannheim, Diplomstudiengang Psychologie  
Sept. 2003   Diplom in Psychologie  
Okt. 2004- Nov 2004  Praktikum Filmfestival Mannheim-Heidelberg 
Dez. 2004 – März 2005 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Mikro-
soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Universität Mannheim 
April 2004 – Sept. 2004 Praktikumsinitiative „Creative Village”, Berlin 
Ab Oktober 2004 Promotions-Stipendiatin des Internationalen Graduierten-
Kollegs „Konflikt und Kooperation zwischen sozialen 
Gruppen“ 
 
 
EHRENWÖRTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG  140 
EHRENWÖRTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG 
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass mir die geltende Promotionsordnung der Fakultät für Sozial- und 
Verhaltenswissenschaften der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena bekannt ist. 
 
Ferner erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbst und ohne unzulässige 
Hilfe Dritter angefertigt habe. Alle von mir benutzten Hilfsmittel, persönliche Mitteilungen 
und Quellen sind in der Arbeit angegeben. Insbesondere habe ich hierfür nicht die Hilfe 
eines Promotionsberaters in Anspruch genommen und Dritte haben weder unmittelbar noch 
mittelbar geldwerte Leistungen von mir für Arbeiten erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Inhalt der vorgelegten Dissertation stehen. 
 
Die Arbeit wurde weder im In- noch Ausland in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form einer 
anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt. Weder früher noch gegenwärtig habe ich an einer 
anderen Hochschule eine Dissertation eingereicht. 
 
Ich versichere, dass ich nach bestem Wissen die reine Wahrheit gesagt und nichts 
verschwiegen habe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________                                                             _________________ 
Ort, Datum         Unterschrift 
 
 
